Charter 77

WWI & the Partition of the Ottoman Empire: Mandates as a Pretext for Imperial Domination

2007-11-23T19:17:00.000-08:00

This article has been published in the Binghamton (University) Journal of History: available at http://history.binghamton.edu/resources/bjoh/index.html

The article surveys the partition of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, illustrating the way in which the modern Middle East was created by the victorious parties after the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. It is the position of this paper that the boundaries were drawn not to serve the interests of the regions people, but rather served as a veiled form of imperialism for the European mandatory powers. The implications are on display in the turmoil that has engulfed the region in recent decades.

The advent of the nineteenth century found the Ottoman Empire, once a tri-continental power, faced not only with the question of decline, which was arguably no longer even a question, but with the far more daunting question of imminent dissolution. In 1856 the decaying empire was admitted into the “Concert of Europe,” thus assuring that the empire would be maintained, “tottering but intact,” at least for the time being.[1] With the rise of Germany as a great power, the Concert of Europe broke down and the continent divided into hostile camps.[2] The outbreak of war in 1914 left Ottoman statesmen with the choice of which alliance it would join. Ottoman neutrality was not an option, as neutrality made partition by the winning side inevitable.[3] Unfortunately for Ottoman leaders, they entered the war on what would prove to be the losing side. Five years later, the victorious powers divided the former empire into imperial possessions, drawing borders where they had never before existed. At this juncture, Gertrude Bell – widely recognized as one of Great Britain’s leading authorities on the Middle East, wrote to her old friend Aubrey Herbert

O my dear they are making such a horrible muddle of the Near East, I confidently anticipate that it will be much worse than it was before the war…It’s like a nightmare in which you forsee all the horrible things which are going to happen and can’t stretch out your hand to prevent them.[4]

As she wrote in April 1919, Liberals and Labourites clashed with conservatives in Britain over annexation and international supervision regarding conquered territories, while an exceedingly powerful colonial lobby struggled to assert its influence over Prime Minister Clemenceau in France. In the realm of international diplomacy, Clemenceau and British Prime Minister Lloyd George were involved in a fierce debate regarding their rival imperial interests, while both statesmen cringed at Woodrow Wilson’s calls for internationalization and “self-determination.” As these statesmen deliberated over virtually every aspect of the pending mandates, Great Britain’s promise to establish an independent Arab state fueled emerging Arab nationalism, and unrest brewed throughout the former Ottoman territories.
The cauldron of animosities which would continue to boil long after the Peace Conference resulted from empty and often conflicting wartime promises, misplaced rhetoric, and a total disregard for the people of the former Ottoman Empire. During the Paris Peace Conference, the delegates formed the League of Nations as a new means of international diplomacy in world affairs. Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter established a mandate system for societies they deemed “not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.”[5] The self proclaimed “advance nations,” were to take on the “responsibility” of “ensuring the well-being and development of such peoples.”[6] Thus, the sole duty of the British and French in their Middle Eastern mandates was “the rendering of assistance…until such a time as they are able to stand alone.”[7] Furthermore, it was required that “the wishes of the communities must be a principle consideration in the selection of a mandatory.”[8] British statesman Arthur Balfour articulated his nation’s contempt for the wishes of Arab communities in his response to Edwin Montagu’s statement “Let us not for Heaven’s sake, tell the Moslem what he ought to think, let us recognize what they do think.” Balfour replied “I am quite unable to see why Heaven or any other Power should object to our telling the Moslem what he ought to think.”[9]
British and French disregard toward the will of the former Ottoman subjects was manifested in the decisions reached at the San Remo Conference of April 1920. Tracing British and French planning on the Middle East from 1914 to the San Remo Conference illustrates the way in which the mandates system was developed to serve as a mediator both in the domestic sphere – between colonial ambitions and calls for no-annexations, as well as in the international sphere – between Wilson’s principle of “self-determination,” and British and French plans to extend their imperial empires. It is the position of this paper to illustrate that “ensuring the well-being and development” of the former Ottoman territories came secondary to guaranteeing British and French interests in the region. Consequently, the mandates fostered gross instability in the region, much of which reverberates to the present.
. . .
As the war broke out in Europe, it was not yet clear which side the Ottomans would take. Although Great Britain had been the staunchest supporter of Ottoman territorial integrity up until the war, it was unlikely that they would side with an alliance which included their historic rival, Russia. When the Ottomans joined the Central Powers in October, Allied planners began to set their sights on various prizes which they hoped to acquire by right of conquest. Russian planners had long sought a warm water port, and since 40% of all Russian exports passed through the Turkish Straits, the prospect of such an acquisition was all the more compelling.[10] The Russian Empire had also long shown interest in Palestine, for the territory contained sites holy to the Orthodox Church while Orthodox Christians in the region looked to Russia to protect their interests from the French-backed Catholics.[11] France claimed “historic rights” to the territories which include modern-day Syria and Lebanon, as a protector of both the Maronite Christian population and French investments in railroads and silk production.[12] Great Britain, for its part, aimed to maintain control over the Suez Canal, protect communications to India and ensure post-war security for British investment and trade in the region.[13]
French colonial ambitions in the region led to the founding of the Amis de l’Orient – an affiliation of various colonial lobby groups, which was renamed the Comite de l’Orient in 1914. Within its ranks, the Comite included Etienne Flandin and Georges Leygues of the ‘Syrian party’ in parliament, an association which had planed for a Lebanese uprising even before the Ottoman Empire entered the war.[14] The French colonialists became preoccupied with British actions in the Ottoman Empire, regarding them as a potential threat to French imperial interests. This preoccupation would lead France to participate in the disastrous Gallipoli campaign in April 1915.[15] Churchill’s original plan for the campaign included a British occupation of Alexandretta, touching a nerve with the French colonialists.[16] The French viewed such an action as a British attempt to gain a foot hold in the part of Asia Minor that had traditionally been regarded as part of the French sphere of influence.[17] Victor Augagneur, the French Minister of Marine, met with Churchill on 26 January 1915, agreeing to take part in the Dardanelles operation so long as Britain dropped plans to land at Alexandretta.[18] In a development indicative of the French cabinet’s lack of control over policies regarding imperial interests, Augagneur deliberately concealed the plans until 13 February. On 4 March, Russia formally demanded Constantinople, and an area on either side of the Straits, to which the British conceded almost at once. Theophile Delcasse, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, had been kept fully informed of the developments but, like Augagneur, failed to inform the cabinet in a timely fashion.[19] Kept in the dark until after the fact, the French government had no choice but to acquiesce and seek a quid pro quo, demanding Russian recognition of a French sphere of influence in Syria and Cilicia.[20]
Once the French had struck a deal with Russia, planning turned toward securing British approval of French colonial ambitions. The French consul-general in Beirut, Francois Georges-Picot, urged Delcasse that he must move quickly in negotiating with the British since the size of the British forces in the Middle East would be far greater than that of the French and thus, he argued, the right of conquest would fall far more with the British than with the French.[21] Delcasse had, in fact, attempted talks with England in March, but had found Sir Edward Grey “not very anxious to carve up Asia Minor in advance.”[22] Nevertheless, Picot was sent to the London embassy in preparation for future talks.
. . .
While the French moved to secure British acceptance of their colonial ambitions, the British were engaged in talks which promised to give control of these territories elsewhere. A series of letters known as the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, regarding an Arab uprising against the Ottomans in exchange for the promise of a future independent Arab kingdom, culminated in a fiery controversy following the Paris Peace Conference. Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt and Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, laid the framework for the British backed Arab uprising and the specific details of the future Arab kingdom in a correspondence beginning on 14 July 1915 and extending into March, 1916.
In the first letter to McMahon on 14 July Hussein proposed that the lands of the kingdom should be

Bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37 degree of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, MArdin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn ‘Umar), Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina.[23]

According to this plan the kingdom would include much of what today constitutes the modern Middle East. In McMahon’s reply on 30, August, he affirmed Britain’s desire for “the independence of Arabia and its inhabitants,” but continued that “With regard to the questions of limits and boundaries, it would appear to be premature to consume our time in discussing such details in the heat of war.”[24] On 9 September Hussein replied that “it is necessary to first discuss this point [the establishment of boundaries].” McMahon realized that Britain could no longer stall on the issue and replied “I have realized…that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance.” He then revealed the British reservation that
The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the district of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo [modern day Lebanon, Iraq, Palestinian occupied territories and parts of Syria and Jordan] cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.[25]

In addition the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad were to be under a temporary “special administrative arrangement.”[26] McMahon then guaranteed that “in the name of the Government of Great Britain…Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sharif of Mecca.”[27] In the letter dated 5 November Hussein renounced insistence on inclusion of the vilayets of Mersina and Adana but pressed to keep the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut.[28] McMahon replied on 14 December that in regards to Aleppo and Beirut, “the interests of our ally, France, are involved in them both, the question will require careful consideration and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course.”[29] On 1, January 1916 Hussein more or less acquiesced, but insisted “at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts,” adding that “it is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions.”[30]
The aforementioned letter by Hussein was the seventh in the correspondence of ten, and was the last to deal with the issue of the future Arab kingdom’s territories. The final three letters dealt solely with preparations for the uprising. The vast kingdom promised to Sharif Hussein of Mecca would be parceled away between the British and the French, leaving his sons with only nominal control of the post-war kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan.
. . .
At a meeting of the French Asian Committee (Comite de l’ Asie Francaise) on 18 February 1915, the committee abandoned its traditional policy of maintaining a sphere of influence within the Ottoman Empire, opting instead for establishing control over Cilicia and “la Syrie integrale,” a Syria which included Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan.[31] Throughout the spring and summer of 1915, other sections of the colonial party began to push for “la Syrie integral,” including the Syrian party in parliament, led by Flandin and Leygues, who presented the acquisition of Syria as a matter of national prestige.[32] As mentioned, in March 1915 Delcasse had found that Britain was not yet ready to discuss partition of the Ottoman Empire. By October 1915, however, the correspondence between Hussein and McMahon had produced a promise of an Arab uprising in exchange for an independent state. Such a promise, of course, would first have to be discussed with the French.
On 21 October Sir Edward Grey asked Paris to appoint a delegate, and Francois Georges-Picot was promptly selected by Ambassador Paul Cambon.[33] Picot had intimate ties with the French colonial movement, as his father was the founder of the Comite de l’Afrique Francaise, and his brother Charles the treasurer of the Comite de l’Asie Francaise. Therefore his appointment guaranteed that the French government’s war aims in the Middle East would be those of the parti colonial.[34] Picot was scheduled to meet with Sir Mark Sykes, a wealthy aristocrat who dabbled in British diplomacy and had traveled in the Middle East from Cairo to Baghdad.[35] At the time of their meeting, the war was not going particularly well for the Allies, the Gallipoli landings had failed and in Mesopotamia a large Indian force had surrendered.[36] British military strategists had promised Arab independence, in the hope that the Arab Revolt could harass the Ottoman forces and cause them to overextend their armies.[37] In addition, British planners believed they could use the revolt to shore up their right flank as their armies invaded from Egypt.[38] In order to begin the offensive, however, the British would be forced to divert troops and resources from the Western Front, a move which would require the approval of their ally France.[39] As Arab independence had been offered to bring the Sharif of Mecca on board with British planning, so was Sykes-Picot offered to the French.
Picot drafted his own instructions for the meeting, which the new French prime minister and foreign minister Aristide Briand approved without amendment.[40] The ambitious French demands included the whole of Syria (including Palestine, Lebanon and Mosul) as well as Cilicia in Ottoman Turkey.[41] These French claims did not originate within the government, but rather, they were those of the French colonialists. The cabinet, it appears, did not even partake in the discussions.[42] On 3 January 1916, while the Hussein-McMahon letters had just established the boundaries of a future “independent” Arab state, Sykes and Picot provisionally agreed on a partition of the territories that were simultaneously being promised to Hussein. British and French imperial wrangling as early as 1915 is indicative of the fact that their ambitions stretched far beyond ensuring “well-being and development” in the region.
While Picot’s full ambitions were not realized, he regarded the agreement as the best obtainable at the time, and French Prime Minister Aristide Briand concurred. According to the draft, direct French control was to be limited to Cilicia and costal-Syria, while the Syrian interior was to be granted to the future Arab kingdom within a French sphere of influence.[43] Furthermore, the Syrian interior would exclude the ports of Haifa and St. Jean d’Acre, which were reserved for Britain.[44] Additional British possessions would include central and southern Mesopotamia, extending down into present-day Saudi Arabia along the Persian Gulf.[45] Palestine was to be internationalized in accord with Russian claims, to which the French conceded, adding that they might move to acquire it at a later date.[46] What remained was an area which included modern-day Syria – minus access to the Mediterranean, Jordan and Mosul in northern Iraq. The aforementioned territory was to be divided into spheres of influence, France’s sphere incorporating the remnants of Syria and northern Iraq, the British zone including Jordan and south-west Iraq. The plan was approved by the respective governments in May 1916, in blatant disregard to promises made, on behalf of the British government, to the Sharif of Mecca. Hussein, oblivious to the secret pact, launched the Arab Revolt a month later.
. . .
No sooner had the British signed on to Sykes-Picot than they began to regret it. Lord Curzon cursed “that unfortunate agreement which has been hanging like a millstone round our necks ever since.”[47] Lord Curzon joined fellow hardliner Alfred Milner in Lloyd George’s War Cabinet, which took power in December 1916 and would prove to be far less accommodating to French colonial ambitions than Asquith’s government had been.[48] In March 1917 Alexandre Ribot returned as Prime Minister of France and found himself in an increasingly difficult position. The French colonialists had stepped up their pressure on the foreign ministry. As one British Foreign Office official reported “The French colonial party is at present extremely strong and active.”[49] The increased pressure came at a time when many British planners were working to dismantle the promises made by Sykes-Picot. Lloyd George, “a Liberal turned land-grabber,”[50] in the words of historian Margaret MacMillan, had already determined to “grab” Palestine.[51] On 6 April Sykes informed Picot, his former protégé, that “it would be advantageous to prepare [the] French for [the] idea of British suzerainty in Palestine by international consent.”[52]
As fears over British intentions mounted, the French colonialists continued to exert pressure on the government. In early May, Shukri Ganim founded the Comité Central Syrien, a colonial pressure group which included Georges Samne and P. Etienne Flandin.[53] On 23 May at an audience with Prime Minister Ribot, the delegation pressed for French military action in Syria and also raised the question of Palestine, presenting a petition calling for a French protectorate.[54] Pressure by the colonialists was futile, however, in light of the situation on the ground. The French army, stretched increasingly thin along the Western Front, was further demoralized by mutinies in May and June.[55] As British forces stood poised to capture the Ottoman territories, French colonialists realized the futility of pressing for revision of Sykes-Picot, an agreement which many planners on both sides regarded as obsolete. The Ottoman territories would fall to the British by conquest and throughout the summer, the colonial planning turned from revision of the agreement to preservation.
The French saw their position further weakened in November 1917 when Britain issued the Balfour Declaration, promising the Jewish people a national home in Palestine. Throughout 1917, British and Zionist goals appeared to be converging. Chaim Weizman wanted a Jewish Palestine, which he argued would need protection for some years to come.[56] The Zionists preferred British protection over American or French protection, and thus appealed to British planners who hoped Palestine could be transformed into “an Asiatic Belgium” in a strategic location protecting the vital Suez Canal.[57] This made sense to Lloyd George, who gave his blessings to the declaration, dismissing as irrelevant any French claims to Palestine or, for that matter, any claims by the people who inhabited the land. One month after the Balfour Declaration, Field Marshal Edmund Allenby led the Egyptian Expeditionary Force into Palestine, sweeping the Ottoman soldiers from the Holy Land. The French responded with a weak appeal to preserve internationalization.
. . .
While British and French imperialists battled one another for colonial possessions, a wave of anti-imperialist idealism presented a new challenge, both in the domestic sphere and on the international stage. In April 1917 the Independent Labor Party in Britain charged that “annexation of territory and people by force of arms is robbery and oppression,” and incompatible with international socialism.[58] Throughout the spring and summer of 1917 the Manchester Guardian editorialized against annexations and pushed for a new colonial policy arguing that “imperial aggrandizement” was inconsistent with Allied principles.[59] “Populations,” they argued “ought not to be bandied about without regard to their own wishes as if they were property.”[60] British Liberals and Laborites were united in calling for no annexations and internationalization of colonial affairs during the final years of the war. The Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference met in London in February 1918 and went on record demanding that “the natives of all Colonies and Dependencies must be protected against capitalist exploitation, and that “administrative autonomy should be granted to all groups sufficiently civilized, and to others a progressive participation in local government.”[61] In Great Britain, the powerful and influential coalition of Liberals, Laborites and Socialists were a force that had to be considered and their calls for new colonial policies no doubt influenced the way in which mandates were later applied.
Even in France, where the Socialists pushing against annexation were a marginal power, Cachin was able to pressure Prime Minister Ribot into stating “we repudiate all annexations” because the international climate had shifted, yet another example of an empty wartime promise.[62] Despite this slight ideological divergence, attitudes in France were such that the bulk of French opinion still favored annexations.[63]
While imperial planners were generally able to overcome domestic ideological attacks, international developments came to constitute a far greater obstacle to their objectives. With the Bolshevik rise to power in Russia following the October Revolution, Lenin became a force on the international stage. On 8 November Lenin read his Decree on Peace before the Soviet Congress, calling for an immediate end to hostilities and a peace without annexations or indemnities.[64] A few days later Trotsky began to publish the Allied secret treaties, further embarrassing the Allied governments. In London, Lloyd George, understanding the need to conciliate Labor opinion, made yet another shallow war time promise, declaring that there should be no partition of the Ottoman Empire.[65] In the United States Woodrow Wilson felt that Lenin’s Decree on Peace should have been his own.[66] Accordingly, on 8 January 1918 Wilson issued his Fourteen Points. “Wilsonian idealism” struck a blow to British and French planners alike. Wilson’s fifth point established a principle that was to be a thorn in the side of imperial planners for decades, the right of self determination. Point five read:
A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.[67]

Wilson’s twelfth point specifically extended these rights to the people of the Ottoman Empire, stating “the…nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of an autonomous development.”[68]
Gaston Domergue articulated the French colonialist response, exclaiming that “The obstacle is America!”[69] While the British were equally outraged, both sides realized the necessity of paying lip service to the principle of self-determination. In both Britain and France, imperial planners began to talk the language of the Americans. Shifting gears, Domergue argued “we need a colonial empire to exercise, in the interests of humanity, the civilizing vocation of France.”[70] In London, Curzon argued that the British ought “to play self determination for all its worth, wherever we are involved in difficulties with the French, the Arabs, or anybody else, and leave the case to be settled…knowing…that we are more likely to benefit from it than anybody else.”[71]
Masking their distaste for self determination, the British and French issued a joint declaration to the Arabs on 8 November, assuring the Arab people that the goal of their campaign against the Ottomans had been “the complete and definitive liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of indigenous populations.”[72] The sincerity of the declaration must be placed under intense scrutiny, in light of later Franco-British actions in the region.
. . .
While the public declarations by the British and French had taken a new form in light of domestic and international developments, behind the scenes the imperial wrangling continued. The winter of 1917 saw the French colonial movement receive several crushing blows. Georges Clemenceau returned to power in November 1917. His earlier career was marked by bitter opposition to colonial expansion, which now took the form of indifference, mingled with shades of contempt.[73] Clemenceau viewed the war with a single-minded concentration on the Western Front, ending any hopes of a substantial French force being deployed in the Middle East.[74] While Clemenceau ignored both his foreign and colonial ministers, the parti colonial watched as the Egyptian pound became the currency in Palestine and then in Syria.[75] Picot rushed to Palestine in an attempt to protect French interests, but Sir Edmund Allenby and his occupation forces were found to be uncooperative.[76]
In April 1918 British forces under Arnold Wilson took control of Mesopotamia. With this development British troops controlled virtually every Ottoman territory up for partition. Among the British, two schools of thought emerged about what should be done with their acquisitions. The Anglo-Indian school of thought, represented by A.T. Wilson and Lord Curzon, argued that securing the empire’s communications with India required total British control over the Middle East, unhampered by calls for any Arab state or states.[77] The Anglo-Egyptian school supported by T.E. Lawrence, Gertrude Bell and Commander Hogarth, argued that British control over empire communications should be assured by fostering the growth of Arab states with British advisors, in close alliance with Great Britain.[78]
While British actions in the Middle East continued to arouse fears about British intentions amongst the French colonialists, the British maintained an ominous silence in regard to their long term plans.[79] In the summer of 1918 the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Quai d’Orsay, warned that French public opinion would not accept that “France be deprived of benefits which were rightly hers by those who diverted their troops at the crucial moment.”[80] In similar fashion, Picot attempted to inform Sykes about the mood in France; the British refused to take Picot or the Quai d’Orsay seriously, refusing to hand over full powers to French representatives in the part of Syria promised to them by Sykes-Picot.[81]
With the decisive Allied breakthrough on the Western Front in August, the French colonialists launched a campaign to rally public support for their cause, utilizing the familiar device of national prestige. In order to placate the fears of their ally, on 30 September the British defined Picot’s rights and duties as French representative in the occupied territories and reassured the French that if Syria “should fall into the sphere of interest of any European Power, that Power should be France.”[82] The British then informed France that unfortunately, the Sykes-Picot agreement would have to be revised. Following the conclusion of hostilities, the British further asserted their position of dominance by insisting on negotiating the armistice with the Turks alone, infuriating even Clemenceau, who had claimed indifference to colonial affairs.[83]
Nevertheless, setting their differences aside, Lloyd George and Clemenceau met in December 1918, just before Wilson arrived for the Peace Conference. Under pressure from the colonial lobby, the Quai d’Orsay presented Clemenceau with a lengthy rationale for preserving Sykes-Picot, which he subsequently ignored.[84] During the meeting, of which no historical record exists, Clemenceau abandoned French claims to Mosul and Palestine; his generosity, many historians argue, was on account of promises made by Lloyd George to support French demands in Europe, particularly along the Rhine.[85]
. . .
As the Paris Peace Conference opened in January 1919, the delegates were faced with the daunting task of sorting out rival claims to the former Ottoman territories, as well as establishing the nature of the mandates system. Woodrow Wilson was the first delegate to issue a Paris Draft Covenant. In it, he described the League as “the residuary trustee with sovereign rights of ultimate disposal,” demanded approval of the mandates by the populations, gave the populations the right of appeal to the League, and gave the League “complete power of supervision and of intimate control.”[86] The draft was opposed by even the most anti-imperialist delegates. In a second draft, Wilson tried to remove some of the harshest wording, but was once again rebuked. Four days later the British delegation proposed a Paris Draft which would eventually become Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter. At a meeting of the Council of Ten on 30 January, Wilson tried to shame his adversaries and was once again reproved. The British Draft was adopted as part of the Covenant on 10 February, with Wilson’s sole contribution of the clause establishing the Permanent Mandates Commission, which provided a certain degree of League oversight regarding the mandates.[87]
Having established the mandate principle in theory, the Paris delegates turned to the more difficult task of putting it into practice. On 6 February Feisal, the son of Hussein bin Ali, and leader of the Arab revolt, called on the British to fulfill their promises from the Hussein-McMahon letters.[88] Caught between guarantees to both the French and the Arabs, Lloyd George delayed on withdrawing his troops from Syria.[89] Clemenceau, who had made numerous concessions to Lloyd George in December, was furious. He assured French President Raymond Poincare, “I won’t give way on anything any more, Lloyd George is a cheat.”[90] The deadlock continued throughout March. While the French wanted to use the mandates to claim Syria without granting Arab independence, the British wanted to use it to fulfill their promises to King Hussein and the Arabs.[91]
As the delegates stood at a stalemate, developments in other parts of the Ottoman Empire roused British planners into action. The rhetoric of self-determination had the unanticipated consequence of fueling nationalist movements in other parts of the world. Protests in Egypt turned violent following the arrest of several nationalist leaders. On 18 March, eight British soldiers were murdered and the British government reacted by imposing martial law and dispatching Allenby’s troops.[92] Likewise, in India, March and April saw huge demonstrations for independence in several major cities. On 13 April a panicked British officer ordered his troops to fire into a crowd in what came to be known as the Amritsar Massacre.[93] With the uprisings in Egypt and India spiraling out of control, Lloyd George began to realize the limits of British power.
While the British fought desperately to maintain control over Egypt and India, Feisal, upon his return to Syria in May, began to agitate for independence. More specifically, he called on Arabs to “choose to either be slaves or masters of your own destiny.”[94] British military planners warned that they would be unable to control an uprising in Syria, thus prompting Lloyd George to withdraw British troops in September and allow the French to move in.[95] With the Syrian question finally resolved, the British and French were able to move toward an agreement.
At the San Remo Conference in April 1920 the British and French awarded themselves mandates: Palestine (including Jordan) and Mesopotamia for the British, Syria (including Lebanon) for the French.[1] [96] While the Franco-British struggle for Syria had ended, the French had not yet reached an understanding with Feisal, who on 7 March 1920 was proclaimed king of Syria within its “natural boundaries” (including Palestine and Lebanon), by the Syrian Congress.[97] A similar congress, claiming to speak for the people of Mesopotamia, likewise declared independence from British rule, proclaiming Feisal’s brother Abdullah as king and demanding that the British end their occupation.[98] Following an ultimatum, French troops under General Gourard moved into Damascus on 24 July, destroying a poorly armed Arab force and sending Feisal into exile; the French proceeded to shrivel Syria’s borders while swelling those of Lebanon, thus placing thousands of Muslims in a Christian dominated state.[99]
As the French asserted control over the recalcitrant Arabs in Syria, rebellions broke out in Mesopotamia, evoking a violent British response whereby expeditions burned villages and extracted fines, while the British air-force set a new precedent in colonial domination by firing machine-guns and dropping bombs from the air.[100] Once order had been restored, British planners looked for a more cost effective way to manage their colonial acquisitions. At a conference in Cairo in March 1921, British colonial secretary Winston Churchill decided that Feisal should be given the crown of the newly created kingdom of Iraq and his brother Abdullah the crown for Transjordan, both in close consultation with British advisors.[101] Feisal was officially crowned king of Iraq on 23 August, 1921.
. . .
Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter gives the official explanation for establishing the mandates system. The mandatory powers were to assist the people of the former Ottoman Empire who “are…not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.”[102] The “advanced nations” (the mandatory powers) were to take on the “responsibility” of “ensuring the well-being and development of such peoples.”[103] Accordingly, the sole duty of the British and the French in the region was “the rendering of assistance…until such a time as they [the mandated people] are able to stand alone.”[104] Finally, it was required that “the wishes of the communities must be a principle consideration in the selection of the mandatory.”[105]
The way in which the mandate system came to be applied to the former Ottoman Empire demonstrates clearly that such justifications for establishing mandates were merely rhetorical guises for imperial ambitions. It is not difficult to recognize that the Arab people wanted a unified and independent Arab kingdom. The Sharif of Mecca made this known in his correspondence with McMahon. Furthermore, in March 1920 the Syrian Congress called for independence as well as a unified Syria, under the rule of King Feisal. These calls echoed the findings of Wilson’s commission of inquiry, the King-Crane commission, which spent the summer of 1919 traveling through the Middle East and found that an overwhelming majority of people wanted Syria to encompass both Palestine and Lebanon and that a similar majority wanted independence.[106] Furthermore, on 2 July, 1919 the Syrian General Congress at Damascus passed a resolution, which began by stating that “we ask absolutely complete political independence for Syria (a Syria including Lebanon and Palestine);” if a mandate were necessary they asked that it be the United States or Great Britain but added “We do not acknowledge any right claimed by the French Government in any part whatever of our Syrian country and refuse that she should assist us.”[107] Illustrating British contempt for the requirement under Article 22 that “the wishes of the communities must be a principle consideration in the selection of the mandatory;” Lord Balfour wrote
there are only three possible mandatories England, America, and France. Are we going ‘chiefly to consider the wishes of the inhabitants’ in deciding which of these is to be selected? We are going to do nothing of the kind. England has refused. America will refuse. So that, whatever the inhabitants may wish, it is France they will certainly have.[108]

Clearly, the mandate system was not created as a means to the ends articulated by Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter. Rather, it served as a domestic mediator between colonialists and the anti-imperialists who called for no annexations. Further, it provided a veil for imperial powers to practice a new form of colonial domination in an international community where notions of “self-determination,” began to take hold. Finally, it allowed Britain and France to control the resources, development and governance of the weaker societies on the pretext that they were helping to foster Arab independence, all while insuring continued imperial domination.

[1] In addition twenty-five percent of the oil profits from Mosul would be given to France.
[1] Donald Quataert. The Ottoman Empire: 1700-1922 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
2005), 56.
[2] James L Gelvin. The Modern Middle East: A History. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 175.
[3] Quataert, 60
[4] Margaret MacMillan. Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World. ( New York, NY: Random House, 2003), 400.
[5] Gelvin, 180-1
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] MacMillan, 380
[10] Gelvin, 177
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner. “The French Colonial Party and French Colonial War Aims, 1914-1918” The Historical Journal: Vol. 17, No. 1. (1974) http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed, October 21, 2006), 80.
[15] Andrew, 81
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Andrew, 82
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Andrew, 83-4
[22] Andrew, 84
[23] Ralph H Magnus ed. Documents on the Middle East. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969), 12.
[24] Magnus, 14
[25] Magnus, 17
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Magnus, 18
[29] Magnus, 20
[30] Magnus, 22
[31] Andrew, 82-3
[32] Andrew, 83
[33] Andrew, 84
[34] Ibid.
[35] MacMillan, 383
[36] Ibid.
[37] Gelvin, 178
[38] Ibid.
[39] MacMillan, 383
[40] Andrew, 85
[41] Ibid.
[42] Andrew, 86
[43] Andrew, 85
[44] Ibid.
[45] MacMillan, 384
[46] Andrew, 85
[47] MacMillan, 383
[48] Andrew, 94
[49] Andrew, 92
[50] MacMillan, 382
[51] Andrew, 94
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] MacMillan, 416
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ernest B. Hass. “The Reconciliation of Conflicting Policy Aims: Acceptance of the League of Nations Mandate System.” International Organization> Vol. 6, No. 4 (1952): 521-536. http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed October 1, 2006), 523.
[59] Hass, 522
[60] Ibid.
[61] Hass, 523
[62] Hass, 524
[63] Hass, 525
[64] A.J.P. Taylor The First World War: An Illustrated History. (New York, NY: Penguin Putnam Inc., 1972), 201.
[65] Taylor, 205
[66] Ibid.
[67] Arthur S. Link et al., eds.,The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 45 (1984), 536. http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/51.htm (accessed October 21, 2006).
[68] Ibid.
[69] MacMillan, 386
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Hass, 526
[73] Andrew, 96
[74] Ibid.
[75] MacMillan, 385
[76] Ibid.
[77] Hass, 526-7
[78] Ibid.
[79] MacMillan, 385
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Andrew, 103
[83] Ibid.
[84] Andrew, 104
[85] MacMillan, 382
[86] Hass, 534
[87] Hass, 535-6
[88] MacMillan, 391
[89] MacMillan, 393
[90] MacMillan, 394
[91] Hass, 530
[92] MacMillan, 402
[93] MacMillan, 405
[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.
[96] MacMillan, 406
[97] MacMillan, 407
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
[100] MacMillan, 408
[101] Ibid.
[102] Gelvin, 180
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Gelvin, 181
[106] MacMillan, 406
[107] Gelvin, 216
[108] Wm. Roger. Louis “The United Kingdom and the Beginning of the Mandates System, 1919-1922.” International Organization: Vol. 23, No. 1 (1969): http://www.jstor.org// (accessed October 1, 2006), 89.

Bibliography

Crozier, Andrew J. and A.S. Kanya-Forstner “The Establishment of the Mandates System 1919-25: Some Problems Created by the Paris Peace Conference.” Journal of Contemporary History> Vol. 14, No. 3 (1979): 483-513. http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed October 1, 2006).
Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: A History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Haas, Ernest B. “The Reconciliation of Conflicting Policy Aims: Acceptance of the League of Nations Mandate System.” International Organization> Vol. 6, No. 4 (1952): 521-536. http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed October 1, 2006).
Link, Arthur S. et al., eds.,The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 45 (1984), 536. http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/51.htm (accessed October 21, 2006).
Louis, Wm. Roger. “The United Kingdom and the Beginning of the Mandates System, 1919-1922.” International Organization: Vol. 23, No. 1 (1969): 73-96. http://www.jstor.org// (accessed October 1, 2006).
MacMillan, Margaret. Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World. New York, NY: Random House, 2003.
Magnus, Ralph H. Documents on the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969.
Taylor, A.J.P. The First World War: An Illustrated History. New York, NY: Penguin Putnam Inc., 1972. 201

Quataert, Donald. The Ottoman Empire: 1700-1922 2nd ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

The 4th Branch of the Government: A Case Study of the Media as a Government Megaphone

2007-07-04T09:51:00.000-07:00

In times of war, the media, be it in a corporate dominated state such as the United States, or a tightly controlled one-party system, such as the former Soviet Union, by and large acts as a megaphone for governmental policy. These case studies of media coverage on the crises in Poland in the early 1980s, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, utilizing primary sources, will demonstate the way in which biased media accounts can polarize public opinion in hostile nations, illustrating the importance of independent media in a time of war.

Part 1: The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Comparing the viewpoints of the world’s two most powerful nation-states; nations that had been at war politically, economically and ideologically for decades, will no doubt turn up fundamental differences in opinion. However, in comparing several articles on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (from the U.S. based New York Times, and the Soviet Union based Current Digest of the Soviet Press) one will find a common position between both sides, hoping that a new chapter to the cold war will not unfold.

The fundamental difference, however, lies in the fact that while the US blames the war in Afghanistan and Carter’s reaction, for increasing tensions; the Soviet Union feels that the return to cold war policies has nothing to do with Afghanistan, but rather, is the product of US imperialistic foreign policy.

The New York Times articles acknowledge that the Soviet action is a “brutal violation of both moral and international law”[1]; and label the arrival of troops as an attempt to protect a Marxist regime - such as moves into Hungary and Czechoslovakia[2]; as well as proposing that the Soviet’s were acting to protect oil interests in the region[3].
While the move is criticized throughout the Times articles, President Jimmy Carter’s reckless and “dangerously explosive – policy of cold war rhetoric in the Afghan crises”[4], is met with far greater alarm.

The Current Digest of the Soviet Press does not share the New York Times condemnation of their actions claiming that the Soviet Union acted on an appeal from the legitimate government of Afghanistan, based the provisions of the “Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation concluded between Afghanistan and the USSR in December 1978”[5] and that they would leave as soon as “aggression from the outside”[6] – the U.S. training and providing aid to insurgency groups within Afghanistan – came to an end. The Press appealed for understanding of the Soviet position, claiming “to act otherwise (than the present course) would have been to look on passively while a hotbed of serious danger to the security of the Soviet state was created on our southern border”.[7]

The Press claims that their actions in no way threaten the United States and that Carter, caught in an “election struggle”[8] is attempting an abrupt policy swing, citing a growing “Soviet military threat”[9], in order to instill fear in the populace and justify increased military spending.

Analysis of articles from both the New York Times and the Soviet Press illustrate that neither the American nor the Soviet media were in favor of a return to Cold War policies, but rather, were in opposition to a new wave of Cold War between the Super Powers. In his article for the Times: “Carter’s Cold War Tactic”, John B. Oakes acknowledges that the occupation of a neighboring Marxist country, by the Soviet Union, is not unprecedented; that the move has not placed America “in a state of crises”; and that Carter’s proclamation that the decision is “the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War” is true – “if we choose to make it so”.[10]

The sentiment expressed by Oakes is mirrored by the article “Arabatov Hits US Return to Cold War” that “the greatest threat to world peace, at least in the past 10 years, is posed by the US policy swing toward cold war”.[11] There is however, one fundamental difference – the statements on the “threat to world peace”. The difference in understanding the situation at hand underscores the key issue in the divergent viewpoints. In criticizing the departure from détente and improved relations, the Times articles (excluding the Shabad article) blame the Carter administration’s reaction to the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, as the threat to peace; however only the Oakes article addresses the fact that Carter is drastically overreacting to the circumstances. The Press articles claim that Carter’s move to cold war rhetoric has nothing to do with events in Afghanistan. In the article entitled “Is the US Bringing Back the Cold War” it is argued that “the national interests or security of the United States of America or of other states are not in the least affected by the events in Afghanistan” and that “all attempts to pretend otherwise are absurd…[and] are being made maliciously, for the purpose of facilitating the achievement of these states imperial designs”.[12]

The fundamental problem separating these two sides, who share relatively similar goals, is where the blame is placed. While the Times articles go as far as to blame Carter for overreacting; the Press articles go beyond criticism of Carter, blaming the system of US foreign policy as a whole, rather than any single aspect. In summing up the conflict over Afghanistan the Press noted that “If there were no Afghanistan, certain circles in the US and NATO would surely have found another pretext to exacerbate the world situation”.[13]

The Press writers substantiate their assertion by claiming that the new policy (presented as a response to the events in Afghanistan) – “a course aimed at an accelerated buildup of the military power of the US and it’s allies” was adopted “before, not after, these events”.[14] The article cites the NATO decision to increase military budgets every year over a fifteen year period; a “five year plan” of new military programs and arms appropriations; and the deployment of medium range missiles in Western Europe - no doubt a direct threat to the Soviet Union.[15] The article continues to note the pre-Afghanistan breakdowns in peace, including the US freezing of arms limitation talks, a policy of delaying the SALT-II treaty – toward arms reductions – and a policy of promoting anti-Soviet hysteria during meetings in Peking.[16] The claims that the US was the driving force toward a nuclear disaster, was further substantiated by the fact that the US aided Pakistan – under a brutal dictatorship – as it sought to develop weapons of mass destruction.[17]

While the Oakes article in the Times calls Carter’s reaction a “frantic junking of some pretty firm principles that in a calmer moment the American people might well have wished to retain”.[18] Oakes also notes the mockery of US policy by offering aid to Pakistan, “as ugly a military dictatorship as exists today and almost certainly a developer of nuclear weapons”.[19] He continues his criticism noting:

Military spending is suddenly up; arms control is down if not out; critical problems of the economy are being shoved under the rug of the military emergency. Salt is being shelved (which Carter stated) is “in the national security interest of the United States and the entire world”.[20]

Bernard Gwertzman in his Times article “Afghanistan’s Impact: A New U.S.-Soviet Freeze” notes, “the events in Afghanistan, however, did not occur in a vacuum”, noting that ties between Moscow and Washington had been strained in recent months[21] despite the Brezhnev treaty, which he noted, “now seems to be the first and most obvious victim of deterioration in relations”.[22] Gwertzman, however, views the US response as similar to previous tensions over Czechoslovakia and Hungary; and claims that the Kremlin decided that relations with Washington were so poor, that the reaction could not stand in the way of a Soviet intervention.

Clearly an ideological gap exists between the columnists for the Soviet Union and the United States. While both sides acknowledge the existence of a crises and Carter’s hard-line reaction; the Soviet leaders felt a revival of cold war politics was inevitable and was dictated by a US foreign policy pattern; while the United States attributed the crises to Afghanistan and Carter’s reaction. The fact that the US felt the crises was rooted in the Afghanistan conflict; while the Soviet’s felt the crises had nothing to do with Afghanistan, led to a complete ideological divergence. The Shabad article[23] on Moscow receiving Afghan gas, and other such articles, served only to provide a possible Soviet motivation, diverting attention from the underlying issues.

If the Soviet Union and the United States were to work toward their common goal, to ease tensions and move away from cold war politics; it was necessary to acknowledge the underlying issues between the powers. Clearly this would not to be accomplished, as the two nations failed to agree on what the real issues were. The ideological differences then, served to further complicate the goal of easing nuclear tensions, common, not only to both sides, but to the rest of the worlds inhabitants as well.

[1] John B. Oakes. “Carter’s Cold War Tactic,” New York Times, 22 January 1980, p. A21.
[2] Bernard Gwertzman. “Afghanistan's Impact: A New U.S.-Soviet Freeze," The New York Times, 1 Jan. 1980, pp: 2.
[3] Theodore Shabad. “Moscow to Receive Extra Afghan Gas: Opening of Large New Field Could Mean Double Share for Soviet,” New York Times, 4 February 1980, pp: A1
[4] Oakes, A21
[5] “Bringing Back the Cold War,” Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol XXXII, no. 2, 13 February 1980, pp: 2
[6] “
[7] “
[8] “Arbatov Hits US Return to Cold War,” Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XXXII, no. 9, 2 April 1980, pp. 1
[9] “
[10] Oakes, A21
[11] “Arbatov Hits” pp. 2
[12] “Bringing Back” pp. 2
[13] “
[14] “Arbatov Hits” pp. 1
[15] “
[16] “
[17] “
[18] Oakes, A21
[19] “
[20] “
[21] The Soviet’s would argue this was due to intentional planning by the US.
[22] Gwertzman, 2
[23] Shabad, Theodore. “Moscow to Receive Extra Afghan Gas: Opening of Large New Field Could Mean Double Share for Soviet,” New York Times, 4 February 1980, P. A1-A2.

Part II: The Crises in Poland

The crises in Poland of the early 1980’s, which began with strikes in July and August of 1980, and culminated in a declaration of Martial Law by the Polish government on December 13, 1981, was heavily covered in both the American and Soviet press. Extensive media coverage, which would ideally provide a truthful, accurate understanding of the crises, instead served to polarize U.S. and Soviet opinion on the crises through a massive, ideologically driven propaganda war. The United States argued that the Solidarity movement represented an “overwhelming majority”[1] of the Polish people acting against “brutal repression”[2] by the government; while the Soviet’s labeled the movement as “counterrevolutionary”[3] and argued that Martial Law had been declared to “safeguard public order”[4].

These exceptionally polar viewpoints certainly leave one lacking a truthful and accurate understanding of the crises in Poland. These divergent viewpoints offer a textbook example of the “war of words” that existed throughout the Cold War period. The declining Soviet Union desperately sought to preserve the power-structure in Poland, lest the Solidarity movement infect the rest of the Soviet bloc. The United States, focused on weakening the Soviet bloc, supported Solidarity in Poland. Victory for Solidarity would prove a crushing blow to the Soviet bloc, while a Soviet military invasion would play into the United States anti-Soviet rhetoric. Thus, the Soviet Union had no choice but to protection a mediocre, repressive and illegitimate regime at all costs.

The United States sensed the weakened Soviet position and took common cause with the Solidarity movement by launching a campaign of blistering anti-Soviet rhetoric. It is clear that the United States was not overly concerned with freedom or abolishing brutally repressive regimes, as is evident by U.S. policy of limiting freedom and supporting brutal dictatorships in the Middle East, South America, East Asia and the rest of the world throughout the Cold War era.

Nevertheless, the rigid Cold War framework resulted in a traditional, polarized rhetorical debate, each side attacking the others position, both sides indifferent toward establishing stability, which the people so desperately needed. Examining the United States and Soviet Union’s conflicting viewpoints on the government under the Polish Communist Party; the Solidarity movement; and the will of the Polish people, clearly illustrates that the media - the New York Times and the Current Digest of the Soviet Press - could not be relied upon for anything but a biased rhetorical attack against the interests of their respective Cold War rival.

Following the declaration of martial law by the Polish government, United States President Ronald Reagan boldly proclaimed that “freemen will not stand by in the face of brutal oppression.”[5] Martial law – “a state of war” had been declared following over a year of social upheaval, sparked by the government’s failure to abide by the Gdansk agreement it had signed. The “state of war” was declared against the “self organization” or Solidarity movement under Lech Walesa. The Soviet Press praised the declaration of martial law which they argued was instituted in the face of “anarchy” - to “safeguard public order” and “cleanse Polish life of evil”.[6]

An act of “Brutal repression”, ordered to “safeguard public order”? Clearly these descriptions, both on the declaration of martial law, were written with radically divergent agendas. The leadership of the communist party in Poland was described as both a Russian “instrument”[7] of oppression and a force defending the “constitutional foundations”[8] of People’s Poland in the face of encroachment by “class enemies”[9]. The implications are obvious. The Soviet Union had no choice but to defend the regime, as its only chance to preserve a foothold in the Eastern European bloc, short of military invasion. By defending the governing apparatus, they had no choice but to attack the Solidarity movement, which stood in opposition.

The Soviet media launched a tirade of propaganda against the movement, labeling them as “counterrevolutionaries”[10]. They are “terrorizing workers”, threatening physical violence against those who stop striking, the Soviet Press contended.[11] The accusations also included “promoting starvation”, by stopping agricultural production in order to create instability[12]; and according to “documents and materials” Solidarity leaders planned to “take repressive measures against or physically annihilate” about 80,000 members of the Polish United Workers Party.[13] One Soviet editorial even concluded that “Solidarity’s leaders were guided above all by the experience of the Nazi party and it’s storm troopers.”[14]

Naturally the United States was quick to condemn the government’s actions and take the side of the Solidarity. In an address to the nation on December 22, nine days after the declaration of martial law, President Reagan announced that the Polish people “have been betrayed by their own government”, “the men who rule them and their totalitarian allies” he continued, “fear the very freedom the Polish people cherish.”[15] Reagan argued that ten-million out of the population of thirty-six million people were members of Solidarity and taken with their families comprised an overwhelming majority of the Polish nation.[16] Thus, he concluded that “in attacking Solidarity, it’s enemies attack an entire people”.[17]

This assessment, published in the New York Times was far from that of the Soviet Press, which argued that the Polish people reacted to the “foiling of the (Solidarity) plot” with “complete satisfaction” and a “sigh of relief” from “strike terror”.[18] Public opinion, the Press noted, found that 91% of Polish citizens supported the military operations.[19] It is not necessary to further comment on these absurdly polar assessments of what the people wanted, suffice to say, an accurate description was not readily available in either the US or Soviet Press.

Perhaps the best available assessment of what the people in Poland wanted was made by Pope John Paul II who, although critical of martial law in Poland, urged renewed dialogue between the two sides.[20] The US and Soviet media, however, seemed more determined to expand the breach that had developed between Solidarity and the government, than to reconcile the two. In the process, US and Soviet relations began to deteriorate once again.

The New York Times intensified the conflict by accusing the Soviet Union of acting behind the scenes. In an article titled “Russian Attitude Toward Poland Has Changed Little Since Days of the Czars”, the Times argued that Russia used “Polish military and political leaders as it’s instruments” in order to “extinguish the flame of Polish nationalism” once and for all.[21] Reagan also attacked Soviet leadership in it’s alleged involvement, claiming martial law plans had been printed in the Soviet Union months before it’s declaration; that Soviet Marshal Kulikov – chief of the Warsaw Pact, and other senior Red Army officials were in Poland while the “outrages” were being initiated; and that the situation had been precipitated by public and secret pressure directly from the Soviet Union.[22]

The accusations in the US media were met with flat out denial by the Soviet Press, who argued that the Soviet Union was a “dependable ally and true friend” to Poland, and that the US and it’s allies were attempting to undermine the “fraternal friendship” between Poland and the Soviets, which was formed in the “joint struggle against Fascism”.[23] The Soviet’s also countered the US position by alleging US involvement in the “counterrevolutionary” activities.

The Solidarity movement was condemned as having “flowed from overseas” with “plans hatched in Washington” acting in the interest of US imperial circles”.[24] Furthermore, the Press blamed Washington for promoting destabilization in order to create further tensions to justify continuation of the arms race.[25] Following Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s declaration in Brussels that he was “concerned about the decision of martial law”, the Soviet Press responded alleging that Haig was “starting to threaten the Polish people”.[26]

The “renewed dialogue”[27] that Pope John Paul II prayed for clearly was not on the agenda for either US or Soviet planners. Rather than continuing to work toward diplomacy and improved relations or to help restore order for the people who suffered in Poland, the US and Soviet media used the crises in Poland to attack one another’s position and manipulate public opinion. The relentless media attacks illustrate how an ideological war – as the Cold War was, can be fought with words rather than weapons.

The interests of each side were made clearly evident by the media coverage of the crises in Poland. The arguments were biased and in many cases, completely contradicted that of the rival media. Thus, studying the crises in Poland in the early 1980’s, through the accounts in the US and Soviet media will perhaps illustrate the rigid doctrinal framework of the Cold War era, but will leave one with anything but a truthful and accurate account of the actual events in Poland.

[1] Drew Middleton, “Russian Attitude Toward Poland Has Changed Little Since Days of the Czars,” New York Times, 17 January 1982, p. 12.
[2] “Reagan’s Remarks on Marshal Law in Poland,” Special to The New York Times 24 December 1981, p. A10.
[3] “Poland Begins the Second Week of Martial Law,” Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XXXIII, no. 51, 20 January 1982, pg. 9
[4] “Poland Declares Martial Law,” Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XXXIII, no. 50, 13 January 1982, p. 4
[5] “Reagan’s Remarks on Marshal Law in Poland”
[6] “Poland Declares Martial Law”, p. 4 and 5
[7] Middleton, 12
[8] “Poland Declares Martial Law”, pg. 7
[9] Ibid. pg. 4
[10] Poland Begins the Second Week of Martial Law”, pg. 9
[11] Ibid.
[12] “Poland Declares Martial Law”, pg. 2
[13] Poland Begins the Second Week of Martial Law”, pg. 6
[14] Ibid.
[15] “Reagan’s Remarks on Marshal Law in Poland”, A10
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Poland Begins the Second Week of Martial Law”, pg. 7
[19] Ibid. pg. 10
[20] “Pope Denounces Polish Crackdown”, A9.
[21] Middleton, 12
[22] “Reagan’s Remarks on Marshal Law in Poland”, A10
[23] Poland Begins the Second Week of Martial Law”, pg. 6, 9
[24] Ibid. pg. 8
[25] Poland Begins the Second Week of Martial Law”, pg. 10
[26] Ibid. pg. 8
[27] “Pope Denounces Polish Crackdown”, A9.

The Cycle of War Hates and War Crimes in the Pacific Theatre of WWII

2007-07-04T09:30:00.000-07:00

In times of war, a primary tool to promote national unity and legitimize the war efforts is the dehumanization of ones enemy. Throughout modern history, the media has served as a government tool of dehumanization. This phenomena persists today, with the way Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi insurgents, Iran, Venezuela and North korea, among others, have been portrayed in the media, as well as the way the west is portrayed in these places. Such efforts create hatred for ones enemies, leading to a dangerous climate where war crimes become the norm as cycles of violence and government propaganda spin relentlesly beyond control. This study of war hates and war crimes in the WWII Pacific theatre will, I hope, demonstrate this viscious cycle.

In the WWII Pacific Theatre, as Japanese historian John Dower points out, many of the atrocities reported by both sides did occur, and the “horror, rage, and hatred this provoked on all sides was natural.”[1] The problem, Dower continues, is that:

such behavior was offered as confirmation of the innately inferior and immoral nature of the enemy–a reflection of national character–when, in fact, the pages of history everywhere are stained with cruelty and unbridled savagery.[2]

Understanding why atrocities, an inevitable consequence of war, were manifested as expressions of national character must be understood in a wider historical context. Dower concurs, arguing that the dehumanization which took place on both sides must be understood as having belonged to “webs of perception that had existed for centuries in Western and Japanese culture,” and he adds, “the atrocities were taken as simply confirming their validity.”[3]

Simply addressing the phenomenon through this lens, however, would be to ignore the tools utilized to fit these atrocities into the webs of perception: “selective reporting,” and “centralized propaganda.”[4] Returning to the question posed by Dower then, we may say that Japanese propaganda depictions of US atrocities were an attempt to take isolated, though at times recurrent, incidents and present them as consequences of the savagery inherent in the psyche of the military and population alike. This tool was utilized to convince the Japanese people and military to continue a war which, throughout the years, increasingly revealed itself as unwinnable. Likewise, the United States also used selective reporting and propagation of isolated incidences in constructing a universal American understanding of the Japanese national persona.

I would thus like to trace a path from the comparatively minor act of "collecting souvenirs" to the ultimate Allied atrocity of the atomic bombing of the civilian centers of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; illustrating, with examples from the Dower text, the role that selective reporting and centralized propaganda played in compounding atrocities. As Dower illustrates, in the Japanese war against the Anglo-Americans, atrocities and crimes of war were inherent in the webs of perceptions and fierce fighting. Selective reporting and propaganda on both sides, however, culminated in a vicious cycle where atrocities were committed on a far grander scale than seemingly anyone on either side could have imagined in 1941.

Let me begin with Dower’s contention that while the Japanese public was not completely unaware of Japanese atrocities, accounts of most massacres such as the Rape of Nanking, the Bataan Death March, and the sack of Manila “appear to have been successfully censored, and even withheld from relatively well placed individuals.”[5] Thus, “to the majority of Japanese, as to the Anglo-Americans, atrocities committed by one’s own side were episodic, while the enemy’s brutal acts were systematic and revealed a fundamentally perverse national character.”[6] Let us then, conduct our examination through this crucial frame of reference.

The first example Dower gives of Japanese propaganda which portrays the allies as the “real barbarians of the modern age” is the “mutilation of Japanese corpses for ‘souvenirs.’”[7] These atrocities did take place and were, in fact, well documented. Dower includes accounts by several American servicemen of such practices including one particularly gruesome account of a “wounded Japanese thrashing on the ground as a Marine slit his cheeks open and carved his gold-crowned teeth out with a kabar.”[8] These practices were not entirely taboo in the West, although Dower notes “it is virtually inconceivable, however that teeth, ears and skulls could have been collected from German or Italian war dead and publicized in the Anglo-American countries without provoking an uproar.”[9] To illustrate, Life magazine published a photo of an attractive blonde posing with a Japanese skull she had been sent by her fiancé.[10] As Edgar L. Jones, a former American war correspondent in the Pacific noted, this and other atrocities certainly took place on all sides, but, he adds this atrocious behavior and others were “not condoned by all or even most fighting men.”[11] The Japanese propagandists, nevertheless, took the practice and “gave it wide publicity as a revelation of the American national character,”[12] much as the diary found on a fallen Japanese soldier depicting a “good story” of the decapitation of an Allied soldier was editorialized in the New York Times as having illuminated “the real nature of our Asiatic enemy.”[13]

While these ‘revelations’ no doubt fueled the dehumanization of each respective ‘other,’ a new trend had emerged which would have far graver implications in terms of the ferocity of fighting and war crimes committed, as well as unforeseeable destructive consequences for the future. The Allies had become increasingly reluctant to take prisoners. Propaganda and selective reporting on both sides played a significant role in this trend. The American web of perception, in which racism was a prominent aspect, played a role; so too did the “rage bordering on the genocidal,”[14] which followed in the aftermath of the “treacherous” attack on Pearl Harbor. Japanese practices: “booby-trapping their dead and wounded, and using fake surrenders to ambush unwary foes,” the most notorious example being the “Goettge patrol” where over twenty marines responding to an apparent Japanese surrender were ambushed and shot or bayoneted to death, perpetuated this trend as well.[15] Nevertheless, Dower maintains that this is yet another example of “certain incidents elevated to symbolic status,” and that it was indeed a rare marine, who did not “know” the enemy through this particular encounter.[16] As a result, Allied soldiers became reluctant to take prisoners and engaged in massacres of helpless, wounded or captured Japanese, practices which were ignored, given tacit support or sometimes even ordered by allied officers;[17] behavior which, when practiced by their opponents was seen as “revealing the unique and inherent savagery of the Japanese.”[18]

Japanese propagandists utilized this Allied trend, combining incidents such as the “Slaughter on the Bismark Sea,” coupled with the Allies extreme exterminationist rhetoric like the Marine battle cry on Tarawa: “Kill the Jap bastards! Take no prisoners,”[19] and the proud title of the 41st Division under MacArthur, “the 41st didn’t take prisoners.”[20] Japanese propaganda such as Tokyo Rose’s broadcasts characterizing war in the Pacific as “no holds barred,”[21] effectively convinced the soldiers that surrender was not an option and thus served to perpetuate the very stereotypes which the allies were constructing. Although Dower gives surprisingly few concrete examples of Japanese propaganda depicting the Allies reluctance to take prisoners, he illustrates the effects in two telling examples. Dower cites a US Office of War Information report dated June, 1945 discussing a group of interrogated Japanese prisoners, 84 percent of whom claimed they expected to be tortured or killed if captured.[22] A second example is a summary OWI report citing documents pertaining to Japanese prisoners which were “full of ingenious schemes devised by POWs to avoid being shot while trying to give themselves up,” due to the fact of “surrender being made difficult by the unwillingness to take prisoners” on the part of the allies.[23]

Dower suggests that despite popular notions of loyalty to the emperor, mass frenzy and fear of ostracism at home being the purported reasons why the Japanese did not surrender, the
understanding that surrender was not an option, true in some cases, a manifestation of propaganda in others, was likely the pivotal reason. Allied propaganda utilized this stereotype of the Japanese “willingness to accept incredible casualties” and convinced their camp, planners, soldiers and civilians alike, that the Japanese were an enemy which “not only deserved to be killed, but had to be.”[24] The consequences are well known. Although the Allies had harshly condemned Japanese bombings of civilian targets in China, American and British planners had, in secret, discussed the prospect of bombing enemy cities months before Pearl Harbor, however they feared a public reaction “detrimental to the postwar development of the air forces.”[25] By the time Japan surrendered, sixty-six cities had been bombed, including the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, an estimated 400,000 civilians were killed, “scorched and boiled and baked to death,” and yet “there was scarcely a murmur of protest on the home front,” Japan had merely “reaped what it had sowed.”[26] The escalation from the inevitable atrocities of war, to some of the fiercest fighting the world has seen, and the culmination of “nuclear destruction against two virtually defenseless cities,”[27] was by and large a consequence of selective reporting and propaganda on both sides; atrocities took place, were propagated as universal and in turn, fueled further atrocious behavior to be utilized again, culminating in a vicious cycle. War hates and war crimes in the Pacific theater between the Allies and the Japanese can not be understood outside of this framework. As Professor Bix often deals with comparative history, I would like to close in saying that with the nature of tensions between the United States and the Islamic world today, these lessons on the effects of language in times of war may indeed prove pertinent.

End Notes:

[1]. Dower, John W. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York, NY:
Pantheon Books, 1986. 72
[2]. Dower, 72
[3]. Ibid.
[4]. Dower, 73
[5]. Dower, 61
[6]. Ibid.
[7]. Dower, 34
[8]. Dower, 65
[9]. Dower, 66
[10]. Dower, 65
[11] Dower, 64
[12]. Dower, 65
[13]. Dower, 51
[14]. Dower, 36
[15]. Dower, 64
[16]. Ibid.
[17]. Dower, 66-67
[18]. Dower, 66
[19]. Dower, 68
[20] Dower, 69
[21] Ibid.
[22] Dower, 68
[23] Ibid.
[24] Dower, 52
[25] Dower, 40-41
[26] Ibid.
[27] Dower, 34

A Comparative Analysis of Lynne Viola’s Monographs on Collectivization in the Soviet Union

2007-07-04T09:14:00.000-07:00

The drive to collectivize Soviet agriculture, an integral aspect of Stalin's First Five Year Plan revolution, was about more than agricultural production. As this comparative analysis of Russian historian Lynne Viola's monographs on collectivization will illustrate, collectivization defined the true dynamics of the Soviet revolution, which came to be defined less by class warfare, than by a civil war between city and countryside, worker and peasant. Under the auspicies of the dictatorial vanguard, a people's revolution was transformed into rule by a tyrannical, one-party state. The collectivization drive also had longstanding implications for the Soviet state, and is key to capturing the true dynamics of the 1917 revolution. Understanding the dynamics of the revolution is important, not only to the Russian historian, but to society at large, as communism and socialism have been discredited in the popular discourse based on the failure of the USSR which, I also hope to demonstrate, did not constitute a communist entity in virtually any sense of the word.

A Comparative Analysis of Lynne Viola’s Monographs on Collectivization in the Soviet Union

Viola, Lynne. Peasant Rebels Under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Viola, Lynne. The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987.

The campaign to collectivize agricultural production in the Soviet Union, a vital component of Stalin’s First Five-Year Plan revolution, marked a period of fundamental transformation for all realms of Russian society. In the countryside, the drive for wholesale collectivization constituted a full-scale assault on peasant culture, autonomy and subsistence. Indeed, to many peasants Soviet power and the collectivization campaign were synonymous with the antichrist and the advent of apocalypse. In the cities, collectivization was seen as a new front - a war against kulak saboteurs, endemic hunger, Russian backwardness and capitalist encirclement. The campaign was to be the final surge in realizing the utopian vision of the Communist revolution. For the Soviet regime, the collective farm was to be an instrument of state control, guaranteeing the procurement of grain while extending political and administrative control over the countryside to the detriment of peasant culture and autonomy.[1]

Russian historian Lynne Viola – the first Western scholar granted access to the Soviet state archives on collectivization, has prepared two English language monographs on the collectivization campaign: The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization (1987) and Peasant Rebels Under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (1996). Although the Russian Revolution has been widely portrayed in the Marxist context of class struggle, Viola argues that notions of class conflict served to veil the true dynamics of the revolution – a struggle between town and countryside, state and peasantry, modernity and “backwardness.”[2] Collectivization marked the culmination of this struggle, as the dictatorship of the proletariat launched an “all-out attack” in an attempt to transform the peasantry into a “cultural and economic colony.”[3]

While firmly condemning the state’s brutal assault on the countryside, Viola is critical of the emphasis Western-scholarship has placed on “high-politics,” and the tendency of simply “fixing blame” rather than “understanding the historical process and the actors who participated in the process.”[4] Viola quotes the late E.H. Carr who observed that much of Western historiography on the Soviet Union “has been vitiated by this inability to achieve even the most elementary measure of understanding what goes on in the mind of the other party…History cannot be written unless the historian can achieve some kind of contact with the mind of those about whom he is writing.”[5] Rather than engage in wholesale condemnation of what she describes as “one of the twentieth century’s most horrific episodes of mass repression,” Viola presents collectivization through the vantage of both worker and peasant in an attempt to capture the underlying dynamics of the campaign.

The Best Sons of the Fatherland provides a case study of the 25,000ers, a cross-section of the urban social base of the Stalin revolution. The 25,000ers were mobilized in December of 1929, as the violence and “dizziness” of the collectivization campaign reached a crescendo in the Soviet countryside. This particular group of workers, which Viola argues represent a significant portion of the working-class, were urbanized, hereditary proletariat with long factory tenure and records of service to the party and state.[6] In addition, many of these workers had participated in the “formative experience,” of the civil war which provided the “revolutionary myths and traditions” that Stalin would call upon during the mobilization.[7] Viola presents the 25,000ers as a vehicle to explore the dynamics of collectivization through an “on-the-scene angle of vision,” in order to illuminate the actual process of collectivization and how little Moscow’s intentions corresponded with the realities on the ground.[8] In doing so, Viola attempts to illustrate that Stalin’s “revolution from above” had a significant support base among the working class.[9] Thus, “understanding the motivations, perceptions and behavior of the cadres is necessary to analyze both the process of policy implementation and the often tragic consequences of both the policy and the process.”[10] Together with an examination of the political and social profile of the cadres, Viola seeks to “resurrect the mentality of the times,” as the brutal legacy of the 1930s has altered the “historical recollection” of the “optimism, excitement, and revolutionary militancy of the First Five-Year Plan revolution.”[11] While this atmosphere is often dismissed as artificial, or attributed to a few fringe elements or utopian dreamers, Viola argues that there was in fact a significant core of “true believers” whose mentality not only shaped the drive to collectivize agriculture but “preconditioned the country for the events of the 1930s.”[12] Thus, Viola examines the campaign of the 25,000ers in order to “achieve some kind of contact with the mind of those about whom [she] is writing,” in this case, the rank and file cadre worker in the midst of the collectivization campaign.

While The Best Sons of the Fatherland presents the collectivization campaign from the vantage of the worker, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin examines the attitudes, beliefs, behaviors and actions which formed a peasant “culture of resistance” against the brutal policies of the collectivization campaign.[13] Viola uses resistance as a prism to understand peasant consciousness, arguing that resistance allows the peasant to “speak out loud,” and thus grants a voice to an otherwise inaccessible sector of society.[14] Besides serving to complement her previous work on collectivization, Viola’s sequel aims to challenge the traditional image in Western scholarship of the “passive and inert Russian peasant,” as well as Sheila Fitzpatrick’s contention that the peasantry accepted collectivization “fatalistically.”[15] Ultimately, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin seeks to “understand something of the politics of the revolution by understanding the politics of the countryside during the climax of the revolution,” since Viola maintains the primary aspect of contention was never class, but rather city vs. countryside, state vs. peasantry.[16] In order to illustrate this dynamic, Viola focuses the study on the “circulatory of response and effect” between peasant actions and state policy.[17] Viola admits that due to the nature of sources, she must view peasant resistance through the lens of the state.[18] This does not detract from the study, however, as Viola utilizes the nature of the sources to examine the “official discourse” – “the language and mentality that transformed the peasantry into enemies.”[19] Finally, the study examines the consequences of peasant resistance for both the peasantry and the state.

I will now shift to a more in depth summary of Viola’s monographs, focusing on the evolution of her primary assertions. I will then demonstrate that within the context of collectivization as civil war, Viola’s ability to understand and articulate the mindset of each opposing side allows the reader to step back from the endemic brutality and understand the historical and social circumstances that served as a backdrop for the Stalinist revolution.

Viola opens The Best Sons of the Fatherland with a discussion of the civil war years, which served as a “formative experience” that would prefigure the behavior of workers and the state during the crises period of the late 1920s.[20] Lenin proclaimed that the rural-bourgeois were using grain “as a political weapon against Soviet power,” and workers were mobilized to procure grain for the urban base.[21] Although fierce peasant resistance ultimately forced a retreat, the war scare of 1927, combined with endemic food shortages reignited the civil war mentality among the urban-workers.[22] With Stalin’s calls for “extraordinary measures,” the rural officialdom launched the collectivization drive, and, understanding the need to exert central control over the process, the Central Committee passed a resolution authorizing the mobilization of the 25,000ers in November, 1929. Manipulating the radical, militant, revolutionary atmosphere the war scare and grain procurement crises had provoked among urban cadres, the state was able to mobilize the 25,000ers with resounding success.[23]

The success of the recruitment drive should not be overlooked, for as Viola illustrates “there was little material incentive for a skilled worker to leave his factory and share in the trials and tribulations of the collective farmer.”[24] Western scholars often attribute the high levels of success to coercion, but Viola dismisses this claim, arguing that state policy and workers interests overlapped on the issue of collectivization.[25] This of course was due in part to the success of the state in portraying collectivization as the solution to the “grievances, fears, and needs of a part of its working class.”[26] Understanding the political and social origins of these cadres, as well as the atmosphere in which they were mobilized, is significant not only to our comprehension of the collectivization campaign, but also to our understanding of the “social underpinnings of the Stalin revolution,” as these workers would come to dominate the party and state bureaucracies throughout the 1930s.[27]

Having established the historical circumstances surrounding the worker-cadres in question, Viola turns to the onset of the campaign, highlighting the disparities between central policy and implementation in the rural countryside. The 25,000ers arrived in late-January and early-February 1930 amid the frenzied drive to collectivize.[28] Upon arrival in the countryside, the disorder of the campaign became apparent, as hostile local officials had received no instructions for the newly dispatched workers.[29] Indicative of the bureaucratization that plagued the Soviet Union throughout its existence, some 19 different agencies were responsible for certain aspects of the 25,000ers campaign.[30] “Everyone was responsible but no one assumed responsibility,” Viola adds cynically.[31] It was not until March, following the retreat and consequent purge of rural officialdom that the 25,000ers, often the beneficiaries of the vacant positions, were able to settle in and begin to consolidate power.[32] The disorder of the campaign in the first months serves as a microcosm of the reigning disorder plaguing rural administration during the frenzied drive to collectivize.[33] While Moscow presented an image of total control, Viola argues “the center was both all-powerful and completely helpless.”[34]

Collectivization was initiated to undermine the old order, modernize agriculture, create reliable grain collection, facilitate a cultural revolution, and build a new administrative base in the countryside.[35] Not only had the local officials failed to create something new, but the violent force employed had severely disrupted the agricultural foundation.[36] The 25,00ers were left to “pick up the pieces after the destructive interference of district cadres.”[37] The March retreat, however, was more about reclaiming central control than stopping excesses, although there was some fear of a massive peasant uprising.[38] Placing blame on rural officials also held the innate assumption that central policy had been correct and realistic, and with better leadership might well have been successfully implemented.[39] As the 25,000ers would come to find, however, such assumptions did not hold true when faced with the realities of the Russian countryside.

With the 25,000ers finally settled into the newly vacated positions as collective farm heads and rural officials, the “constructive phase of the socialist transformation of the countryside” was set to begin.[40] For many of the 25,000ers, “collectivization was much more than simply a struggle for grain,” it was a revolution aimed at forever destroying the antagonisms dividing city and countryside by rooting out the “idiocy of rural life.”[41] The directives were to come from the center as well as from the cadres own factory experience, however it soon became apparent that a third factor would play a decisive role in shaping the formation of the collective farm as well.[42] Bringing the “proletarian experience” to the countryside - the organization of piecework, wage scales, labor discipline, production conferences, shock work, and socialist competition - meant an entirely new form of life and labor, one that necessarily entailed the destruction of traditional means of farming and led to a direct clash between two disparate cultures.[43] The peasantry responded with numerous forms of active and passive resistance and the 25,000ers were forced to balance the factory experience and directives from the center with traditional peasant norms. Ultimately, the collective farms that were most successful were those that interfered least with peasant traditions.[44] By 1932 the state was forced to accept a socialized agriculture which combined elements of old and new to varying degrees.

On 23 December 1931, the Central Committee issued a decree coinciding with the conclusion of the First Five-Year Plan revolution which instructed regional and district organs not to retain those 25,000ers who wished to return to the factory.[45] Although the First Five-Year Plan had been a relative success, the realities of rural Russia had led to a loss of revolutionary momentum.[46] Consolidation and gradualism became the new order of the day.[47] Many of the cadres, increasingly isolated from the revolution, the working class, and the factory, returned to the city.[48] Despite the hardships and loss of revolutionary momentum, some 18,000 of the original 27,000 cadres deployed in the 25,000er campaign served until the end. The relative success of the campaign, as well as the dedication of the workers illustrated the strong social foundations upon which the Stalinist revolution was built.[49] It was these same workers - activists, party members, highly skilled workers and civil war veterans that would rise up through the party and state bureaucracy to replace the cadres purged in the 1930s.[50]

The workers took a leading role in the construction of the collective farm system, helping to establish a basic structure that would remain by and large unchanged throughout the Soviet period.[51] The irony of the revolution in the countryside is that its outcome was directed less by the center than by the “undisciplined and irresponsible” activities of rural officials and the experimentation of the collective farm leaders (25,000ers) who attempted to pick up the mess.[52] The experience of the 25,000ers was indicative of the gap between Moscow’s intentions and the actual implementation of policy.[53] The state ruled by decree but did not have the proper organizational infrastructure or manpower to ensure proper implementation.[54]

Like The Best Sons of the Fatherland, Viola begins Peasant Rebels Under Stalin with a discussion of the civil war. The brutalizing legacy of years of war, revolution and civil war created a party determined to wage what Lenin called “the last and most decisive battle.”[55] Foreshadowing the mind-set of the late 1920s, in May 1918 Lenin declared that anyone with surplus grain, regardless of social status would be regarded as “enemies of the people.”[56] In order to justify the contradiction, Lenin cited a “kulak mood [that] prevails among the peasants.”[57] Any anti-party activity could be labeled as kulak activity, therefore peasant revolts against grain requisitioning became kulak revolts against the people.[58] It is important to establish this precedent, as the official discourse was used to dehumanize the peasantry, thereby making repression and violence permissible.

The smychka of the mid-1920s was short-lived, as the grain procurement crises – partially created by Soviet pricing policies, was interpreted in the city as a “kulak grain strike,” igniting a civil war-like mood and mentality.[59] Collectivization and dekulakization campaigns began in the summer of 1929, jumping the rails of central control and creating an escalating cycle of violence.[60] In the countryside the party and the collective farm came to be viewed in apocalyptic terms, declaring them to be “tools of the antichrist,” while in the town the peasantry became a “parasite, able and willing to hold the town hostage.”[61] Poor and middle peasants who “rebelled” were deemed podkulachniki, literally “under the kulak” or agents of the kulaks.[62] Despite the clear political and social aims of peasant rebellion, the kulak lost all political agency and was deemed a “terrorist,” “bandit” or “arsonist.”[63] While hostile actions by the peasantry were demonized, atrocities committed by the state or its agents “became mistakes, deviations, or excesses committed by cadres who were “dizzy from success” rather than by criminals or savages.”[64]

With collectivization and dekulakization came a wholesale assault on peasant culture as well. Churches were closed, bells were removed and priests were arrested.[65] Other cultural institutions and social spaces were also targeted such as agricultural markets, the peasant commune, the skhod (peasant council), mills and shops in order to eliminate key grounds for meeting and interaction.[66] Community leaders such as priests, intelligentsia, village elders, craftsmen, traders and shop-owners were targeted as well.[67] It is against this repressive backdrop that Viola condemns collectivization as internal colonization, both economically and culturally.[68] In response, peasants of every social-stratum united behind their common culture, forming a culture of resistance rooted in biblical notions of the apocalypse.[69]

Rumors, ever-present among peasantries during times of fear and upheaval “spread like wildfire throughout the [Soviet] countryside.”[70] Rumors of the return of serfdom, the coming of the apocalypse and the imposition of the “common blanket,” were all used as weapons “in the arsenal of peasant resistance.”[71] The apocalyptic tradition was used to delegitimize collective farms and the state that backed them as many peasants argued that to join the collective farm was to be stamped with the mark of the beast.[72] “Tales of moral abomination in the collective farms served as metaphors for the amorality, atheism, and evil of communism,” while rumors of the return of serfdom implied a betrayal of the revolution.[73]

Another non-violent tool in the arsenal of peasant resistance came in the form of collective and individual forms of self-help. Razbazarivanie, or Luddism - the “squandering,” destruction or sale of livestock, machinery and crops was utilized for the purpose of self-dekulakization, protest and/or sabotage.[74] A collective form of self-help was community defense, as peasants across the countryside declared “we have no kulaks here.”[75] Some peasants even went so far as to boycott the sale of expropriated properties in a demonstration of solidarity.[76] The long-standing tradition of peasant complaint through letters and petitions also remained strong, despite the fact that petitioning could bring charges of counterrevolutionary activity.[77] Forms of collective resistance both undermined and enhanced Stalin’s revolution in the countryside, undermining it through vast destruction and opposition, while enabling him to “kulakize,” and therefore wage war against, the entire countryside.[78]

As state policies continued to back the peasant into a corner, however, violence was increasingly seen as the sole recourse to state repression.[79] Violence had always been a last recourse for peasants, however forced to resort to such measures, they played into the state image of terror, becoming “kulaks with sawed-off shotguns,” in the official discourse.[80] Terror served as both a threat, as well as retribution for anyone who might break from the village community.[81] Arson, known as the “red rooster,” was also a powerful tool, as it could be portrayed as an accident by the perpetrators, and consequently accidental fires could be portrayed as arson as well.[82] Peasant summary justice (Samosud), part of a traditional and brutal form of peasant justice, could take the form of beatings, burning, drowning or even the murder of one’s family.[83] While peasant terror was indeed dangerous to the state, it also served to “sustain the violent momentum of the state’s campaign and to rationalize the repression of the peasantry.”[84]

The cycle of state repression and peasant violence reached a crescendo in March of 1930, a period described as “March fever,” in an attempt to cast it in a pathological light.[85] March fever was marked by a sharp increase in mass disturbances often with women assuming the leading role as the men waited on the sides, armed, waiting for the outbreak of violence.[86] Women’s riots (bab’i bunty) may in fact have been the “dominant mode of active protest in the peasant culture of resistance during collectivization.”[87] Women understood that they had little chance of being punished, as the state designated them as “irrational,” and thus apolitical.[88] Viola argues that these riots were often in response to “generic” peasant concerns including threats to subsistence, the village ethos of collectivism or symbols of village culture and tradition.[89]

The “March fever” of 1930, however “represented the last real wave of active resistance on any large scale, the final open, collective act in the peasant civil war against Soviet power.”[90] There was much less resistance to the Fall collectivization campaign, as the peasantry was already “too exhausted by food shortages and state repression to continue active collective resistance.”[91] By the end of 1930 peasant resistance entered a new phase under the official rubric of tikhaia sapa - “on the sly,” “a quiet or stealthful undermining or weakening of foundations.”[92] This form of resistance included refusal to work, foot dragging, dissimulation, pilfering, flight and sabotage as the peasants struggled against those who sought to extract labor, food, taxes, rents, and interests from them.[93] Such forms of resistance had been deeply ingrained from the earliest days of serfdom and into the Soviet period.[94] These forms of resistance would continue to varying degrees throughout the Soviet period. In 1935 the Model Collective Farm Statute fully legalized private plots, ensured the inviolability of private property and even allowed the use of collective farm horses - at a price - for private usage.[95] The state understood they would have to accept certain realities of the countryside and settle for “just” taking grain, rather than completely re-socializing the peasant colony.[96] While the peasantry did not emerge triumphant, resistance had maintained the cohesiveness and durability of the peasantry as an “autonomous social formation.” Peasant resistance to state repression had led to an uneasy truce between city and countryside with consolidation and compromise extended from each end of the spectrum.

The grain procurement crises combined with the war scare in the late 1920s struck a death blow to the uneasy alliance (smychka) between worker and peasant. In the urban sphere, chronic unemployment, housing problems and a lack of material benefits combined with the food supply crises and the reintroduction of rationing to plague urban workers.[97] Stalin successfully presented the shortcomings of the state as products of internal sabotage and argued that collectivization “as an integral part of industrialization and the resolution of food supply problems, was of immediate interest to the working class.”[98] The peasantry, meanwhile, saw intrusion from Soviet power as the advent of the apocalypse, the return of serfdom, the onslaught of amorality and/or a direct threat to their very means of subsistence. Resurrecting the mentality of the times, understanding the escalating cycle of violence and placing collectivization within its proper historical context, Lynne Viola, in her complementary monographs, is able to instill a degree of empathy for both the worker and the peasant as they engaged in a brutal civil war.

Nevertheless, while Viola’s monographs excel in accessing the mind-set of the workers, peasants and central authorities, they fail to offer the reader a sufficient understanding of why the rural officialdom acted as it did. While offering explanations, though not necessarily justifications, for the actions of the other major players, Viola fails to provide access into the rural officialdom and thus, perhaps inadvertently, fixes much of the blame for the “excesses” of the collectivization campaign upon them. Perhaps a third study on collectivization from the vantage of the rural officialdom would serve to complement the reader’s understanding of the “historical process and the actors” – in this case the local officials – “who participated in the process.”

[1]Viola, Lynne. Peasant Rebels Under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of
Peasant Resistance. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996., vii
[2] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, viii
[3] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, vii
[4]Viola, Lynne. The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987, 5
[5] Ibid.
[6] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 6, 34
[7] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 9, 16
[8] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 5
[9] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 6
[10] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 5
[11] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 6
[12] Ibid.
[13] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 4
[14] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 4-5
[15] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 4
[16] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, viii
[17] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 11
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 9
[21] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 10
[22] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 26-7
[23] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 25
[24] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 56
[25] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 53
[26] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 72
[27] Ibid.
[28] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 74
[29] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 79-80
[30] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 87
[31] Ibid.
[32] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 88
[33] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 89
[34] Ibid.
[35] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 91
[36] Ibid.
[37] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 104
[38] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 114
[39] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 115
[40] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 152
[41] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 153
[42] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 154
[43] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 161
[44] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 160
[45] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 179-80
[46] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 180
[47] Ibid.
[48] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 186
[49] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 211
[50] Ibid.
[51] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 215
[52] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 216
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 15
[56] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 16
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 21
[60] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 28
[61] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 30-1
[62] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 34
[63] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 36
[64] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 37
[65] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 39
[66] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 40-1
[67] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 41
[68] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 44
[69] Ibid.
[70] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 45
[71] Ibid.
[72] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 55-6
[73] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 59
[74] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 68
[75] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 88
[76] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 90
[77] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 91, 93
[78] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 99
[79] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 100
[80] Ibid.
[81] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 101
[82] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 121-2
[83] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 127
[84] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 130
[85] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 132
[86] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 154-5
[87]Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 197
[88] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 204
[89] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 155
[90] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 176
[91] Ibid.
[92] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 205
[93] Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 206
[94] Ibid.
[95]Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 232
[96] Ibid.
[97] The Best Sons of the Fatherland 24-5
[98] The Best Sons of the Fatherland, 27

The United States of America and the People’s Republic of China: A Comparative Analysis of Economic Performance and Governmental Policy (1986-2006)

2007-07-04T08:59:00.000-07:00

Introduction

Politically, economically, socially, culturally and historically the discrepancies between the United States and China are immense, yet as of 2007 these disparate states have emerged as the world’s dominant economic powers. Tracking the changes in each respective nation’s economic performance over the past twenty-years (1986-2006), the role of the government and governmental policies, and the trends for the future is a daunting task. Indeed, the immense complexity inherent in a discussion of political-economic systems in an increasingly “globalized” world market presupposes the fact that that the author will be forced to resort to mild generalities. Nevertheless, in addition to an investigation of the political-economic trends over the past twenty-years, I hope to incorporate historical circumstance and the role of ideology in shaping governmental policy, as well as to frame the discussion within the context of what Professor and Chair of Development Sociology at Cornell University, Philip McMichael calls “the globalization project,” (1980-present). Thus, I will not neglect the ideology of Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedmen that gave birth to the “neoliberalism” which has shaped the current world economic framework and transformed the US and China from their respective Keynesian and centrally planned economic systems, into the economic backbone of a neoliberal capitalist world order.

I will begin with a brief historical sketch of the political economic development of China and the United States from the conclusion of the Second World War to the mid-1980s, in order to contextualize the discussion. Once a backdrop has been established, I will move to a more in-depth study of economic development and governmental policy in each respective nation over the past twenty-years, arguing that while the political-economic developments of the respective nations took starkly different forms, each served to fill a niche within a structurally cohesive world framework. Upon completing the aforementioned discussion, I will highlight the most dominant trends, and close with a discussion of what the future may entail for the political and economic evolutions of each respective state.

China: Brief Political-Economic History

The long and storied history of Chinese civilization, which dates back more than six millennia, is a strong source of pride for modern Chinese citizens.[1] By the mid-Nineteenth Century, however, the once great and prosperous imperial order came under siege from Western penetration and domestic unrest. In 1911 the Qing dynasty fell, and the next four decades were marred by civil war and imperial overtures by Japan which culminated in a full scale invasion with massacres bordering the qualification of genocide. With the capitulation of Imperial Japan in the summer of 1945 the fleeting and volatile alliance between Chinese communist and nationalist armies collapsed and the nation once again descended into civil war. By 1949 the nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek had retreated to Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established under the leadership of Mao Zedong and the elite vanguard of the communist party-state.

In 1950 the PRC conducted a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union and utilized the limited Soviet aid to develop heavy industry through planning agencies of the centralized bureaucracy.[2] In order to fund the project, Mao pressed China’s 600-million peasants to pool their land holdings into small cooperative farms, followed by full collectivization under government control.[3] In 1958 the process of collectivization was accelerated by the “great leap forward,” an ambitious plan to make China the industrial equal of the West within 15-years. The party set impossibly high quotas for agricultural output, leading lower-echelon officials to exaggerate output figures, and culminating in a false belief of high agricultural production.[4] An overestimation of surplus, an exhausted and under-compensated agricultural workforce and extreme weather (drought in some areas, flooding in others) begot one of the worst manmade famines in history. From 1959-62, the devastating famine cost an estimated 27-million lives.[5] In the wake of the disastrous famine, Mao retreated from public view (though he remained party chairman) and many of his radical policies were eased as the government shifted industrial policy toward the production of consumer goods and allowed farmers to market portions of their crop yields.[6] The period of moderate government policies was short-lived, as Chairman Mao reemerged from isolation in the mid-1960s and launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution – targeting moderate party-members such as Deng Xiaoping; attacking traditional values of Chinese culture; and creating an atmosphere of intense factional fighting. By 1967 the government had all but ceased to function and the country was fraught by a state of near-anarchy.[7] Mao, unable to control the chaos, disbursed the army to restore order and reinstated many of the party-moderates who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution.

In the early 1970s a debate ensued regarding succession of the ailing party-chairman. The heightening of tensions with the Soviet Union over border disputes and the historic visit by American President Richard Nixon in 1972 (one of the first steps toward the normalization of Sino-American relations) might have signaled the direction China would ultimately take, yet at the time of Mao’s death in 1976 the struggle for power between party radicals and economic modernizers had not been resolved. By 1978 a rehabilitated party-leader and proponent of economic modernization, Deng Xiaoping emerged as China’s paramount leader and the government initiated an incremental process of economic reform, creating a system which would later be referred to as a “socialist market economy,” or “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The rise of Deng Xiaoping and the economic modernizers constituted a fundamental shift in China’s political economic development, and is crucial to our discussion of Chinese economic performance from 1986-2006.

The fundamental priority shift in 1978 was based on 2 key tenets, first, economic growth was to be the vehicle in constructing Chinese socialism; and second, stability and the maintenance of domestic order would be necessary to achieve economic growth. From 1978-1984 Deng’s economic policies can broadly be described as economic “liberalization.” The government dismantled the commune system and allowed peasants to produce food for the market; established an “open-door” policy for trade and investment, particularly through the establishment of “Special Economic Zones” (SEZs); and inaugurated massive construction projects to develop infrastructure.[8] The process of economic reform was coupled with political liberalization, including the reversal and rehabilitation of the victims of Mao’s Cultural Revolution; the introduction of legal procedure and equality before the law; the end of hostilities toward intellectuals and private entrepreneurs; a redesigned education system; the removal of all class and political designations; and the articulation of “officially acceptable” forms of political participation, (while still cracking down on “officially unacceptable” forms, which might undermine the tenet of promoting stability).[9] I should add that while these policies were a radical divergence from those pursued under Mao, they were implemented (and continue to be implemented) incrementally. Understanding the historical evolution of the Chinese political economic system is fundamental to our discussion of Chinese economic performance from 1986-2006.

Having established the context for our discussion of Chinese economic performance, I will now turn to a discussion of the political economic history of the United States from the Second World War to the onset of the period in question. Through this exercise in comparative history, I hope to instill a sense of the vast disparities between post-war American and Chinese development, as well as to articulate the period in which American and Chinese political economic development began to converge.

The United States: Brief Political-Economic History

The United States of America was founded in 1776, after the break-away British colony fought a successful war of independence. Throughout the 19th century the United States expanded across the continent and extended its imperial influence throughout much of Latin America and the Pacific. Fueled by imperial acquisitions, a massive industrial revolution and victories in the First and Second World Wars, the United States emerged in 1945 as one of two world superpowers alongside the Soviet Union.

Following the conclusion of hostilities, the war-economy made a transition to a Keynesian-based economic system featuring deficit spending and near full employment, as well as traditional Keynesian social spending measures including an increased minimum wage, health and housing initiatives and an expansion of social security benefits.[10] One of the major undertakings of the Keynesian period was the government funded construction of the interstate highway system (following the 1956 Highway Act), which provided massive employment as well as a substantial boost to commercial development.[11] Prosperity and economic growth continued through the mid-1960s and President Lyndon B. Johnson called for the establishment of a “Great Society,” passing a torrent of Keynesian-based social welfare measures including the establishment of Medicare, and increased government spending on education, welfare and housing. By the late 1960s, however, growth and prosperity had reached a crest and inflation began to plague the prospects of sustained economic progress.

In 1969 Richard Nixon was elected President amid rising inflation. Despite his conservative rhetoric, Nixon continued to implement Keynesian measures, but to little avail. In 1973 the problem of inflation was coupled with a rise in industrial costs (triggered by the “oil shock”), sparking high levels of unemployment. The result was a period of stagflation (high unemployment coupled with inflation) a policy bind whereby ameliorating the effects of one problem results in aggravation of the other. Accordingly, the growth of the economy (measured by GDP) dropped from 5.9% in 1973 to -0.5% in 1974 and -0.2% in 1975.[12] Neither Ford nor Carter proved able to curb stagflation, and in 1981 the newly elected President Ronald Reagan implemented a revolutionary economic policy, permanently shifting American political economic development away from the Keynesianism of the previous three decades.

From 1980-1982 the economic growth rate plunged (-0.2% in 1980; 2.5% in 1981; -2% in 1982).[13] The new economic policies introduced by Reagan included tight monetary policy, a massive tax-cut (especially on capital gains), a substantial decrease in social spending, governmental deregulation and increased privatization. These policies have taken on various definitions, including “neoliberalism,” “supply-side economics,” “Reaganomics,” and “trickle-down economics.” Regardless of the terminology, the basic tenets of Reagan’s political economic policies remain in tact to this day, and have become the hegemonic model for political economic development throughout the world. Under Reagan, the economic growth rate (GDP growth rate) did recover: 4.5% in 1983, 7.2% in 1984; 4.1% in 1985 and 3.4% in 1986.[14] The death of Keynesian social spending, however, was not the only cost of Reagan’s economic recovery, as the national debt soared during Reagan’s tenure in office. At the conclusion of the 1981 Fiscal Year (Reagan’s first year in office) the Gross Federal Debt stood at 994,828 (million US dollars) – 32.6% of the GDP.[15] By the end of the 1988 Fiscal Year (Reagan’s final year in office) the Gross Federal Debt had risen to 2,867,800 (million US dollars) – 53.1% of the GDP.[16] Understanding the historical context of the United States’ political economic evolution will likewise prove crucial to our discussion of US economic performance from 1986-2006.

Finally, before we begin the discussion of economic performance in China and the United States, I would like to briefly frame the economic liberalization pursued by the Chinese government in the early 1980s and Reagan’s policies of neoliberalism during the same time period, within the framework of what sociologist Philip McMichael describes as “the globalization project” (1980-present). It was in this same period (late 1970s-early 1980s) that many developing nations in the “3rd World” fell into a debt trap whereby they were unable to repay loans from foreign banks. Faced with the prospect of defaulting on their loans, the governments were rescued by the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) via debt rescheduling. In return however the governments of the debtor nations were forced to implement structural adjustment programs (austerity measures – cuts on social spending, opening borders to trade and investment, allowing the privatization of national industries etc). These “new disciplines,” argues McMichael, represent a “fundamental shift in the world order,” a world order dominated by banks, international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO, G-8), and powerful transnational corporations (TNCs) – which control two-thirds of all world trade.[17] Having contextualized the history of political economic development in both China and the United States, as well as the global shift to a world market system governed by neoliberal tenets, I will begin the discussion of China’s economic performance from 1986-2006 and the role of the government and governmental policies.

China: 1986-Present

While the political economic reforms in China are multifaceted and extremely complex, there are several major issues that have dominated the path toward liberal market reform in the PRC. In addition, there is a dominant trend of gradual reform that has emerged, and in order to understand the dynamics of Chinese economic reform, it is important to understand why reform in China has remained gradual. For example, a major issue in China’s path toward liberal market reform has been the gradual decline of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which have proven increasingly burdensome. Many of the SOEs are no longer turning a profit and survive only by means of government subsidies. If the PRC were to allow all of the loss-making enterprises to go bankrupt, however, the social safety net would not be able to support the millions of unemployed workers, which may in turn spark domestic unrest.[18] Such a development would undermine the social order and stability, which is held as the prerequisite to China’s economic growth. Thus, we must remember this important trend of gradual reform as we explore the PRC’s political economic development.

In Fiscal Year 1986 the GDP of the PRC stood at 293,467 (million USD, current prices) with a per-capita GDP of 275 (USD), following two years of extraordinary growth (15.2% GDP growth rate – 1984; 13.5% GDP growth rate – 1985).[19] From 1986-1988 the PRC government embarked on an ambitious reform package including the introduction of a contract labor system, the enactment of an enterprise law, the legalization of land sales, the opening of the nation’s first mergers and acquisitions market, the decentralization of control over foreign exchange transactions and an overly ambitious attempt at price reform.[20] The introduction of a contract labor system – whereby new workers sign contracts for short-term employment rather than the traditional “iron rice bowl,” and the opening of the nation’s first mergers and acquisitions market in Wuhan, were clearly targeted at reforming the deteriorating SOEs. Indeed, as of August 1988 about 17% of the 6,000 major state-owned enterprises were unprofitable (losing 1-billion USD in the first 6 months of 1988) and the growth rates lagged far behind both the private industrial and the collective sectors.[21] The demise of SOEs provided a paradox, however, for of China’s 120-million urban workers, 85% were concentrated in state-run enterprises and very few of them were willing to risk entering the private sphere.[22] Still, the establishment of the mergers and acquisitions market in Wuhan set the precedent for the failing SOEs to merge, a tactic that would prove useful in the transition toward economic liberalization.

Despite the increasing problems with SOEs, the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have significantly bolstered the Chinese economy. While the PRC had experienced trade deficits in 1985-6, 1987 saw a trade surplus as exports surged.[23] The surge in exports came as the SEZs had their best year to date, with combined industrial output value increasing by 52%.[24] Accordingly, the SEZ model was extended to include more of the eastern coastal region in the spring of 1988 through the expansion of special tax and licensing benefits.[25]

While the reform plans regarding SOEs and SEZs were not insignificant, the most ambitious (as well as devastating) aspect of the 1986-88 reforms occurred in the realm of price reform. In the gradual transition from a command to a market economy, the PRC had shown restraint in decontrolling prices. In 1987, however, Deng Xiaoping called for an accelerated pace of price reform and by May almost 90% of products, excluding staple crops, had been decontrolled.[26] The price reform, coupled with the decentralization of control over foreign exchange transactions, had a devastating effect on the urban cost-of-living-index. Chinese consumers in urban settings already spent an average of 50-60% of their income on food, but following the dual reforms the price of foods increased by 10.1% with the price of meat, poultry and eggs rising 16.5%; by 1988 prices for non-staple foods were up by 24.2% and the costs of fresh vegetables were up 48.7%.[27] The massive inflation and price hikes led to bank-runs, stockpiling, a rise in crime and corruption, increased student protests and an uprising in Tibet - developments which forced the government to halt reform, freeze prices, recentralize economic policy and consolidate reforms, rather than continue expansion.[28] The failure of accelerated reform served as a reaffirmation of the principle of gradualism, which has been a tenet of political economic development since 1978.

As the 1990s began, the political economic policies of the PRC focused on opening the country to foreign investment, expanding export platforms and curtailing the role of SOEs in the economy. In 1990 foreign investment was modest in size, geographically concentrated, and focused almost exclusively on export industries.[29] In 1992 China began to offer unprecedented domestic market access to foreign investors, particularly those that could offer “advanced technology.”[30] Accordingly, from 1986-1991 the private sector employment growth had averaged 3.46 million new jobs per year, but 1991-1995 saw the annual average skyrocket to 10.85 million new jobs per year.[31] In addition, the PRC began to grant direct export and import rights to many private firms by substantially reducing non-tariff barriers (NTBs). In 1992 only a few hundred enterprises had obtained trade rights, by 1996 the number had rose to roughly 10,000.[32] Consequently, the nominal output by foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), which totaled only 100-billion yuan in 1991, had risen to nearly 700-billion yuan by 1994.[33] The FIEs saw their share in total exports rise dramatically, from 1.9% in 1986, to 12.6% in 1990 and to an unprecedented 40.8% by 1996.[34]

The shift to FIEs was, of course, a dual-process, as the PRC continued the gradual reform on the increasingly burdensome state-owned industries. The SOEs, which accounted for 78% of industrial output in 1978, continued to be overshadowed by collectives and private enterprises.[35] In mid-1993 austerity measures were adopted to substantially curtail the access of SOEs to guaranteed credit, forcing the SOEs to cut costs and reduce employment levels.[36] Subsidies for SOEs, accounting for nearly 8% of GDP in the early 1980s had been reduced to only 1.2% by 1995.[37] That same year, the industrial output of the SOEs fell further, accounting for only 31% of industrial output.[38]

Having weathered the Asian financial crises despite a massive investment flight, the PRC under newly instated Prime Minister Zhu Rongji laid out an ambitious reform agenda in the spring of 1998. Zhu’s program included the privatization of public housing, halving the bureaucracy, extending unemployment insurance, expanding the private sector, restructuring the SOEs and improving relations with foreign investors – all of which served as a precursor for China’s entry into the WTO.[39] The bureaucratic cuts were met with resistance, yet by 1999 over 4-million officials had lost their jobs and many of the former industrial bureaus were transformed into non-governmental industrial associations.[40] Since tariffs and quotas are not permissible by the WTO, rapid SOE reform became necessary. Many SOEs were converted to mixed public-private ownership (still permissible under the constitution as long as 51% remained state-owned) while others underwent a wave of merges and acquisitions in order to “marry the strong with the powerful,” so that they might compete with the inevitable onslaught of foreign competition.[41] While the large-scale SOEs converted to mixed ownership, many small and medium enterprises were privatized outright, in fact, by 1999 90% had been privatized.[42] That same year private sector growth accounted for a stunning 90% of new jobs and 80% of value added growth.[43] Having implemented sufficient reforms, the PRC was admitted into the WTO in December, 2001.

Since China’s ascension into the WTO, the size of the Chinese economy has nearly doubled with annual output surpassing 2-trillion (USD) in 2005.[44] China has famously helped to lift several-hundred-million people out of poverty, accounting for 75% of poverty reduction in the developing world over the last 20-years. GDP per-capita has risen from 275 (USD) in 1986 to 1,553 (USD) in 2005.[45] China’s human development index (HDI) has risen from just under .6 in 1986, to .768 as of 2004 (compared to .948 US).[46] The percentage of the population that is undernourished stands at 12%, down from 16% in 1990.[47] Life expectancy at birth has risen from 63.2 years in 1975 to 71.5 years in 2005; and infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) has fallen from 85 in 1970 to 26 in 2004.[48] The adult literacy rate has also shown significant progress, rising from 78.3% in 1990 to 90.9% in 2004.[49] These tangible gains in standard of living have served to compliment the continued strong economic growth – 10.1% GDP in 2004, 9.9% in 2005.[50]

Nevertheless, as China continues to dismantle SOEs, end protection for domestic firms and implement austerity measures, much of the social-welfare system has been dismantled, and the promise of the “iron rice bowl” has long passed. Millions of Chinese workers have been laid off over the past 5-years, a trend that will no doubt continue as China gradually dismantles state-control over the economy.[51] Due to imbalanced growth, more than 135-million people (heavily concentrated in the interior regions) continue to live off less than $1/day.[52] Economic liberalization has also brought the inevitable consequence of increased wealth disparity, as China’s overall Gini index has increased from 35 in 1990 to 45 in 2003.[53] To place this rating in perspective, the richest 20% of the population controls 50% of income and consumption, while the poorest 20% have only 4.7%.[54] Furthermore, China’s rapid growth has severely depleted natural resources and led to large scale environmental destruction - the inevitable byproduct of rapid industrial development, which will likely result in major health crises down the road.[55]

China’s 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010) aims to achieve an annual GDP growth of 7.5%, with the goal of doubling the 2000 GDP by 2010, while reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20%, and the total discharge of major pollutants by 10%.[56] The plan also includes rebalancing the pattern of growth, extending reforms and openness, constructing a “new socialist countryside,” promoting more balanced development and increasing the nation’s capacity for independent innovation.[57] Despite attempts to limit governmental involvement in economic development, it is likely that China’s government will be forced to play an integral role in assuring that economic reform can proceed without provoking a major social backlash or environmental disaster.

The United States: 1986-Present

Like that of the PRC, the economic system of the United States is extremely complex, as it is currently the largest and most advanced economy in the world. As mentioned, the crises of the Keynesian period which had monopolized US political economic development for more than three-decades was countered by Reagan’s shift in economic policy (cutting taxes, governmental deregulation, adopting austerity measures, tackling inflation via the Federal Reserve) which curbed inflation but led to a spike in the national debt and a rise in wealth disparities. Six years into Reagan’s presidency, in Fiscal Year 1986, the US GDP stood at 4,427,700 (million USD) with a growth rate of 3.4%.[58] While the economy had grown, so too had the national debt, which rose from 909,041 (million USD) – 33.3% GDP in 1980, to 2,120,501 (million USD) – 48.1% GDP, in 1986.[59] While the period in question was presided over by four different presidents, the fundamental tenets established by Reagan - governmental non-interference, open markets, tax-cuts, austerity and private enterprise - has continued to dominate the nation’s political economic development.

Though growth remained steady through the conclusion of Reagan’s tenure in office, the onset of the 1990s brought growth to an abrupt halt, as growth rates fell from 3.5% in 1989, to 1.9% in 1990 and -0.2% in 1991.[60] As corporate stocks began to plummet, “corporate raiders” emerged to buy-up failing companies, restructuring them or dismantling them outright.[61] Poorly managed companies were restructured to regain profitability and others were sold off so that investors could redirect funds, however the economic boost came at the price of a significant loss of jobs.[62] In addition, savings and loan scandals placed many financial institutions in jeopardy, and the subsequent bailout cost American taxpayers billions of dollars. The economy staggered in the latter half of 1991 and continued to decline in 1992.

From this point, I would like to shift focus to 3 key themes which I have found to be the most significant political economic developments within the United States. The first is the launching of NAFTA and the implications of bilateral economic agreements for the US economy. Second, I would like to discuss the maintenance of neoliberal economic policies and the implications for the future. Finally, I will discuss the economic boom from 1995-2000 and the subsequent recession, as well as the lessons we might draw for future political economic development. I will conclude the discussion with a summation of current trends and what the future may entail for the development of the US economy.

The establishment of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), an initiative of former president George H. W. Bush, was launched on 1 January, 1994. NAFTA is only one of many regional trade agreements that the US is party to. The onset of NAFTA promised more accessible investment for US corporations and a supplement for Mexican economic development via the mutually beneficial aspects of free trade. NAFTA, however, does not necessarily adhere to the principles of free trade, for example: the US pressured Mexico to end its shipments of low-priced tomatoes to the United States, costing Mexico an estimated $800-million annually, but protecting domestic growers in Florida.[63] In addition to serving as a protectionist measure for US business interests, Cornell University Labor economist Kate Bronfenbrenner revealed another feature of NAFTA in a study commissioned by the NAFTA Labor Secretariat. The agreement serves as a tool for strike-breaking, as about half of union organizing efforts came to be disrupted by threats to shift production to Mexico.[64] Of the drives that nevertheless succeed, employers closed the plants (in whole or in part) at roughly three-times the pre-NAFTA rate (roughly 15% of the time).[65] Indeed, early in 1995 a study conducted by two economists for the Institute of Policy Studies found that NAFTA had led to a net-loss of some 10,000 US jobs.[66] These developments were lauded in the 1997 Economic Report of the President, which stated that “changes in labor market institutions and practices” are a factor in the “significant wage restraint” that bolsters the health of the economy.[67] In this light, NAFTA and similar trade agreements have served as a catalyst for the massive out-flow of US jobs to areas of lower production costs, bolstering the economy at the expense of domestic labor.

Shifting gears slightly, I will now discuss the continuity of neoliberal policy implementation, as the fundamental tenets established by Reagan continued to dominate the political economic policies of the Clinton administration despite his Democratic Party affiliation. According to the Clinton Doctrine, the victory over the Soviet Union had led to a new mission, to “consolidate the victory of democracy and open markets.”[68] While Clinton’s introduction of a health care reform plan in 1993 indicated that he might be moving away from the Reaganesque “small government” austerity programs, the death of the plan in 1994 marked the end of Clinton’s push for increased social spending. Following the 1994 “Republican revolution” - whereby Republicans led by Newt Gingrich and his “Contract with America” gained control of both the House of Representative and the Senate - Clinton’s stance on social spending seemed to undergo a fundamental shift. After reaching a compromise with the legislature following two partial closures of the federal government, Clinton passed the Republican measure for “welfare reform,” ending the government’s guarantee of financial help for poor families which dated back to the New Deal era.[69] The measure, ostensibly entitled the “Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996” stipulated that welfare benefits be cut off after two-years, limited lifetime benefits to five-years and limited the allotment of food stamps for people without children to a maximum of three-months within a three-year period.[70] The goal of the legislation was to save $50-billion over a five-year period (less than the cost of a new generation of fighter planes).[71] As if to cement his adherence to neoliberal doctrine Clinton, during his 1996 campaign, proclaimed “the era of big government is over.”[72] In the spring of 1997, Clinton scrapped a major component of his education plan ($5-billion to repair crumbling schools), and rejected a proposal to extend health insurance to the nation’s 10.5-million uninsured children.[73] Nevertheless, true to Reagan-era doctrine, the government continued to spend at least $250-billion per year on defense.[74]

Despite Clinton’s assault on social spending, he was lauded for presiding over a period of strong economic growth, as well as wiping out the budget deficit by 1998. Although Clinton had expressed disdain for “big government” he, like Reagan, relied heavily on the Federal Reserve to regulate the overall pace of economic activity. I would now like to turn to the economic boom from 1995-2000 and some of the factors that contributed to this period of growth. I will also discuss the end of the boom, the subsequent recession, and some possible undertakings for the US economy to achieve a sustainable growth pattern for the future. The discussion will focus on two integral components of the economic boom - productivity growth and consumption growth.
Productivity growth is an increase in productive capacities via improved technologies, production facilities and workforce quality. Consumption growth is an increase in the amount of goods and services consumed through the market.

The period from 1991-1995 was characterized by sluggish economic, employment and wage growth – prerequisites for low levels of consumption growth; whereas the period from 1996-2000 was marked by accelerated economic, employment and wage growth – prerequisites for high levels of consumption growth.[75] Accordingly, productivity growth had averaged 1.5% in the first period and increased to 2.5% in the second period.[76] The innovations in telecommunications, computer hardware and software, networking and so forth, which sparked the 1996-2000 economic boom fueled the increasingly high rates of consumption, which in turn fueled investment and led to further productivity growth. As consumption accelerated, so too did investment, however high rates of consumption became dependent on consumer debt, and by the end of 2000 households had reached historically high levels of debt service burdens.[77] With an increasing percentage of household income dedicated to servicing debt, consumption came to a relative halt.[78] As a measure of the importance of consumption to economic growth, consider that by 2000 consumption accounted for a striking 68% of GDP.[79] Consumption, as we have seen, can not be sustained for a long period by consumer debt, and thus requires sustained levels of income growth.[80] Perhaps the Federal Reserve’s anti-inflationary policies inherited from the Regan-era reforms should be revamped to consider full-employment on an equal par with controlling inflation, creating a situation whereby sustained consumption leads to sustained investment and productivity growth.

A second factor which should be considered regarding the economic boom is the role of public investment in expanding technology and productivity growth. While private investment was instrumental in accelerating productivity growth, it was public investment via government-funded research and development (R&D), defense contracts and university research that sparked the explosion of new technologies in the first place.[81] If government funding in education and R&D is expanded and properly utilized, perhaps new technologies and innovations can fuel increased productivity growth, which may in turn create high levels of employment, high wages and high levels of income growth giving rise to sustainable levels of consumption. If so, the United States may be able to embark on a sustained period of economic growth.

Unfortunately, the neoliberal trend against government participation in the economy has led to a situation whereby federal R&D spending has dipped below 1% of GDP.[82] Furthermore, despite the economic recovery (entering its 4th year in 2005), real median income among the working-age population fell by $600 (1.2%) in 2004 and real median income for non-elderly households declined by $275 (0.5%) in 2005.[83] In fact, as of 2005 real median income has fallen by $2,000 (3.7%) since 2001, while the percentage of the population living in poverty rose from 11.7% in 2001 to 12.7% in 2005.[84] Such conditions are, unfortunately, not conducive to high levels of consumption.

Conclusion

In concluding this broad survey on political economic development in the United States and China from 1986-2006, I would first like to express my regret for not engaging the dynamics and interplay between job-loss in the United States and exponential economic growth in China. There are numerous aspects of the utmost significance to this complex and multifaceted discussion for which time will not allow. Nevertheless, it is my hope that through this basic survey some important trends have become apparent. Since the early 1980s the United States, China and a vast majority of the world’s states have undergone an unprecedented transformation which has significantly curtailed the role of governments while strengthening the hand of massive transnational corporations and their clients in the growing network of international financial institutions. As this transition unfolds, the extent to which the national governments can combat the excesses of increasingly unrestrained capitalism will be a crucial factor in determining the future political economic development of each state as it establishes its place within the emerging world framework.

[1] Melanie Manion, Politics in China, in Longman Custom Comparative Politics ed. Gabriel A. Almond et al, comp. Ricardo Laremont (Boston: Pearson Custom Publishing, 2006), 254.
[2] Manion, 256
[3] Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy – Overview: China, (2002), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/index.html (accessed March 16, 2007)
[4] Manion, 256
[5] Manion, 257
[6] Commanding Heights – China: Overview
[7] Manion, 257
[8] Commanding Heights – China: Economy
[9] Manion, 269-278
[10] Commanding Heights – United States: Economic
[11] Ibid.
[12] United Nations Statistics Division: National Accounts Main Aggregates Database (January, 2007). http://unstats.un.org/unsd (accessed March 16, 2007).
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] “Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007.” Section 7 – Federal Debt. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington (2006). http://www.budget.gov/budget (accessed March 18, 2007), 126.
[16] Ibid.

[17] Philip McMichael, Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 2004), 153-4.
[18] Manion, 253
[19] United Nations Statistics Division
[20] Lowell Dittmer, “China in 1988: The Continuing Dilemma of Socialist Reform,” Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 1988: Part I. (January 1989), http://www.jstor.org (accessed March 21, 2007), 15-27.
[21] Dittmer, 15
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Dittmer, 19
[26] Dittmer, 21
[27] Ibid.
[28] Dittmer, 23-4
[29] Nicholas R. Lardy and Barry Naughton, “China’s Emergence and Prospects as a Trading nation,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1996, No. 2. (1996), http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed March 20, 2007), 279.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Lardy, 286
[32] Lardy, 297
[33] Lardy, 279
[34] Lardy, 298-9
[35] Lardy, 278
[36] Lardy, 294
[37] Lardy, 278
[38] Ibid.
[39] David Zweig, “China's Stalled "Fifth Wave": Zhu Rongji's Reform Package of 1998-2000,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 2. (March - April 2001), http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed March 22, 2007), 233.
[40] Zweig, 237
[41] Zweig, 244-6
[42] Zweig, 244
[43] Zweig, 245
[44]“China's WTO Entry Sparks Rapid Economic Expansion: Report,” Xinhua News Agency (December, 2006), Available online at China.org.cn http://www.china.org.cn (accessed March 21, 2007).
[45] United Nations Statistics Division
[46] United Nations: World Development Indicators 2006.
[47] UN (United Nations). 2006c. Millennium Indicators Database. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, New York.[http:// mdgs.un.org.]. Accessed July 2006. , based on data from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
[48] UN (United Nations). 2006c. Millennium Indicators Database. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, New York.[http:// mdgs.un.org.]. Accessed July 2006. , based on data from a joint effort by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO).
[49] UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Institute for Statistics. 2006a. Correspondence on adult and youth literacy rates. April. Montreal.
[50] United Nations Statistics Division
[51] World Bank. 2006. World Development Indicators 2006. CD-ROM. Washington, D.C.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Stephen Roach, “Globalization’s New Underclass,” (Republished with permission from Japan Focus), Asia Times Online, (April 26, 2006), http://www.atimes.com/ (accessed, March 20, 2007).
[54] World Bank.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.
[58] United Nations Statistics Division
[59] Historical Tables…
[60] United Nations Statistics Division
[61] “The US Economy: A Brief History,” U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs. http://usinfo.state.gov/ (accessed March 23, 2006).
[62] Ibid.
[63]Noam Chomsky, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999), 84.
[64] Chomsky, 104
[65] Ibid.
[66] Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States: 1492-Present, (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 658.
[67] Chomsky, 104
[68] Chomsky, 92
[69] Zinn, 649
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Zinn, 650
[73] Zinn, 651
[74] Ibid.
[75] Christian Weller, “Learning Lessons from the 1990s: Long-Term Growth Prospects for the U.S.,” (originally published in The New Economy Vol. 9, No. 1, in March 2002) The Economic Policy Institute (2007) http://www.epi.org/ (accessed March 21, 2007).
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] “Economic Recovery Failed to Benefit Much of the Population in 2004,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, (August 30, 2005), http://www.cbpp.org/ (accessed March 22, 2007).
&
“Poverty Remains Higher, and Median Income for Non-Elderly is Lower Than When Recession Hit Bottom: Poor Performance Unprecedented for Four-Year Recovery Period,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, (revised September 1, 2006), http://www.cbpp.org/ (accessed March 22, 2007).

[84] “Economic Recovery…”

Review: A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible

2007-07-04T08:45:00.000-07:00

With the onslaught of neoliberal policies over the last several decades the state, once a means of resistance to powerful transnational corporations, has become all but subservient to the interests of global capital, working to enhance corporate profit, rather than peoples basic interests. In response, progressive thinkers and revolutionary leaders throughout the world have joined the common people who struggle daily against the injustices of capitalism to form new social movements - movements of people who struggle against injustice with massive demonstrations and various forms of nonviolent resistance. The interviews and essays in a movement of movements discuss the workings of several social movements, and the possibility of uniting these various "antisystemic movements" into a serious counterweight to the corporate elites who currently dominate the global discourse.

A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?
By Tom Mertes, ed.; with contributions by Walden Bello, et al. London and New
York: Verso, 2004. 273 pages, introduction, index. $19/£13/$29CAN.

In this collection of interviews and short essays, Tom Mertes ed. examines various modern social movements while pondering the question: is another world possible? In posing this question, Mertes, the administrator of the Center for Social Theory and Comparative History at UCLA and member of the New Left Review Editorial Committee, is referring to a world without the current neoliberal framework which has become systemic over the past 25 years. A Movement of Movements describes how the neoliberal world system was established, the devastating toll for humans and the environment alike, and the new “antisystemic”[1] social movements which have evolved on the local, provincial, national, regional and global levels to challenge the established framework. Mertes has compiled the voices of a wide range of activists, organizers and intellectuals, which are divided into three sections: “Southern Voices,” “Northern Voices,” and “Analytics.”

The “Southern Voices” section contains testimony from leading activists of local, national and global social movements. On the local level, Subcomandante Marcos speaks on behalf of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), which represents the indigenous people of the impoverished Chiapas region of south-eastern Mexico. During the time of the interview, the EZLN was focused on opening a serious dialogue with then-President Vincente Fox on issues such as land reform and the deliverance of socioeconomic programs to the excluded and marginalized indigenous population of Chiapas. In many ways the EZLN has become an inspiration for the new social movements, with its commitment to non-violence, its dedication to the struggle for power outside the realm of politics, and its use of the internet to gain international solidarity and support.

Another local movement included is the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), a massive movement of people in the Narmada Valley in Central India against the construction of privately owned mega-dams. Chittaroopa Palit, an activist involved with the NBA discusses the dam projects, which would adversely affect the lives and livelihoods of some 25 million people, and displace at least 500,000 people by land submergence.[2] The communities, which have existed along the river for centuries, were to be deprived of their livelihoods so that new lands could be irrigated to grow thirsty cash crops rather than staple foods, leaving the farming families at the mercy of the global market.[3]

Joao Pedro Stedile presents the voice of the Sem Terra movement (MST), a massive organization of landless farmers who conduct land occupations and work against the privatization of land and patents on agricultural techniques in the hope of achieving land and food sovereignty for the abject populace.[4]

Trevor Ngwane speaks on behalf of the Soweto Electricity Crises Committee (SECC) and the South African Anti-Privatization Forum (APF). These groups are active in the fight against the continued concentration of South Africa’s wealth in the hands of the white capitalist elite, the lack of a minimum wage, and the failure of the ANC to provide domestic electricity to a majority of black citizens.

On the regional level, Njoki Njehu speaks on behalf of the 50 Years is Enough Network, an affiliation of various activist groups working on behalf of the African people and demanding, among other things, a cancellation of debts, an end to structural adjustment programs and a transparent and democratic reform of the IMF and World Bank.[5]

Finally, there is Walden Bello, who speaks on behalf of Focus on the Global South, a movement committed to establishing cross-regional links in order to “bring together the global movements.”[6] Thus, Bello and his fellow activists in Focus serve the purpose of uniting local movements from all over the globe, such as those aforementioned, toward the realization that they are all struggling against various aspects of the same neoliberal system.

The “Northern Voices” section contains interviews with four activists of the global north and a short essay by the Yale anthropologist and anarchist philosopher David Graeber. While many of the activists and organizations in the “Southern Voices” section are focused primarily on local and regional issues, those in the “Northern Voices” section seem to be more broad in scope, for fairly obvious reasons - many of the movements in the global south must focus on local struggles, as the issues often entail the very survival of the people involved.

Jose Bove speaks on behalf of the Confederation Paysanne, a movement of farmers against the intensive-farming system, whereby multinational corporations press for massive export-oriented production with no regard for the farmers, the environment or the quality of the food; and Via Campesina, a massive coalition of farmers movements from around the globe that demand “Food out of the WTO,” and focus on food sovereignty, food safety and patenting, amongst a host of other local, regional and global issues.[7] One of the Confederation Paysanne’s most celebrated achievements was the dismantling of a half-built McDonald’s as a response to US trade practices, a symbolic moment for agricultural workers struggling against multinationals.

Bernard Cassen speaks on behalf of another global movement, ATTAC, an initiative of the French periodical Le Monde diplomatique. Unlike many of the aforementioned southern movements, ATTAC is not a groundswell movement but rather, in the words of Cassen, an “action-oriented movement of popular education.”[8] ATTAC works to mobilize and educate the various movements struggling against the neo-liberal world framework, since, according to Cassen “militants must be well-informed, [and] intellectually equipped for action.”[9] ATTAC activists are quick to acknowledge that local committees are the backbone of the organization and nothing can happen without them. Together with the Brazilian Worker’s Party (PT), ATTAC-France organized the World Social Forum (WSF), which met in Porto Alegre in 2001, and has held subsequent annual meetings ever since.

On the national level, John Sellers speaks on behalf of Ruckus, a US environmental movement (though Sellers claims they are neither a movement nor an institution, but rather encompass some middle ground) which has since diversified and now works with various human rights, labor, social justice and fair trade organizations as well. Ruckus works as a sort of training mechanism for various activists including media training, tree-climbing training for tree sit-ins, direct action planning, training activists to create effective blockades and so forth. While Ruckus has received requests to establish training-centers in other parts of the world, Sellers claims they are most effective mobilizing resistance “in the belly of the beast itself.”[10]

Bhumika Muchhala speaks on behalf of Students Against Sweatshops, an informal network of campus anti-sweatshop movements throughout the United States. The group organized solidarity campaigns with international workers (such as Gap laborers in El Salvador), took part in “living-wage campaigns for campus workers, and encouraged colleges to cut contracts with corporations that severely exploit foreign labor.

David Graeber’s short article closes out the “Northern Voices” section by discussing the role of the corporate media in undermining and misrepresenting the movement against neoliberalism; the historical circumstances that led the new social movements to take their unprecedented form; the characteristics of these new forms of organization (decentralized networks, horizontal structures, consensus democracy, etc); and the role of new communication technologies which have made the emergence of these “global revolutionary alliances” possible.[11] Graeber’s contribution excels in tying together the preceding, though I am a little perplexed as to why this article did not appear in the “Analytics” section.

The “Analytics” section, as one might guess, is an analysis of the various social movements regarding the specific nature of the various movements, how they have evolved, and how (or if) they will be able to form a cohesive entity powerful enough to challenge the neoliberal world system in the 21st century. Naomi Klein begins the section by discussing the ties amongst the various movements, which she argues, is a spirit for a “radical reclaiming of the commons.”[12] Klein argues that these activists are not waiting for a revolution, but rather are acting against the system on a local level. While the movements are diverse, they nevertheless periodically converge – Seattle, Prague, Quebec. Klein maintains that the success in Seattle is a direct result of organizers viewing their local and national struggles “through a global lens.”[13] Eventually, she hopes, the neoliberal framework will be overthrown and replaced by horizontal democracies at the local level, “one world with many worlds in it,” as the Zapatistas say.[14] It is an inspirational prophecy, which may in fact take shape, given the internal structures (horizontal, decentralized, democratic) of these new social movements.

Michael Hardt and Tom Mertes’ respective contributions offer somewhat divergent views on the nature and effectiveness of the WSF. Michael Hardt argues that the WSF is divided between two primary positions: those who hope to reinforce the sovereignty of the nation state against neoliberal globalization; and those who want a non-national alternative to the present world order. The PT and ATTAC, the most visible and dominant organizations at the WSF are, according to Hardt, aligned with this first school of thought, while the vast majority of those in attendance adhere to the second school. Eventually, Hardt argues, those “political” (state sovereignty-school) activists who dominated the forum will be swept up by the multitude, thereby decentralizing the WSF according to the spirit of these new social movements. Therefore, the form that the “movement of movements” will take, according to Hardt, is that of an ever-expanding network.[15]

Mertes finds this theory somewhat problematic, arguing that the relations between these various groups will take the form of “an ongoing series of alliances and coalitions, whose convergences remain contingent.”[16] Elaborating his position, Mertes argues:
The Turtles and Teamsters will no doubt meet again on the streets of North America, but this does not mean they are in the sort of constant communication that a network implies. The WSF provides a venue in which churches and anarchists, punks and farmers, trade-unionists and green can explore issues of common concern, without having to create a new web.[17]

Mertes also feels that Hardt’s focus on questions of national sovereignty and organization are overstated, and argues that greater divergences exist such as that between economy and environment, between the very different realities of those in the global north and those in the south, and on the question as to whether the international financial institutions should be reformed or abolished.[18]

Emir Sader’s contribution focuses on the history of “leftist” (communist and socialist) parties, the devastating blow they were dealt with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the embrace of neoliberal policies by modern leftist parties and the forms that the “new social movements” have taken today. The rejection of the political sphere by the new social movements is, for Sader, problematic for two main reasons. The first is “the NGO practice of entering into ‘partnerships’ with big business.”[19] The second problem is that the exclusion of political parties and States would, if pushed through, “severely limit the formulation of any alternatives to neoliberalism,” thus surrendering the entire area to the enemy.[20] Sader also points out another problem the new movements face, an ideological battle, whereas “many [people]…implicitly renounce any attempt to construct an alternative society: as if our indefinite confinement within the limits of capitalism and liberal democracy was accepted as fact,”[21] (a problem which was made ever apparent by many of the postings in our blackboard discussion).

The final contribution in the “Analytics” section comes from Immanuel Wallerstein, who discusses the rival popular movements of the 20th century, “social,” and “national” movements. Wallerstein points out that while the two sides had ideological divergences, both agreed on a so-called two-step strategy: “first gain power within the state structure; then transform the world.”[22] Many of these movements did in fact manage to seize political power, yet they found, as Wallerstein argues, that “state power was more limited than they had thought.”[23] It follows, then, that many of these new social movements are deeply suspicious of state-oriented actions. Wallerstein then concludes that the greatest problem facing the WSF will be how to integrate all of the movements within a single framework, while avoiding a vertical hierarchical structure from emerging. Wallerstein hopes that the new “antisystemic” movements will be able to focus on short-term immediate needs, establish interim, middle range goals and “develop the substantive meaning of our long-term emphases,” all while assuring a process of constant, open debate.[24]

Overall, this collection of interviews and essays is very informative in terms of introducing readers to various global movements, how their interests, structures and goals converge and diverge, and what actions these movements must take if they are to succeed in creating a powerful, global movement of movements. Two detrimental aspects of this book are the focus on various aspects of the activist’s personal lives, and the confusion associated with hearing the positions of so many different activists and intellectuals at once. Since the stated goal of these various movements includes maintaining a non-hierarchical, decentralized system, I felt that focusing on the life of a single member of a movement runs contrary to the overall spirit that these movements embody. Secondly, I ended up having to read this book twice, since discerning the specific position of each of the numerous contributors proved somewhat problematic. Nevertheless, A Movement of Movements is an excellent introductory read for those who want to better understand the new social movements which are taking place and the active and lively debate surrounding the future and possibility of a “movement of movements” coalescing against a common enemy: the neoliberal capitalist world framework.

[1] The term coined by Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1970s.
[2] Chitaroopa Palit, Monsoon Risings: Mega-Dam Resistance in the Narmada Valley, in A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?, ed. Tom Mertes, (New York: Verso, 2004), 76.
[3] Palit, 85
[4] Joao Pedro Stedile, Brazil’s Landless Battalions: The Sem Terra Movement, in A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?, ed. Tom Mertes, (New York: Verso, 2004), 43.
[5] Njoki Njehu, Cancel the Debt: Africa and the IMF, in A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?, ed. Tom Mertes, (New York: Verso, 2004), 98.
[6] Walden Bello, The Global South, in A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?, ed. Tom Mertes, (New York: Verso, 2004), 57.
[7] Jose Bove, A Farmers’ International?, in A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?, ed. Tom Mertes, (New York: Verso, 2004), 140-45.
[8] Bernard Cassen, Inventing ATTAC, in A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?, ed. Tom Mertes, (New York: Verso, 2004),156.
[9] Ibid.
[10] John Sellers, Raising a Ruckus, in A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?, ed. Tom Mertes, (New York: Verso, 2004), 191.
[11] David Graeber, The New Anarchists, in A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?, ed. Tom Mertes, (New York: Verso, 2004), 215.
[12] Naomi Klein, Reclaiming the Commons, in A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?, ed. Tom Mertes, (New York: Verso, 2004), 220.
[13] Klein, 222
[14] Klein, 228
[15] Tom Mertes, Grass-roots Globalism: Reply to Michael Hardt, in A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?, ed. Tom Mertes, (New York: Verso, 2004), 244.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Mertes, 245-6
[19] Emir Sader, Beyond Civil Society: The Left after Porto Alegre, in A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?, ed. Tom Mertes, (New York: Verso, 2004), 253.
[20] Sader, 254-5
[21] Sader, 259
[22] Immanuel Wallerstein, New Revolts Against the System, in A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?, ed. Tom Mertes, (New York: Verso, 2004), 263.
[23] Wallerstein, 266
[24] Wallerstein, 272-3

Diverse Social Movements Lead Latin American Resistance to Neoliberal Capitalism

2007-07-04T08:27:00.000-07:00

The Chavista Revolution in Venezuela and the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico.

*A note on definitions: Neoliberalism, a term often used in this article refers to the policies of "free markets," privatization, austerity measures (cuts to social programs such as healthcare, education and public transportation), etc instituted under Reagan (US) and Thatcher (UK) in the 1980s and systematically forcefed to the rest of the world via various international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.

The American Professor of literature and anti-globalization activist Michael Hardt contends that there exist “two primary positions in the response to today’s dominant forces of globalization”:
Either one can work to reinforce sovereignty of nation-states as a defensive barrier against the control of foreign and global capital; or one can strive towards a non-national alternative to the present form of globalization that is equally global.[1]

Latin America, in the wake of colonialism, forced labor, independence struggles, bloody civil wars, brutal dictatorships, US military interventions and the destructive impact of the debt regime has been struck particularly hard by the globalization project. The Zapatista Movement in Chiapas, Mexico and the Chavista revolution in Venezuela have come to dominate the respective poles of the anti-globalization movement in Latin America. While the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) has adopted a horizontal power structure, concentrates on local issues and rejects contention in the political realm, the Chavista revolution in Venezuela, while maintaining a strong grass-roots support base, is fighting for global justice through the Venezuelan state under democratically elected President Hugo Chavez. While some commentators, such as Hardt, would argue that the Zapatista movement and Chavista revolution are contradictory and even conflicting forms of political organization, I would argue that the movements are both necessary and complimentary in the fight against powerful corporate interests.

This paper will examine the structure of the Zapatista movement and the Chavista revolution, how each respective structure has allowed the participants to fight back against the onslaught of global capital, and the advantages and disadvantages of each respective system. In concluding, I will argue that the Zapatista movement – representing what Hardt describes as the “democratic-globalization” position, and the Chavista revolution – representing the “national-sovereignty” camp, are complementary and necessary means of protest in attacking the neoliberal order from above and below.[2]

The spike in oil prices in the 1970s saw the Venezuelan economy boom, however the fall in oil prices in the 1980s devastated the economy as the government was forced to seek IMF loans and implement austerity measures.[3] Hugo Chavez was elected President in 1998 against a backdrop of political corruption, economic depression and political and social upheaval. Although Venezuela is the world’s fifth-largest oil exporter and the nation has vast hectares of rich farmland and numerous natural resources, the country’s wealth has been kept from the majority of the people as it is concentrated among Venezuela’s European-elite and siphoned off by foreign-based corporations and investors. It was against these realities of economic and social injustice that the Chavista revolution based its legitimacy. For this short discussion, I will highlight two key features (one domestic and one international) of the Chavista revolution – the nationalization of key industries and the diplomatic pressure against the agents of globalization. I will also describe the relationship with the state, and the advantages and disadvantages of this relationship as the people of Venezuela struggle for “another world.”

Privatization has emerged as a key tenet of neoliberal policy, as powerful transnational corporations have taken control of industry, the cultivation of resources and even basic government services as part of the forced structural adjustment programs of the 1980s. Thus, an integral aspect of the Chavista revolution has been the nationalization of various privately held industries. Chavez has already nationalized key industries including telecommunications and electricity and is threatening to nationalize the steel industry, currently controlled by Siderúrgica del Orinoco (Sidor), which is owned by the Techint Group of Argentina.[4] Chavez warned the company chairman, Paolo Rocca, “I’ll grab your company,” adding “I’ll pay you what its worth…I wont rob you.”[5] Chavez has also threatened to nationalize the banking system, controlled by financial institutions from the US and Spain, unless it agrees to offer low-cost financing to domestic industries.[6] The most significant nationalization project, however, was the nationalization of the massive oil industry announced during May Day (2007) celebrations with Chavez declaring “today is the end of that era when our natural riches ended up the hands of anyone but the Venezuelan people.”[7] Chavez will still allow the private companies, which include Exxon Mobil, Chevron and ConocoPhillips to remain as minority partners.[8] These developments will likely allow the President further leverage as he works to redistribute Venezuela’s massive oil wealth to the people through extended social programs, particularly in the realms of health and education. The President also used the opportunity to declare that Venezuela would leave the IMF and World Bank, a development of transcendent importance for the Chavista revolution in the fight against global capitalism.[9]

In the diplomatic realm, Chavez has managed to build a strong support base, despite condemnation from Washington and many of its key allies. In a trip to Great Britain, a key American ally and a harsh critic of the Chavez administration, the Venezuelan President addressed crowds outside the Camden Town Hall and at the Banqueting Hall in Whitehall.[10] Each respective speech of more than three-hours criticized the neoliberal policies of Washington, the IMF and the World Bank and defended Venezuela’s policies of democratic socialism.[11] Chavez also called for British investors to participate in several projects including an underground railway system, a natural gas pipeline and other petrochemical projects.[12] The trip succeeded in bringing acclaim from politically active British youth, Latin American migrants and investors alike.[13]

In Latin America, Chavez’s diplomatic and political leadership has helped other left-leaning candidates gain electoral inroads, and Chavez continues to maintain cordial relationships with neoliberal-oriented leaders in Mexico, Chile and Peru.[14] Such developments have elevated Chavez as a Latin American leader as he pursues policies of mutual aid and solidarity such as the proposal for a hemispheric union, the “Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas” (ALBA) as an alternative to Washington’s plans to institute the “Free Trade Area of the Americas” (FTAA).[15] Chavez has also advocated a collective negotiation of the Latin American debt, featuring 10% of the payments going to an “International Humanitarian Fund” to implement social programs without neoliberal strings attached.[16] His popularity among Latin America’s poor and oppressed was seen at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre where, compared to the mixed reaction to Brazilian President Lula’s speech, Chavez received thunderous applause as he emphasized his commitment to grass-root struggles declaring: “I am not here as the President of Venezuela… I am only President because of particular circumstances. I am Hugo Chavez and am an activist as well as a revolutionary.”[17]

On the World Stage, Chavez appeared before the United Nations, clutching a copy of world renowned intellectual Noam Chomsky’s Hegemony of Survival and declaring that the world was “standing up” against “American imperialism.”[18] Chavez called for an end to imperialist wars, and expressed solidarity with the people of Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Iran, Latin America, the African Union, Russia and China among others.[19] Chavez closed by calling for a new era: “for our children and our grandchildren a world of peace based on the fundamental principles of the United Nations, but a renewed United Nations.”[20] The speech was hailed by a loud and enthusiastic round of applause, demonstrating a strong and growing support base for the ideals of Chavismo on the international level.

While the Chavista revolution has thus far maintained a relatively vertical structure, it also features a massive support base of some 60% of the electorate.[21] Massive popular mobilizations have played a decisive role in ensuring the continuity of the revolution, particularly during the attempted coup in April 2002. Moreover, the groundswell of support has served to legitimize Chavez’ rule in the face of accusations that he is becoming increasingly dictatorial. Ensuring the viability and sustainability of the Chavista revolution will greatly depend on a continued alliance between the state and the grass-roots activists in Venezuelan society.

At the other end of the spectrum, the Zapatista movement began on January 1, 1994 when the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) seized several municipalities in Chiapas with the intent of establishing autonomous communities. The uprising corresponded with the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but was also a response to neoliberal governmental policies as well as the failure to fulfill the land rights under Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution. While the Chavista revolution focused on state power, thus falling under Hardt’s “national-sovereignty” camp, the Zapatista’s have rejected the seizure of state power, thus encompassing the “democratic-globalization” position. For this discussion I will highlight two key components of the Zapatista movement – the establishment of autonomous communities and the formation of a transnational solidarity network.

The liberal projects of the 19th century sought to transform communal landholdings into individually owned holdings, a development which stood in stark contrast to indigenous conceptions of land.[22] The Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the subsequent Constitution of 1917 (particularly Article 27) sought to redress the previous expropriations with the establishment of the ejido and the restitution of communal holdings.[23] Following the 1982 financial collapse in Mexico and the forced austerity measures that followed, the communal land holdings, as well as government services, began to erode. Preparations for the signing of NAFTA exacerbated these trends, as Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution was revised to allow for the dissolution of the ejido. Historically the Mexican indigenous, a majority in Chiapas, have been systematically excluded from the workings of the state. This has created a situation whereby the Zapatistas no longer aspire to seize state power. Instead, their structure is horizontal in nature, focusing on two key tenets – “mandar obedeciendo” (command obeying) and the constant alteration of representatives within the Juntas of Good Government.[24] The Zapatista communities have focused on providing what the government has failed to – land reform, education and basic healthcare. With the failure of the PRI to implement the San Andreas Accords, the Zapatistas have taken it upon themselves to initiate the reforms. “We don’t need the government’s permission to build our own autonomy,” the commandantes insist.[25]

While the Zapatista’s primary focus remains local in scope, they have also been successful in establishing a transnational solidarity network. Solidarity networks, inspired and encouraged by the Zapatista movement, have sprung-up throughout the world providing a sort of “transnational spotlight [providing] protection vis-à-vis the Mexican state and military.”[26] Furthermore, the Zapatistas, with their barrage of online publications and communiqués, have illustrated that the problems many Mexicans, and indeed many other oppressed peoples, face is rooted outside the borders of the country.[27] The Zapatistas have used the concept of neoliberalism to link the problems created by unrestrained global capitalism to struggles other populations face and have thus facilitated the formation of an important component in the anti-globalization struggle - all from the marginal state of Chiapas in Southern Mexico. Still, the Zapatistas have been criticized with the “slowness of their advance” which is attributed to “their inability to broaden [their struggle] into a class struggle, a national one.”[28] Naomi Klein argues that this is not necessary however, for the Zapatistas, along with countless other local movements like it, should continue to focus on the local struggle while networking outward, thus creating, in the words of the Zapatistas “one world with many worlds in it.”[29]

As our examination of the Chavista revolution and the Zapatista movement has shown, the anti-globalization struggle has taken many different forms, some of which seem radically opposed in the opinion of observers such as Michael Hardt. I would argue to the contrary however, as the Chavista revolution and the Zapatista movement, while assuming varying forms and divergent relations to the state, have nevertheless taken strides in opposing the neoliberal capitalist order. In the domestic realm the Chavista revolution has succeeded through the nationalization of key industries and the expansion of social programs, while the Zapatistas have succeeded by carving an autonomous social space free from the reach of global capital. On the international stage, Chavez continues to make strides in forming a state-based alliance against the neoliberal order while the Zapatistas have built transnational linkages with supporters and other new social movements. It is my contention that these unique and separate processes are integral to combat neoliberal capitalism from above and below in the struggle for the attainment of another world.

[1] Tom Mertes, ed.; with contributions by Walden Bello, et al. A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible? London and New York: Verso, 2004. 232
[2] Mertes, 241
[3] BBC Timeline: Venezuela – A Chronology of Key Events. BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/ (accessed May 6, 2007)
[4] Simon Romero. “Chavez Rattles Takeover Saber at Steel Company and Banks,” The New York Times (May 7, 2007) http://www.nytimes.com (accessed May 8, 2007).
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Simon Romero. “Chavez Takes Over Foreign-Controlled Oil Projects in Venezuela,” The New York Times (May 2, 2007) http://www.nytimes.com (accessed May 8, 2007).
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Hugh O'Shaughnessy. “Venezuela's President Chavez Wins Hearts and Minds in London,” The Observer, London (May 22, 2006) pg. 9.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Steve Ellner. “Venezuela: Defying Globalization’s Logic,” North American Congress on Latin America, Vol. 39, No. 2 September/October 2005 (October 17. 2005) available at http://www.venezuelaanalysis.com/ (accessed May 7, 2007).
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Chavez Address to the United Nations (September 20, 2006) available at http://commondreams.org (accessed May 6, 2007).
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ellner.
[22] Jose Rabasa. “On the History of the History of the Peoples Without History.” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations http://www.humboldt.edu (accessed May 1, 2007), 205.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Rabasa, 210
[25] John Ross. “Celebrating the Caracoles: Step by Step, the Zapatistas Advance on the Horizon.” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations http://www.humboldt.edu (accessed may 1, 2007), 46.
[26] Thomas Olesen. “Mixing the Scales: Neoliberalism and the Transnational Zapatista Solidarity Network.” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations http://www.humboldt.edu (accessed May 2, 2007), 84.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Mertes, 42
[29] Mertes, 228

"Why Do They Hate Us?:" A Discussion of Western Imperial Wars Against the Iraqi People

2007-02-21T09:58:00.000-08:00

The Media, with its often extensive coverage of the Iraq War, has failed miserably in its duty to help the American people understand the war in which we are currently involved. Many Americans do not even realize the manner in which the Iraqi state was created in 1919. Below, I have chronicled the brief history of the British invasion of Mesopotamia in 1914, the creation of the Iraqi state in 1919, and the Anglo-American invasion in 2003, outlining the strategic goals of the invading western powers and the consequences for the Iraqi people. (Please note, the article will be broken into 2 sections, part 1 pertaining to the 1914 British invasion and creation of the Iraqi state, part 2 dealing with the 2003 Anglo-American invasion).

Part 1: 1914

The region of Mesopotamia, lying between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in1534 and remained under Ottoman administration until the collapse of the Empire following the First World War. Under Ottoman rule, Mesopotamia was divided into three separate vilayets, or provinces, with Baghdad at the center, Mosul to the north and Basra to the south. The Ottoman Empire had been in a state of perpetual decline, relative to Europe, since the beginning of the 18th century. In 1856 the Ottoman Empire was admitted into the “Concert of Europe,” thus assuring its integrity, however with the outbreak of war in 1914, the Concert dissolved into hostile camps and Ottoman leaders were forced to choose a side.[i] When the Ottoman Empire chose to ally with the Central Powers, British, French and Russian statesmen immediately set their sights on various prizes which they hoped to acquire by right of conquest. While Russian and French interests in the region were more pronounced, Russia seeking access to the Turkish straits and Palestine, and France claiming “historic rights” to modern day Syria and Lebanon, British interests were more broad, concerned primarily with maintaining control of the vital Suez canal, protecting communications to India and ensuring post-war security for British investment and trade in the region.[ii] British interests in the region, however, would continue to evolve as the war progressed.
Throughout the war, British and French planners were engulfed in fierce diplomatic maneuvering to determine where each state would be allowed to extend its imperial influence, however with the French armies bogged down on the Western Front defending their homeland, the British were able to devote far more forces to the Middle Eastern Theatre. British statesmen, faced with great uncertainty and a very real possibility of defeat, repeatedly made cheap and often conflicting promises. In 1915 Hussein bin’ Ali agreed to launch an uprising against the Turks in exchange for a British promise to support the founding of an independent Arab kingdom (Hussein-McMahon Correspondence 1915-16). The British then proceeded to sign a contradictory agreement with the French in January 1916, known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided the former Ottoman territories between the respective powers, in blatant disregard of the agreement with Hussein. According to Sykes-Picot, Mesopotamia would be divided with the provinces of Basra and Baghdad coming under direct British control and Mosul being incorporated into a French sphere of influence.[iii] The plan was approved by the respective governments in May 1916, thus solidifying British ambitions in Mesopotamia.
No sooner had the British signed on to Sykes-Picot than they began to regret it. Lloyd George, a “Liberal turned land-grabber,” in the words of historian Margaret MacMillan, took power in Great Britain in December 1916.[iv] Over the next year, British forces consolidated power throughout the former empire and by April 1918 troops under the command of Arnold Wilson had complete control over Mesopotamia. Following the conclusion of hostilities, the British, in the fall of 1918, informed France that Sykes-Picot would have to be revised and that they alone would negotiate the armistice with the Turks. The French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, who maintained a relative indifference toward colonial affairs, was nevertheless infuriated, although he knew that the situation on the ground (with 500,000 British forces in the Middle East) left the French with little room to negotiate. Clemenceau agreed to a meeting with Lloyd George in December 1918, shortly before the Paris Peace Conference, and while no official record of their meeting exists, it is known that Clemenceau forfeited French claims to Mosul (which Britain had since come to covet), likely in exchange for British support of French interests along the Rhine.[v]
Entering the Paris Peace Conference, Great Britain had secured French acquiescence to their controlling the whole of Mesopotamia, yet three powerful obstacles remained. The first was anti-imperialist rhetoric, articulated by Vladmir Lenin and the newly empowered Bolsheviks in Russia and trumpeted by British socialists, as well as Woodrow Wilson and his calls for the right of peoples to “self determination.” The second was Hussein bin Ali’s son Feisal, who had led the Arab revolt, and was now calling on the British to make good on their promises to support Arab independence. The third problem facing British planners was the effect of self determination rhetoric, which had inspired nationalist uprisings throughout the British Empire, particularly in Egypt, India and the newly acquired territories of Mesopotamia.
Thus, British policy objectives in Mesopotamia following the war included a military suppression of nationalist revolts; a diplomatic settlement with the French over territorial acquisitions and with the Americans regarding self determination; and the establishment of an effective and cost efficient means of political control in Mesopotamia. Having settled the issue of Mosul with Clemenceau in December, the British appeased American calls for self determination by establishing the mandates system under Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter, which stated that they (the mandatory powers) were responsible for “the rendering of assistance…until such a time as they [the mandated people] are able to stand alone.”[vi] Thus, the British, through “the rendering of assistance,” could practice imperial control as they saw fit. Next, the British needed to find a military solution to the crises in Mesopotamia, where a people’s Congress had demanded independence from British rule and an end to the occupation.[vii] The British military response was harsh as expeditions burned villages and extracted fines, while the air-force set a new precedent in colonial domination by firing machine-guns and dropping bombs from the air.[viii] Once order had been restored a senior official in the Indian office articulated British political aims for the region:

What we want is some administration with Arab institutions which we can safely leave while pulling the strings ourselves; something that won’t cost very much, which Labour can swallow consistent with its principles, but under which our economic and political interests will be secure.[ix]

Regarding how well the British achieved their objectives following the creation of Iraq “the well-rooted country,” one must conclude that the new imperial possession was a relative success. Mosul provided the British with immense oil resources, Basra offered an outlet to the Persian Gulf and Baghdad, irrigated by the Tigris and Euphrates, provided rich, fertile farmland.[x] Furthermore, since mandatory powers could not apply tariffs, Britain maintained a colonial-era system of trade with the region, buying raw materials and agricultural products while dumping finished goods on the unprotected markets.[xi] Finally, the British crowned Feisal, a Sunni, as the king of the newly created country. Since his legitimacy was largely undermined by his rise to political power, he and his successors were forced to rely on British assistance, or risk being overthrown by the majority Shiite populace. These perks came in addition to the original (1914) goals of protecting the Suez Canal and insuring communications to India.
While combining the three former Ottoman provinces into a single administrative unit under effective British control made sense from a British imperial perspective, it did not bode well for the “Iraqi” people, for whom religion, geography and ethnicity proved divisive rather than unifying factors. As historian Margaret MacMillan points out, the creation of the Iraqi state was, in European terms, “like hoping to have Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs make one country.”[xii] Indeed, while half of the newly created country was ethnically Arab, many of the inhabitants were Persian, Assyrian or Kurdish, the latter of which had expected an independent Kurdistan following the war.[xiii] Furthermore, the populations remained divided along religious lines as the Shiite Muslims (roughly 50-percent) and Jews and Christians (roughly 25-percent together) came to be dominated by Sunni Muslims (roughly 25-percent), who were widely regarded as agents of British oppression. Consequently, Iraq became notorious for political instability and, following a massacre of Christian Assyrians in 1933, notorious for dealing with political instability through repression and violence.[xiv] Furthermore, since Iraqi industrial development was diminished by the colonial-style trade agreements, it failed to industrialize until well after WWII.[xv] While I would argue that the dissolution of the Iraqi state along ethnic and sectarian lines was not inevitable, it was made vastly more probable by the British planners and their blatant disregard for the interests of the Iraqi people as they crafted the state to serve their own imperial agenda.
[i] James L Gelvin. The Modern Middle East: A History. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 175.
[ii] Gelvin, 177
[iii] C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner. “The French Colonial Party and French Colonial War Aims, 1914-1918” The Historical Journal: Vol. 17, No. 1. (1974) http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed, February 11, 2007), 85.
[iv] Margaret MacMillan. Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World. ( New York, NY: Random House, 2003), 382.
[v] MacMillan, 382
[vi] Gelvin, 180
[vii] MacMillan, 407
[viii] MacMillan, 408
[ix] MacMillan, 398
[x] Gelvin, 182
[xi] Gelvin, 184
[xii] MacMillan, 397
[xiii] MacMillan, 398
[xiv] Gelvin, 184
[xv] Gelvin, 184

Part 2: 2003

On 22 March, 2003, two days after the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, American President George W. Bush articulated the objectives for the invasion in his weekly radio address, stating “our mission is clear, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.”[i] To date, no evidence of weapons of mass destruction or links to al-Qaeda have been found and most competent observers argue that the Bush administration manipulated intelligence in order to make the case for war.[ii] Indeed, according to Richard Clark, former Chief Counter-Terrorism Advisor of the National Security Council for the Bush Administration, the day after the 11 September attacks Bush ordered the counterterrorism team to look for a connection to Iraq:

“See if Saddam did this. See if he’s linked in any way.” “But, Mr. President, al-Qaeda did this,” Clark replied, to which Bush countered “I know, I know, but…see if Saddam was involved. Just look. I want to know any shred.”[iii]

If we conclude then, that the Bush Administration’s primary purpose for invading Iraq was not to find weapons of mass destruction, end ties with terrorism or “free the Iraqi people,” (this latter assertion proves almost humorous in light of previous US actions),[iv] we must ask: what were the true underlying motivations that led to the 2003 invasion? This is a very difficult question indeed; Richard Haass, the Director of Policy Planning for the State Department during the invasion has said that he will go to his grave without knowing the answer.[v] Personally, I feel that in order to gain an understanding of the military, diplomatic and political objectives for Iraq, one must look to several documents produced throughout the 1990s regarding American policy, both toward Iraq specifically, and the world more broadly. The documents which I will examine came into circulation during the Clinton Administration from within the Pentagon, as well as various “neoconservative” think tanks. Examining these documents, their authors, and the positions they came to hold within the Bush Administration will shed some light on why the United States and Great Britain invaded Iraq in March, 2003.
If I may briefly contextualize US policy toward the Middle East, one should note that between the conclusion of the Second World War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, US interests in the Middle East focused on three main issues: securing access to the valuable oil reserves in the Gulf region; providing for the security of Israel which has been the most strategic US ally since the Truman Administration; and blocking the Soviet Union from extending hegemony into the region.[vi] With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, however, US policy makers were able to dramatically shift their priorities in both the Middle East and throughout the world.
In March 1992 the Pentagon drafted the biannual Defense Policy Guidance Paper, the first since the end of the Cold War. The document, drafted by the Pentagon’s Undersecretary for Policy, Paul D. Wolfowitz in consultation with Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, was leaked to the press and the contents were published in the New York Times article by Patrick E. Tyler (March 8, 1992) entitled “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop.” The document placed a “strong emphasis” on “using military force, if necessary, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other such weapons” in countries such as Iraq and North Korea.[vii] The paper also disregarded collective action through the United Nations, arguing that “the United States should be postured to act independently when collective actions can not be orchestrated.”[viii] The document went on to give a list of possible scenarios for future foreign conflicts, naming Iraq specifically.
The second Clinton era document pertinent to this discussion, entitled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” came out of The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, a Jerusalem based think tank, and was drafted by a host of neoconservative thinkers including Douglas Feith and the study group’s leader Richard Pearle. The report was prepared in 1996 for the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, but focused on a partnership between the United States and Israel in the creation of a “new Middle East.”[ix] While the document centered on curtailing Iranian and Syrian influence in the region, the first step toward this end was the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, to be replaced by a more complicit leader, possibly from the Hashemite family in Jordan.[x]
The third Clinton era document relevant to this discussion came in the form of a letter to President Clinton (26 January 1998) from the Project for the New American Century, a Washington based think tank, to articulate their position on US policy toward Iraq. After arguing that the current policy toward Iraq was not working, they wrote that a new strategy “should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power.”[xi] Furthermore, they maintained that the present course of action left American troops, regional allies such as Israel and “a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil” in danger.[xii] “We believe,” they continued:

[that] the U.S. has the authority under existing UN resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf. In any case, American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.[xiii]

The letter’s signatories included John Bolton, Richard Pearle, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, among others.
Historians of the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq might well choose to ignore these documents, however considering the positions the authors would come to hold in the Bush Administration, such a decision would be ill-advised (please note their respective positions in the footnote).[xiv] Therefore, based on these documents, we can broadly outline the policy objectives that the Bush Administration hoped to achieve by invading Iraq. Militarily, the United States hoped to use the war as a pretext to vastly increase troop presence in the heart of the strategic Gulf region. Diplomatically, the United States sought to test the international response to the newly articulated policy of preemption and to downplay the effectiveness of collective action through the UN. Politically, the United States hoped to curtail attempts by Iran, Syria and Hezbollah to increase their influence in the region, while creating a political ally in Iraq to help work toward this end. The British, for their part, had seen their influence in the region diminish following the Second World War and they now assume the role of junior partner to the United States. Therefore, British interests under Tony Blair essentially aligned with those of Washington.
Regarding whether or not the Anglo-American invaders accomplished their objectives, it is difficult to say, as the occupation and pacification are not yet complete, however the situation in Iraq has become increasingly chaotic and as of February 2007 more than 130 British troops and 3,100 US troops have been killed. The death tolls, combined with an estimated cost of more than $360-billion, have created a situation where the war, as well as President Bush and Prime Minister Blaire, have become immensely unpopular at home and even more so abroad. Iraq, “the Petri dish in which [the] experiment in preemptive policy grew,” has become so unpopular that the international public’s support for the war, which scarcely reached 10-percent anywhere outside the US before the invasion, has plummeted dramatically according to international opinion polls.[xv] If anything, the war has harmed the United States and Britain politically and diplomatically, while empowering Iran and Syria. Militarily, the United States has found “the immediate justification…for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf,”[xvi] yet so long as they are bogged down in the escalating chaos of Iraq it is unlikely that they will be able to consolidate power in the region.
As bleak as the situation in Iraq may be for the Anglo-American invaders, it appears far more dismal for the abject Iraqi people. Although the study has come under criticism from Washington, I have found The Lancet study, released on 11 October 2006, to be the best measure of excess Iraqi deaths since the 2003 invasion. The study estimates that 654,965 excess Iraqi deaths have occurred as a result of the invasion.[xvii] These figures are staggering, especially when one considers the population of Iraq is less than 27-million people. Accordingly, the per-capita death rate in Iraq is far greater than the per-capita death rate in the United States would be if the equivalent of the September 11th attack had happened once per week, every week, since March 2003.
While the Anglo-Americans attempt to blame the Iraqi people for the outbreak of sectarian violence, they forget that it was the British who drew the Iraqi borders in 1919, creating a state with populations largely divided along ethnic and sectarian lines. They also forget that it was the Americans who supported Saddam Hussein through much of his reign, and provided the “dual use agents,” (chemical weapons) which he repeatedly utilized to subdue his recalcitrant populace. Whatever the military, diplomatic and political goals of the Anglo-Americans may have been, morally, the respective governments should do all that they can to support a stable and peaceful regime in Iraq (irrespective of Western policy interests) and provide long-term reparations in an attempt to ameliorate the decades of suffering caused by British and American imperial policies.

[i] George W. Bush. “President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom: President’s Radio Address.” Office of the Press Secretary. (March 22, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov (accessed February 18, 2007).
[ii] For example, in a television interview Condoleezza Rice asserted that a shipment of aluminum tubes were being used as centrifuges for enriching uranium, though the experts in the Department of Energy severely doubted the plausibility. Furthermore, documents recording the sale of uranium from Niger were repeatedly cited by administration officials, though they had long been disproved as fraudulent. See also: Downing Street Memo.
[iii] George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 40.
[iv] For example US sanctions led to the deaths of approximately 500,000 Iraqi children throughout the 1990s.
[v] Packer, 46
[vi] David W. Lesch, ed., The United States and the Middle East: A Historical and Political Reassessment, 3d ed., New U.S. Policies for a new Middle East?, by William Quandt (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), 460.
[vii] Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls For Insuring No Rivals Develop: A One-Superpower World,” New York Times, 8 March 1992, p. 1, 14 -Column 1.
[viii] Ibid.
[ix] Richard Pearle and others, A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm (Jerusalem; Washington D.C.: The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies’ “Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000,” 1996).
[x] Ibid.
[xi] Elliott Abrams and others, to The Honorable William J. Clinton, President of the United States, 26 January 1998, Project for the New American Century, Washington D.C. http://www.newamericancentury.org (accessed 17 February, 2007).
[xii] Ibid.
[xiii] Ibid.
[xiv] Richard Cheney who oversaw the drafting of the Defense Policy Guidance Paper was selected as Vice President under George W. Bush; Paul Wolfowitz who drafted the Defense Policy Guidance Paper and signed the letter to Clinton became the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Richard Pearle who helped draft the “Clean Break” paper and signed the letter to Clinton became the Chairman of the Defense Policy Board; Douglass Feith who helped draft the “Clean Break” paper ran the Office of Special Planning within the Pentagon which gathered much of the faulty intelligence that justified the invasion of Iraq; Donald Rumsfeld, who signed the letter to Clinton, was selected as Secretary of Defense; and John Bolton, who signed the letter to Clinton, became the US Ambassador to the United Nations.
[xv] Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2003), 4, 21.
[xvi] Thomas Donnelly and others, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century (Washington D.C.: Project for the New American Century, September 2000), 14.
[xvii] Gilbert Burnham and others, Mortality After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample Survey (Oxford: The Lancet, October 11 2006), http://www.thelancet.com/ (accessed February 16, 2007) 1.

The Colonial Legacy in Kenya

2007-01-03T10:18:00.000-08:00

The focus of this article centers on Jomo Kenyatta as the leader of a post-colonial Kenya. While dealing with a case study of a specific nation, the basic premise, primarily, that a change in a political institution which fails to address socioeconomic inequalities does not improve the lives of those oppressed by a former colonial governing apparatus, is a universal lesson. The premise can be applied to many post-colonial societies throughout the world, such as post-apartheid South Africa. Furthermore, in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, in former Palestine, a peace plan bringing about a successful end to Israeli settlement and occupation can not be achieved through political reform only (as we are currently seeing), without socioeconomic reform which can relieve the devestating effects on Palestinian society by decades of repressive colonial rule. I hope that readers of this article will better understand post-colonial struggles that the people in African societies face, as well as the struggles of other societies which are undergoing similar transformations in the world today. The merits of this article have been verified by Wazir Mohammed, a Doctoral student in Binghamton University's Department of Sociology.

In 1946 the British governor explained to the people of Kenya that Britain controls their land and resources “as of right, the product of historical events [emphasis added] which reflect the greatest glory of our fathers and grandfathers.”[i] If “the greater part of the wealth of the country is at present in our hands,” he continued, that is because “this land we have made is our land by right – by right of achievement.”[ii] The situation in Kenya at the dawn of independence was indeed, as articulated by the British governor, a product of historical events, specifically, the period of colonial settlement and rule. The inequalities of colonialism were deeply entrenched in the political, economic and social structures of Kenyan society. Why then, less than a year after Kenyan independence, did the country’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, in a broadcast speech declare “Let this be the day on which all of us commit ourselves to erase from our minds all the hatreds and difficulties of those years which now belong to history. Let us agree that we shall never refer to the past.”?[iii] Why did he tell (Mau Mau) veterans and former detainees who demanded the return of their land that “nothing is free,” and if they wanted land “they would have to purchase it like everyone else.”?[iv] Perhaps the role of Jomo Kenyatta, widely regarded as the father of an independent Kenya, should be critically reexamined.
In post-apartheid South Africa, it was taken for granted that enfranchisement of the African population would redress the legacy of apartheid by way of the extension of socioeconomic rights. Political reform, however, has failed to transform the blatant social and economic inequalities that historical circumstances have left so entrenched in South African society. A failure to transform the present by confronting the historical past has left the realities of apartheid in South Africa largely intact. Perhaps a look at the supposed “decolonization,” in the wake of Kenyan independence, might have shown that the neglect of past legacies ensure their continuation in the future.
Like Nelson Mandela some thirty years later, Jomo Kenyatta emerged from detention preaching forgiveness.[v] Time and again, Kenyatta would declare that the new nation must “forgive and forget the past.”[vi] For the loyalists who had seized their neighbor’s lands, raped their wives, killed their children and murdered their husbands, it meant continuation of their comparatively luxurious lifestyles.[vii] For the British, including those directly culpable for the atrocities committed in their gulag, it meant a “veil over the past,” in the words of Iain Macleod, who headed the colonial office in the months after the Hola massacre.[viii] For the white settlers, it meant preservation of their lands and a license to continue their practices of exploitative farming. As for the Mau Mau and its sympathizers, it meant suppression of their legacy and a new independent government which, like its colonial predecessor, did nothing to redress the abject situation which had driven them to rebellion in the first place.
Thus, I propose that Jomo Kenyatta, despite his supposed title as the father of independence was, in reality, a stark opportunist who preserved a colonial legacy to guarantee his own wealth and power. I am convinced that an examination of Kenyatta’s government in an independent Kenya, will illustrate how and why the colonial status-quo remained largely intact during a period of purported decolonization.
In December 1964, a year after Kenyan independence, the regional constitution was abolished and Kenya became a republic, with Kenyatta exercising power as both the head of state and head of executive, thereby enhancing his position and authority while curbing the influence of the cabinet and parliament.[ix] As president, Kenyatta held the exclusive right to appoint and dismiss ministers and vice-presidents at will.[x] The president exercised his authority through provincial administrations inherited from the period of colonial rule.[xi] The Provincial Commissioners (PC) and District Commissioners (DC), described as “mini dictators” by one scholar, were able to penetrate all corners of Kenyan society, and played a decisive role in controlling the population on behalf of the government.[xii] Kenyatta relied on the predominantly loyalist colonial administration, rather that the nationalist parties, because many of them enjoyed a privileged position and thus, had a vital interest in preservation of the status quo.[xiii]
At this juncture we must pause and reflect on why Kenyatta would propose maintenance of the (colonial) status quo in a time of purported decolonization. Kenyatta’s economic and development strategy hinged on preservation of the colonial-settler economic system as a spring-board for development, a point to which I will later return.[xiv] Much of the power, both economic and political, in post-independence Kenya, remained with the loyalists who had run the colonial administration. Terence Gavaghan, a former head of the detention camps in Mwea, stayed in Kenya after independence, overseeing the transitioning of loyalists into the Administration.[xv] Kenyatta moved to expand and Africanize the bureaucracy, planting African nationalist politicians in an alliance with the loyalists who had helped establish the colonial administration.[xvi] In addition, African capitalists emerged in various branches of the economic spectrum including trade, transportation and farming, most of whom, relied upon government assistance and protections to ensure their wealth.[xvii] The relative prosperity generated by the newly established elite allowed for a small but substantial middle class to emerge and thrive as well.[xviii] The former loyalists, newly established bureaucrats, emerging African capitalists and powerful white-settlers served as the pillars supporting Kenyatta’s government. Recognizing the newly established alliance, J.M. Kariuki, the socialist politician who knew the system from within, argued “a small but powerful group, a greedy self-seeking elite in the form of politicians, civil-servants and businessmen, has steadily but very surely monopolized the fruits of independence to the exclusion of the majority of the people.”[xix]
Kariuki was not alone in recognizing that the overwhelming majority of the people remained virtually unaffected by economic and social change. The government of Jomo Kenyatta was well aware of the problems inherent in his brand of decolonization. He was also aware, however, that ethnic divisions and feelings of disenfranchisement presented major obstacles in organizing the masses.[xx] One argument often used to discredit the Mau Mau is that ethnically, the movement was Kikuyu and thus did not represent the people of Kenya as a whole. The colonial government, however, had been active in its attempts to fragment Kenyan society and Kenyatta’s government continued the trend. The Mau Mau, an organization of the Kikuyu masses, by the Kikuyu masses, had been the only group in Kenya that had become highly politicized during the colonial era.[xxi] In possibly his greatest contribution to “political stability,” Kenyatta moved to undermine the militant Kikuyu masses by denouncing them as a threat to peace. Before a crowd in Kiambu, Kenyatta argued that “Mau Mau was a disease which had been eradicated, and must never be remembered again.”[xxii] Many of the movement’s supporters found themselves behind bars, with Kenyatta signing their detention orders from the same desk as Sir Evelyn Baring had once employed for the same purpose.[xxiii]
Kenyatta also faced pressure from the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), which came to include his former ally Oginga Odinga, who had become disillusioned with the presidents rule. The rise of the KPU might have served as a rallying point for anti-government mobilization however the party, which had been established by radical opposition from the KANU, came under increasing harassment from Kenyatta’s government, and was finally banned outright in 1969.[xxiv] The KPU was the last political party to form in opposition to Kenyatta’s KANU.
The increasingly organized trade unions in Kenya also might have served as a unifying force for anti-government mobilization. Tom Mboya, who had become increasingly involved in the trade union movement throughout the 1950s threatened, in 1962, to leave the KANU and use the Kenya Federation of Labor as an organizational basis for a new party.[xxv] In order to neutralize the influence of radicals such as Mboya in the trade union movement, the government, in September 1965, forced the various trade unions to join the newly formed Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU).[xxvi] With the formation of the KPU, the radical trade union leaders supporting Odinga were suspended from the COTU, and when they threatened to form a rival organization the Labor Minister informed them that such an association would not be registered.[xxvii] In August 1966, Kenyatta ordered four of the leading trade unionists supporting the KPU to be arrested and detained.[xxviii] Kenyatta had thus undermined the trade union movement, as well as the KPU, and the former Mau Mau resistance, thereby assuring none of them could serve as a base to mobilize the population toward anti-government reform.
Having discussed Kenyatta’s government and its power base, as well as the eradication of opposition forces, I would like to return briefly to his policies toward decolonization in Kenya pertaining to the land situation and the white-settlers. As mentioned, Kenyatta based his economic and development plan for Kenya on the colonial settler-based economic system. From the outset, Kenyatta moved to allay the fears of the settlers and convince them, with their knowledge and investments, to remain in Kenya. In a speech delivered in Nakuru, the heart of the settler nation, Kenyatta won over the white hostile crowd, telling them “We are going to forget the past and look forward to the future.”[xxix] “We want you to stay and farm well in this country,” he continued, “that is the policy of this government.”[xxx] For the white settlers, the colonial image of the native Africans as “lazy and undesirable,” in need of “punctuality, cleanliness and a greater appreciation for method in general and protection of property in particular,” remained fully intact.[xxxi] Images of Kenyatta however, the man once perceived as a “black devil,” began to change almost overnight. Indicative of the change, a Kitale businessman argued “We are awfully lucky to have such a fine statesman in power.”[xxxii] A former activist in the United Party, a pre-independence extreme right-wing settler party, claimed “Kenyatta is a realist…He needed large scale farmers to stay on, to keep the economy ticking over, to feed the nation.”[xxxiii] Statistical analysis will indicate why both the white settlers, as well as the president, were able to benefit from preservation of the status quo.
The thousands of settlers who fled Kenya after independence were given market rates for their land by the Kenyan government, which used nearly £12.5 million in British loans to finance the buyout.[xxxiv] Much of the land was subsequently resold to European investors and wealthy Kikuyu, most of whom had been loyalists throughout the period of emergency.[xxxv] Of the more than thirty-thousand white settlers who stayed, many indeed continued to “farm well” in Kenya. According to the Clerk of Kitale Municipality, the capital of Trans Nzoia - an administrative district of the Rift Valley Province, in 1967 white people still owned 63% of the farms, though they represented only 1.4% of the district population.[xxxvi] In 1967 agricultural exports accounted for 60% of the nations export earnings, and large-scale farming - overwhelmingly owned by whites, accounted for 75% of Kenya’s marketed agricultural products.[xxxvii] Accordingly, the maintenance of the colonial settler-economy was essential for the short-term viability of the nation.
Sociologist Frank Furedi argues that the Kikuyu squatters in the rift valley, from whom Mau Mau arose, were “the quintessential product of settler colonialism and the appropriate agency for its liquidation.”[xxxviii] The squatter struggles from which the Mau Mau arose were primarily over mbeca and mugunda – money and land.[xxxix] Jomo Kenyatta had never been the oath-taking revolutionary he was purported to be.[xl] Rather, in the words of historian Caroline Elkins, Kenyatta was a moderate politician who “wanted a piece of the colonial pie and to be accepted like the rest of the African colonial elite,” and she continues, “he sought the social and economic privileges that went along with that acceptance.”[xli] By assuring that mbeca and mugunda stayed in the hands of the colonial elite, Kenyatta undermined not only the Mau Mau uprising, but all of the have-nots in Kenyan society who shared the progressive vision of the Mau Mau fighters.
In the end, the fruits of freedom were to be divided amongst Kenyatta’s emerging oligarchy, the loyalists, and the settlers who remained in Kenya.[xlii] Those who recognized Kenyatta’s collaboration with the colonial establishment, such as J.M. Kariuki and Tom Mboya were murdered, while others like Jaramogi Oginga Odinga were detained. As for the loyalists and British colonial officials, there would be no prosecutions, and many of them continued to live highly privileged lives among the Kenyan elite.[xliii] As for the settlers who remained in Kenya, many of them (and their descendents) continue to live lives of racial privilege to this day.[xliv] As for Mau Mau, the “true movers of history” in the words of Furedi, their legacy was to remain buried. There have been no monuments to their achievements, and Kenyan children are kept deliberately ignorant of their history.[xlv] Those who suffered under the colonial government, as well as the period of emergency, have not been included in the post-colonial social rebuilding, and many of them continue to live abject lives while their loyalist neighbors prosper.[xlvi] The former Mau Mau adherents continue to long for a day when the damage rendered by Kenyatta’s silencing of history might be undone. Change can only come, argued one former Mau Mau adherent, “once our people are able to mourn in public and our children and our grandchildren will know how hard we fought and how much we lost to make Kenya free for them.”[xlvii]

[i] Noam Chomsky. Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance. (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, LLC., 2003), 183.
[ii] Chomsky, 183
[iii] Caroline Elkins. Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya. (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, LLC., 2005), 360.
[iv] Elkins, 361
[v] Elkins, 359
[vi] Elkins, 360
[vii] Ibid.
[viii] Elkins, 363
[ix] M. Tamarkin. “The Roots of Political Stability in Kenya.” African Affairs Vol. 77, No.308 (1978), http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed December 4, 2006). 302.
[x] Tamarkin, 302
[xi] Tamarkin, 306
[xii] Tamarkin, 306-7
[xiii] Ibid.
[xiv] Tamarakin, 306
[xv] Elkins, 48, 364
[xvi] Tamarakin, 311
[xvii] Ibid.
[xviii] Tamarakin, 312
[xix] Ibid.
[xx] Tamarakin, 316
[xxi] Ibid.
[xxii] Elkins, 361
[xxiii] Ibid.
[xxiv] Tamarakin, 308
[xxv] Tamarakin, 310
[xxvi] Ibid.
[xxvii] Ibid.
[xxviii] Ibid.
[xxix] Elkins, 361-2
[xxx] Elkins, 362
[xxxi] Peter Knauss. “From Devil to Father Figure: The Transformation of Jomo Kenyatta by Kenya Whites.” The Journal of Modern African Studies: Vol. 9, No. 1 (1971), http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed December 4, 2006). 132.
[xxxii] Knauss, 133
[xxxiii] Knauss, 136
[xxxiv] Elkins, 362
[xxxv] Ibid.
[xxxvi] Knauss, 132
[xxxvii] Knauss, 136
[xxxviii] Atieno Odhiambo. Review of Frank Furedi’s The Mau Mau War in Perspective. The Journal of African History Vol. 32, No. 2 (1991), http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed December 4, 2006). 363.
[xxxix] Odhiambo, 363
[xl] Elkins, 358
[xli] Elkins, 358
[xlii] Elkins, 361
[xliii] Elkins, 360
[xliv] Elkins, 362
[xlv] Elkins, 367
[xlvi] Ibid.
[xlvii] Ibid.

Africa: A Case Study in Capitalism, Colonial Dominance and Genocide

2006-11-13T15:00:00.000-08:00

This is a three part posting on Western exploitation and colonial domination of the African continent and its people. Part 1 deals with the way in which African slavery and the establishment of plantations on European colonial possessions was a necessary element in the rise of the capitalist system many of us endorse today. Part 2 is a brief discussion of the "scramble for Africa" which marked the beginning of European colonialism on the African continent in the 1880's. Part 3 is a biography of King Leopold II of Belgium his systematic genocide in the Belgian Congo which reduced the Congolese population from 20 million to only 10 million in a span of 40 years. Statues and monuments of Leopold, one of histories greatest mass murderers, adorn Belgium to this day and the government has refused to pay any type of reparations to the Congolese people, many of whom live in abject poverty as a direct result of Belgian exploitation.

Part 1: Profit Over People

source: "Capitalism and Slavery," by Eric Williams

In accordance with 16th century precedents, the Negro slave trade was entrusted to a company which was given the sole right by a nation to trade in slaves on the coast of West Africa and to maintain forts necessary for the protection of the trade post. They then could transport and sell the slaves in the West Indies. Accordingly, the British incorporated the Company of Royal Adventurers in 1663 and later replaced it with the Royal African Company in 1672, as did the Swedish, Danish and French, following the precedent set by the Portugese in 1450. Individual traders were excluded and thus, the slave trade became, in effect, an economic venture monopolized by European colonial states, thus assuring that profits would flow directly to each respective treasury.

Merchants and Plantation heads alike began to complain about the government monopolies, claiming them to be inefficient and unprofitable, as well as unable to meet demand and provide low prices. Accordingly, on July 5, 1698 the British gave in and allowed the slave trade to be open to all British subjects, so long as a payment of a 10 percent duty was paid on all goods exported to Africa for the purchase of slaves. This development proved profitable in the newly introduced economic theory of mercantilism which stated that a country could increase its stock by a favorable balance of trade, exporting more goods than were imported. Thus, the increased amount of goods traded for slaves (since more slaves could be bartered under the new system) would actually accelerate the growth of the British treasury. In addition, the slaves helped to increase production on the colonies and thus, provided sugar and other tropical commodities which otherwise would have needed to be imported from foreigners, upsetting the favorable balance of trade. As the plantation colonies grew, so too did the markets for British industrial goods and industry flourished in Britain as a result of the ever growing markets. The colonies of the West Indies, with the supply of sugar and other tropical commodities exerted itself as an ideal colonial asset, as opposed to those in the Americas, which began to compete with the colonial empires by producing comparable manufactured goods.

By 1690, the amount of capital produced by the planters of the West Indies was so astonishing that Sir Dalby Thomas that every white man in the West Indies, (through exploitation of the valuable "commodity" "black ivory ") was one hundred and thirty times more valuable, than a white man at home. It was estimated that the profit involved with the slave trade amounted to no less than 36 percent of Britains total commercial profits. As mentioned, as the amount of slaves traded increased, so to did profits and the rise in profits led inevitably to more slaves being traded. By the 18th century this cycle had culminated in one of the greatest migrations in recorded history. The conditions, however were so appalling that, for every 100 slaves that left Africa, only 84 would reach the West Indies and, by the end of three years about one third of them would be dead. Thus, for every 100 that left the coast, only 56 would be alive after three years. This astounding cost in human life, which fueled the massive accumulation of capital, grants merit to the saying that in Liverpool (which grew as a direct result of the slave trade) "the principal streets had been marked out by chains, and the walls of its houses cemented by the blood, of the African slave." The saying may no doubt be extended to countless cities in the colonial empires, whose foundations were likewise laid with the blood and tears of the enslaved African.

The slave trade had another result, besides the massive accumulation of wealth for the European powers. The amount of slaves traded became so dramatic that, by 1787 the population of the British West Indies consisted of 58,353 whites, 7,706 free Negroes and 461,864 slaves, with an annual average of 34,000 slaves exported from Africa. The population of the French West Indies was relatively similar, with an annual export of 20,000 slaves from Africa. This enormous population shift in addition to slaves who perished, resulted in Africa being deprived of many of its most prosperous members of society, crippling the continents development with consequences that reverberate to the present.

Part 2: Capitalism, Competition, Empire and the Partition of Africa

At the onset of the 19th century, Europeans began a process known as the "opening of Africa," whereby the continent was opened to exploration and the exploitation of the continents relatively untapped raw materials. While many of the European powers took control of parts of the continent along the coast and established trading posts, the majority of the African continent remained free of European control. Since Europeans already had access to the raw materials of Africa through trade and trade posts, the question arises as to why Europe proceeded to slice up and distribute Africa amongst themselves, a process known as the "Scramble for Africa," which began in 1885 following the failure of the Berlin Conference and ran through the onset of the 20th century. Examining circumstances in Europe, leading up to the onset of the scramble, will help to illustrate the necessity of further "opening" the African continent.

The unification of Germany in 1871 and Bismark’s policy of Weltpolitik to establish the German Empire’s "place in the sun;" the "Long Depression," from 1873-1876 which hampered the economies of many of the European powers; strategic interests, most notably control of the Suez canal, which was seen as a vital strategic possession; and the advancement of the modern capitalist system, which John A Hobson argued was the necessary precursor to imperialism - were all significant factors. The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 attempted to set rules for the colonization of Africa, many of which were not followed - almost resulting in war amongst colonial powers on several occasions; the end of the Berlin Conference is generally seen as the onset of the scramble and indeed, within a decade all of the continent save Liberia and the Orange free state remained independent of European control (Ethiopia would also gain nominal independence following the defeat of Italy in 1896).

Returning to the reasons for the scramble, the unification of Germany in 1871 under Bismark found the large and powerful nation in a position to compete with Britain and France for European dominance, yet it entered the scene well after most of the world had been colonized. Germany was a quickly rising industrial power and lacking colonies from which to extract raw materials they moved to establish a footing on the African continent. With Germany, who British and French planners already viewed as a rising threat, setting its sights on Africa, Britain and France also moved to grab a piece of Africa, motivated in part, to assure Germany did not seize all the territory first. Other emerging powers, such as Italy, and nominal powers such as Belgium and the former colonial powers of Portugal and Spain also acquired territories on the continent, none of whom managed to control as much territory as Britain, France or Germany.

A second factor in the move to control Africa was the "Long Depression," caused by the reparations payments from the Franco-Prussian war as well as the collapse of the Vienna Stock exchange in 1873 and various other factors. This was a major cause of the "new imperialism" which the scramble for Africa constituted. Many of the European powers were experiencing a rising deficit in their balance of trade and Africa was seen as a vast new market as well as a possible area for development and capital investment. This was in addition to the prospect of increased control over raw materials.

The third factor was strategic interests and control of trade, especially the Suez canal, control of which meant dominance of the primary trade route between the east and west. The British had envisioned strategic control "from Cape to Cairo" a notion made famous by the South African businessman and colonizer Cecil Rhodes. The "red line through Africa," which Rhodes envisioned, uniting resource rich South Africa with the trade route of the Suez canal by railway was hampered by German control of Tanganyika. This British vision also encroached upon French ambitions to extend their control from French West-Africa toward the eastern shores, ultimately the British won out.

While this scramble was fueled by the competition between the European powers, it was also fueled by accelerating Western capitalism. The people of the African continent, whose lands were taken, were seen as idle and lazy, their lifestyles of communal land control and subsistence farming, hunting and gathering did not produce a surplus to be bought sold or traded. These people then, it was thought, could be civilized by revolutionizing agricultural production to produce cash crops, opening mines and setting up light industry where cheap African labor could be produced. The total political, economic, cultural and social intrusion of the African continent which the "scramble for Africa" represented - like the slave trade before it - had devastating consequences for the people, which can be seen by the massive poverty and violence, as Africans on their own continent are still deprived of the land seized from them by European colonialists which is now owned by their white descendents and Western multi-nationals.

Part 3: “beto febole yiwa” - “Rubber is Death”

source: An incredibly well produced and eye-opening documentary film produced by the BBC entitled "White King, Red Rubber, Black Death." The film is available to be viewed in its entirity here: "White King, Red Rubber, Black Death"

For the people of the Equator Province of the Congo, where some of the worst atrocities of the late 19th and early 20th centuries took place, there is a saying to describe the experience during the reign of King Leopold II: “beto febole yiwa” - rubber is death. In 1880 the population of the area encompassing the Congo Free State was as high as 20 million people. By 1920, the population had shrunk by one half, to little over 10 million. Population loss on such a massive scale constitutes genocide in the minds of anyone who applies elementary moral standards, yet statues and monuments of the perpetrator, King Leopold II, adorn the cities of Belgium to this day.

The documentary “White King, Red Rubber, Black Death” shows how the greed of one man systematically raped the African land of both its resources and its souls to produce the grandiose and splendor of his Belgian nation. As one travels through the magnificent cities today there is still no mention of the millions of exploited Congolese at the foundations, and accordingly, historical revisionism continues to keep Leopold’s name from assuming its rightful place on the list of humanities greatest mass murderers.

King Leopold II’s quest for overseas colonies began in the late 1870s, when he appointed Henry Morton Stanley to map out and establish a colony in the Congo region of North Africa, which had yet to be claimed by any of the European powers. The area, more than seventy times the size of Belgium was granted to Leopold in 1885 at the Berlin Conference and he established the Congo Free State that same year. Leopold’s agents had acquired documents signed by tribal leaders, many of whom did not understand the nature of the agreements. Nevertheless, Belgium’s fellow colonial powers deemed them to be binding treaties laying a legal framework for the exploitation that was to follow.

Unlike the older colonial powers, Britain, France and the Netherlands, among others, who no longer extracted wealth from their colonies, but rather, used them for investment and as a symbol of national prestige; King Leopold sought colonial possessions as a means to extract wealth for himself and his country. Upon his crowning, Leopold announced that he planned to make Belgium “greater, stronger and more beautiful.” The rise of rubber as an essential material in the manufacture of tires for automobiles gave the monarch his chance. The Congo was a rich source of rubber and the people a tremendous source of slave labor. As the king of a Christian nation, Leopold was able to justify his actions in the region, not only as a benevolent act of philanthropy to spread civilization, but also in the name of Christianity, adding a further veil of legitimacy. The Belgian army was dispatched to the Congo along with the Christian missionaries. The African people were freed from their brutal Arab slave masters and then forced into a far more devastating system of slave labor in service of the Belgian kingdom.

King Leopold once claimed that he never sought to create any wealth for himself and was only interested in spreading the light of civilization to the Congo. In reality, the profits from rubber produced by Congolese slave labor elevated Leopold to one of the richest men in the world. Using his own private funds accumulated from his African acquisition, Leopold took on huge construction projects including the Cinquantenaire and several museums such as the Royal Museum for Central Africa; none of his projects give any mention of the people whose labor was exploited to construct them. So as not make public the massive fortune which he was accumulating, Leopold kept the funding for the projects a secret. As the monarch’s individual wealth, as well as that of his kingdom grew dramatically, so too did his greed, until it spiraled out of control culminating in a system of suffering and death which remains almost unparalleled in the history of colonial domination.

What separates these crimes from others committed in the name of empire is not only the utter lack of humanity, but the way in which it was systematized and dictated from the very top of the Belgian government. The Belgian General Leon Fievez was an exemplary figure in illustrating how rubber production could reach its pinnacle. Fievez was the General in charge of the Equator Province of the Congo, where some of the worst atrocities took place. It is reported that Fievez, the “devil of the equator,” as he was known by the populace, killed roughly 1,300 Congolese, burned down 162 villages, cut down plantations and destroyed vegetable gardens - leading indirectly to countless additional deaths through malnutrition and starvation. Accordingly, Fievez also had the highest rubber production in all of the Congo. Knowing full well the methodology employed to increase rubber production Leopold sent a message to the Governor General that the Belgian state would pay commissions to stimulate zeal. The message to the Generals on the ground was clear - they could kill, burn and loot to coerce their slave laborers into increased production. By failing to prosecute or even condemn the brutal tactics he knew were taking place, King Leopold II granted consent to the genocidal tactics which were being employed; by paying commissions for higher rubber production, he not only consented, but encouraged these crimes against humanity. As Joseph Conrad wrote, in “Heart of Darkness,” - his account condemning Belgian atrocities in the Congo: “to tear treasures from the bowels of the land was their desire, with no more moral purpose at the back of it than there is to burglars breaking into a safe.”

With the prospect of increased commissions, the Belgian Generals found new ways to maximize profits. Concession companies were granted “hostage licenses,” allowing them to capture the wives of the slave laborers. The prettiest of them were often raped. Every 15 days the Africans brought forward the fruits of their labor, if the amount sufficed, they might be assured their wives safe return, failure could equal punishment or even death for both husband and wife. African soldiers employed by Belgium were used to carry out the murders, and to assure that they did not waste ammunition they were forced to collect severed hands from their victim’s corpses. To avoid the wrath of the Belgian Generals, when ammunition was wasted, the soldiers often severed hands from living people, mostly women and children. Leopold realized the system was a success and continued to employ it for more than a decade. While total profits remain unknown, it is estimated that Leopold’s profits from his private crown domain alone (which remained a secret until 1902) was the equivalent of 231 million euros, an extraordinary wealth for his time.

In 1900 Edmund Dene Morel a London journalist of West African affairs began a personal campaign against King Leopold II. Familiar to Belgian trade with the Congo, Morel was able to prove that while rubber was arriving at Antwerp all that left the port destined for the Congo was guns and ammunition. Responding to such allegations the British government appointed Roger Casement as a consul to the Congo Free State. Casement produced a 50 page report condemning the Congo Free State as the most brutal colonial administration the African continent had ever known, going so far as to prove that the atrocities were systematic and top-down. Striking a further blow to Leopold was the formation of the Congo Reform Association in 1904 by Edmund Morel, which quickly grew into a massive European coalition. In response, Leopold appointed his own international commission to report on the Congo, hoping he control the findings. His strategy proved ineffective as the commission received damning testimony about the horrors of the Congo. Some of the most condemning came from a missionary named John Harris, who had personally witnessed Belgian brutality. Harris contended that King Leopold II should be sent to the gallows. Following the commission’s findings, the Governor General to the Congo took his own life. In 1906 the book “Red Rubber” was published, striking a final blow to King Leopold II. With the tide of international opinion turning against him, Leopold ordered the destruction of all records pertaining to administration of the Congo Free State. In 1908 the CFS officially became a Belgian colony. King Leopold II died the next year, his public funeral procession was met with taunts and boos. At the time of his death, he was widely regarded as the most hated man in Europe. It seemed that the efforts of Morel and Casement, among others, had succeeded in revealing the true character of the fallen monarch.

Today, the hatred of King Leopold II, so prominent with his death, seems to have been largely forgotten. Statues of Leopold still adorn Belgium, including a bust of the former monarch which has been erected only recently. In the various memorials, Leopold is portrayed as a civilizer and a benefactor. Morel and Casement, who led the great human rights campaign against Leopold were condemned for pro-German sympathies during the First World War - Casement was executed - and their names and achievements were largely swept into the dust bin of history. Belgium seems to be suffering from a severe case of historical amnesia; Even the Royal Museum for Central Africa fails to give any mention to the atrocities committed by the former monarch. As mentioned, when faced with international condemnation, Leopold ordered the destruction of the most condemning CFS records while others remain classified by the Belgian government to this day. Thus, when Leopold’s defenders are faced with accusations against him, they may simply respond by saying “bring us the proof.” Has King Leopold II been vilified in death? The question will be answered by the next generation of historians and social scientists.

Today, abject poverty and violence continue in the Congo. The people and resources are still exploited by foreign mining operations, as reported by the UN. Since 1998 more than four million people have died in a brutal civil war. Agencies in Belgium such as Pro Belgica continue to lobby the Ministry of Education against criticism of their role in the Congo. The nation still refuses to pay any type of indemnity for their destructive role in the Congo or even admit that their genocide may have constituted a severe human rights violation. King Leopold II, more than a century after his crimes against humanity, continues to be protected by his subjects.

The Origins of Western Imperialism in the Modern Middle East

2006-07-17T18:17:00.000-07:00

With the current crises between Israel and Lebanon I regret that Lebanon and Palestine are not discussed, however I plan to post about them in the future.

The cold war, between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, fueled a fierce competition for spheres of influence and domination throughout the world, including the Middle East. The strategic location and valuable resources made the Middle East a desirable imperial possession. Describing the US – Soviet competition in the Middle East, a cold war historian labeled the rivalry “old wine in new bottles”.[1] Indeed, foreign intrusion in Middle Eastern affairs began far before the Bolshevik revolution established a socialist republic in Russia, and only decades after the United States declared independence from British rule.
The arrival of the 19th century found the British and French empires expanding their imperial influence and colonial possessions throughout the world. The vast imperial possessions became the lifeblood that fueled the growing empires. The Middle East, a region of substantial wealth and resources at the turn of the 19th century became a prime target. The British and French practiced a foreign policy throughout the Middle East that not only disrupted the economies of the said countries, but created a system whereby the European powers extracted raw materials and opened markets throughout the region. The system was protected through political diplomacy which took place under the shadow of British and French military forces.
Through economic, political and military intrusion in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and Persia; the British and French were able to create semi-sovereign imperial possessions throughout much of, what is today considered, the modern Middle East. One may be inclined to argue that the status of these Middle Eastern entities failed to constitute them as imperial possessions. However, if we accept the definition by imperialist scholar Ronald Robinson - that imperialism is the system “whereby agents of an expanding society gain inordinate influence or control over the vitals of weaker societies”[2]; or the Encyclopedia Britannica definition:
The policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of a nation especially by direct territorial acquisitions or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas; broadly: the extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence.

it must be agreed that the aforementioned regions of the Middle East did in fact constitute British and French imperial possessions.
Examination of European intervention in the Middle East will highlight the imperialist agendas of Britain and France in the Middle East and how the nations were able to profit at the expense of the region in question. The events of the 19th century in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and Persia, will lay the framework for understanding the relationship between the western powers and the Middle East. Highlighting the similarities between all of the case studies will provide insight into how a system of western domination evolved in the Middle East. Understanding the evolution of this power structure will serve, not only to contextualize relations between the Middle East and the western powers; but also to help understand the extreme resentment of the west that exists in the Middle East today.
To begin the study, I will discuss the evolution of Egypt into a western dominated society throughout the 19th century. Following decisive victories in Italy and occupation of the Ionian Islands, the young general Napoleon Bonaparte urged the seizure of Egypt as France’s share of the crumbling Ottoman Empire.[3] The French diplomat, Charles de Talleyrand convinced the directory that an expedition to Egypt would serve a double purpose, providing the French with a valuable colony in Egypt, and serving a strategic position to challenge the British position in the “crown jewel” of India.[4] In 1798, the French landed a fleet in Alexandria Egypt under the command of General Bonaparte. Following the victory at the Battle of the Pyramids, Napoleon declared that “No colony has ever offered greater advantages.”[5]
Napoleon’s ground victories meant little as Admiral Nelson destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir in August 1798; which, followed by a naval blockade forced the landed French forces to capitulate in 1801.[6] Although the French colonization of Egypt was never realized, Zachary Lockman (author of Contending Visions of the Middle East: the History and Politics of Orientalism) notes:
The French invasion of Egypt inaugurated a new era in which the lands of the Middle East and North Africa would be increasingly subject to European economic and political encroachment, and finally European colonial rule.[7]

The Malmuk ruler’s army had been decimated and a young Ottoman officer Mehmet (Mohammad) Ali Pasha began to consolidate power, aligning himself with influential Egyptian merchants.[8] He was appointed Ottoman viceroy of Egypt in 1805. Ali began an intense process of modernization, looking to revolutionary France as a model. Realizing the necessity of a strong military, Ali brought in French military advisors such as Colonel Seve, who had served under Napoleon, and began to conscript peasants.[9] The military under Ali became the utmost power of the Middle East at roughly one hundred thousand strong.[10]
In 1821 the Greeks began a push for independence from Ottoman rule. The sultan offered Ali control of Greater Syria if he could put down the revolt. Egypt’s newly modernized military was able to suppress the revolt, however fearing the rise of a powerful military in Egypt that could serve to upset the balance of power, led to British, French and Russian intervention to rout Egyptian forces at the battle of Navarino.[11] Nevertheless, Ali felt that his side of the bargain had been upheld and through his son Ibrahim, occupied Syria and began to integrate the region into the Egyptian economy.
The possession of Greater Syria combined with influence in Sudan and parts of Arabia provided raw materials that were vital to Ali’s modernization efforts. He focused the economy around cash-crops, and borrowed money to build modern railroad and port systems, to get goods to Europe faster. The money they borrowed not only had to be paid back, but was used to foster closer economic ties to Europe, both aspects positive from a European perspective. Egyptian trade with the Ottoman Empire declined as trade relations with Europe rose dramatically.[12]
As Ali continued to modernize, his power and influence in the region grew. Throughout the 1830s the Ottomans battled with Ali’s forces for control of Greater Syria. By 1839 the Egyptian forces under Ali’s son Ibrahim, were poised to attack Constantinople and the Ottomans were forced to turn to the great powers for help. Fearing the effects of an Ottoman collapse and the rise of a new power in Egypt, Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia intervened and restored the lost territories to the Ottoman Empire.[13] Describing the European intervention against Ali’s military forces, Middle Eastern historian Donald Quataert notes that “Although he may have had the power to do so, Muhammad Ali did not become master of the Middle East, in significant measure because the European states would not allow it.[14]
Despite the territorial losses and the forced reduction of his army, Ali was granted hereditary rule in Egypt. He developed the economy around cotton, a staple crop that would remain as the cornerstone of the Egyptian economy for most of the 19th century.[15] In May of 1861 American President Abraham Lincoln, in the midst of civil war, proclaimed the Union blockade closing virtually all southern ports. The American south was an international cotton provider and the blockade provided a vast cotton boom. Egyptian leaders, perhaps anticipating an extended price surge, began to borrow heavily from European investors to foster internal improvements such as the Suez Canal (completed in 1869).[16] When the blockade ended, southern cotton once again entered the international market and decimated the Egyptian economy. The international depression of 1873 provided a further blow and Egypt was forced to declare bankruptcy in 1876.[17]
The imperial powers relied on a mutual alliance between merchants and the state. In order to protect European investors, a commission was established to supervise the Egyptian budget and ensure repayment of debt. Resentment of foreign intervention into the economy led to the Urabi Revolt in 1881-82 and providing a pretext for British invasion and occupation.[18]
Gelvin notes the irony that “defensive developmentalism” led to borrowing, which led to bankruptcy and economic stagnation, fueling a revolt which would allow for direct economic (and political-military) intervention.[19] The occupation allowed Britain to encourage cotton cultivation to feed British textile mills, while discouraging investment in Egyptian industries that could possibly offer competition.[20] Under the banner of free trade, European merchants were given unobstructed access to Egyptian markets.[21] This trend of European encroachment into foreign markets was mimicked throughout much of the 19th century world. As was the case in Egypt, the Ottoman economy would fall victim to economic intrusion as well.
The Ottoman Empire, a dynastic state encompassing much of modern day Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Israel and Iraq (as well as Egypt prior to the rise of Pasha); became aware of the threat that the European powers posed, following Napoleon’s rout of the Malmuk forces at the Battle of the Pyramids.[22] In response, Sultan Selim III in 1805, attempted to create a military corps - nizam-i jedid (new order) - trained and drilled in the western style.[23] Before Selim was able to bring his army to full strength he was deposed by the janissary forces in 1807. The janissaries had become a dominant force throughout the 18th century, boasting substantial power as well as autonomy they were often able to depose sultans at will.
Understanding the janissaries to be a great obstacle in the path of centralization - due to the autonomy, revenue and power that the forces demanded, Selim III’s successor Mahmud II continued to build the new order corps, while rallying support from conservative opponents, clerics and the ulama.[24] Upon completing his new army corps, the janissaries revolted in 1826[25] and were routed by the newly modernized army. The remaining janissaries were hunted down throughout the provinces in what came to be called the “Auspicious Incident”.[26] While Mahmud continued to strengthen his domestic position, foreign powers and internal revolts began to dismantle the empire.
Egypt had effectively broken free of Ottoman control and Ali’s forces occupied vast portions of the empire throughout the 1830s. The Balkan states also began to call for independence. For example, in 1804 the Serbs rebelled and by 1817, a Serbian prince had established hereditary rule, and while still technically a vassal of the empire (as is the case with Egypt) the Serbian state was in effect independent.[27]
Russia continued territorial expansion as well, such as seizing Bessarabia in 1812. The international community, fearful of total Ottoman collapse often intervened to undue huge territorial losses, but allowed continuous succession of small territories. This pattern would continue into the 1870s with the Ottoman-Russian war, which ended with the Treaty of Berlin, granting independence to many lands formerly under Ottoman control.
Despite the slow dissolution of the once powerful empire, the Sultans were able to set the Ottoman state on a path of modernization. The 19th century Ottoman reforms can be broken into two periods: The tanzimat period, beginning in 1839[28], which sought to modernize along the lines of British Liberalism; and the period of “autocratic reform” beginning in 1878, with the suspension of the short lived Ottoman constitution, which sought to modernize along the lines of German and Italian unification movements.[29]
The Ottoman leaders attempted to restructure the bureaucracy, establish more representative government, reform education, and develop infrastructure. To do so, the state took hold of the economy, attempting to remove the empire from the world economy and the crippling free trade agreements. The state run companies were unable to compete with the superior foreign industry. Lacking skilled workers and investment capital; the Ottomans, aware of the risks[30], turned to foreign investors, offering concessions to those who were willing to invest in the development of infrastructure.[31]
When Mohammed Ali Pasha sent his forces to occupy large portions of the empire, threatening Ottoman control, the empire lacked the resources to put down his forces. The Sultan was forced to ask for European intervention. The European assistance came at a great cost to the Ottomans, who were forced to make a series of concessions, most notably the Treaty of Balta Liman, which set low tariffs and forbade the formation of Turkish monopolies.[32]
The treaty ensured that both the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, which was restored as a vassal state, would: modernize and become more integrated into the world economy; not be able to compete with foreign companies – which protected European market interests in the area; and set an incredibly low import tariff so that a practically open market became institutionalized.
This point is well articulated by Middle East historian Zachary Lockman, who notes:
The workings of the world market, policy decisions by hegemonic European states led to partial deindustrialization in other parts of the world as machine-made European goods undermined or destroyed local production.[33]

Thus, the nations of the rest of the world emerged as the victims of European capitalism – acting as a provider of raw materials and a market for finished goods. So long as these nations could not compete economically, they could not compete militarily and had little choice but to participate in the system. The Ottoman Empire, like Egypt, was faced with heavy borrowing and unfair trade agreements. In a similar pattern the Ottomans, faced with a stagnant economy, were hit hard by the 1873 global depression resulting in eventual bankruptcy.
In 1881 the Ottoman Public Debt Administration emerged, a group of foreign creditors to oversee the Ottoman economy in order to assure the repayment of debts.[34] Historian Donald Quataert notes that the debt administration became “a vast, essentially independent bureaucracy within the Ottoman Bureaucracy, run by creditors.”[35] The debt administration both highlighted and accentuated increasing European control of the Ottoman economy.
The third and final area of the Middle East which I will discuss is Persia (modern day Iran), under the Qajar dynasty. The Qajar’s had established a relatively weak and unstable empire upon the ruins of the Safavid Empire.[36] The dynasty exercised little control outside the capital – surviving by auctioning off tax collection to the highest bidder. The government was unable to create an economy to compete with Europe, rather, revenues were generated by selling the rights to cultivate, produce, and market resources found within Persia.[37] In 1890 a British investor, Major Gerald Talbot, negotiated a concession with minister Ali Asghar Khan Amin-al-Soltan in order to fill Naser-as-Din Shah’s incessant need for money.[38] The concession granted the rights to produce, sell and export Persia’s tobacco for fifty years, all for a mere fifteen thousand pounds and twenty five percent annual profits; which Talbot sold to the British Imperial Tobacco Company, creating a foreign monopoly over a staple cash crop.[39]
The deal was so lopsided that the Shah was forced to cancel the concession resulting in a penalty of three hundred-forty six-thousand British pounds – requiring a subsequent loan of five hundred-thousand to pay off.[40] The borrowing increased the foreign deficit and led to further concessions.
The foreign encroachment enraged the Persian populace. In opposition to the tobacco concession; Sayyid Jamal ad-Din, an Islamic intellectual and vocal critic of the Shah, wrote a letter to Persia’s most prominent Shia religious leader, Hasan Shirazi – reflecting popular Muslim sentiment - in which he stated that the concessions meant:
…the complete handing over of the reigns of government to the enemies of Islam, the enslaving of the people to that enemy, the surrendering of them and of all dominion and authority into the hands of a foreign foe.[41]

The accumulating debt led to the greatest concession of all in which Anglo-Australian investor William Knox d’Arcy was granted the right to obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable for trade, carry away and sell petroleum and petroleum products in exchange for forty-thousand British pounds and sixteen percent of the annual income.[42]
The British government – seeking to convert their navy from coal to oil and to exclude their rival, the French – purchased the concession and founded the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which would come to evolve into the British Petroleum Company “BP”.[43] In the 2005 Fortune Global 500 list of companies “BP” was ranked second in world turnover.[44]
Persia, like the Ottoman Empire was able to remain an independent state throughout the 19th century, however both were subject to economic manipulation by European businessmen.[45] The economic control, granted by the hundreds of concessions ranging from railroad construction to a national lottery - often for a one time fee - gave European investors control over vast sectors of the Persian economy.[46]
As we have seen by studying Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia in terms of their interactions with European powers throughout the 19th century - economic, political and military – encroachment by the powers into the region led to the “modern” Middle East evolving into little more than a European vassal by the 20th century. The system of European hegemony had become a virtual institution throughout the world.
Clearly, the pattern of economic encroachment throughout virtually all of what we today consider the Middle East is not a coincidence. In the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, the arrival of superior and hostile military forces led both Sultan Selim III and his successor Mahmud II, as well as Mohammed Ali Pasha to modernize in an attempt to compete. This led to borrowing from foreign businessmen, however, a failure to compete due to unequal treaties and trade agreements led to failure in both cases. Both Egypt and the Ottoman Empire were forced to submit to economic intervention by European powers protecting investors. Egyptians revolted against the economic intervention, leading to an invasion and occupation, while the Ottoman Empire chose submission over occupation.
The case in Persia is relatively the same. Attempts by the Qajars to modernize and centralize power led to foreign loans and concessions which sold the rights to many of Persia’s resources. These grossly unequal terms, met with public outrage, forced the cancellation of many concessions, and resulted in hefty penalties that required further foreign borrowing to pay. Funding to repay loans was often raised by further concessions, trapping the Shah in a vicious cycle.
These policies, whereby agents of expanding European societies gained inordinate influence over the comparatively weaker Middle Eastern societies no doubt fits Robinson’s definition of imperialism. Indirect control over the political or economic life of Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and Persia by the European powers certainly took place – defining the relationship as imperialist by the Encyclopedia Britannica’s standards as well. Suffice to say, the Middle East became a region of European imperial possessions throughout the 19th century.
Following World War I and Wilson’s Fourteen Points which established the right of national self determination, borders were drawn and many “nations” of the Middle East were granted independence. The power structure that emerged throughout the 19th century did not disappear. The European powers would continue to exert “inordinate influence”[47] over the Middle Eastern nation states. As Britain and France began to fade as world powers and the United States and Soviet Union emerged as world powers, they too fought for control over who would exert their influence in the region. Thus, the label of the U.S.-Soviet competition in the Middle East as “new wine in old bottles” is quite accurate.
The evolution of this power structure of “western” dominance in the Middle East is crucial to contextualize the circumstances that exist in the region today. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower. Today the United States continues to exert an inordinate influence in the region. Open resentment to United States policy in the region has led to terrorism, wars and an increase in the risk of a nuclear weapons showdown. While there seems to be no short term solution in sight, an excellent starting point may be to examine the relationship between the U.S. and the Middle East and how the power structure began.

[1] James L. Gelvin. The Modern Middle East: a History. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005. ( 257)
[2] Gelvin, 88
[3] Bonaparte to Directory, Milan, August 16, 1797. Correspondance de Napoleon I. (Paris 1858-70), Vol. III, No. 2103. Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 244. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
[4] Paul Bailleu (ed.), Preussen und Frankreichvon 1795 bis 1807 (Leipsic, 1881-87), I, 173. Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
[5] July 24, 1798. Corresp. de Nap., Vol. IV, No. 3259. Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
[6] Carl Ludwig Lokke. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
[7] Zachary Lockman. Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) ( 71 )
[8] Jeremy Adelman, Stephen Aron, Stephen Kotkin, Suzanna Marchand, Gyan Prakash, Robert Tignor and Michael Tsin. Worlds Together Worlds Apart. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002). 224.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid. 225
[11] Ibid. 226
[12] In 1800, 50% of Egyptian trade was with the Ottomans and 14% was with Europe. By 1823 the figures had reversed. (Gelvin 78)
[13] Donald Quataert. The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922: Second Edition. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) (58)
[14] Ibid.
[15] Gelvin, 78
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid., 79
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Adelman, 226
[22] Ibid.
[23] Gelvin, 80
[24] Adelman, 227
[25] Some scholars argue that Sultan Mahmud II actually enticed the janissaries to revolt in order to crush their forces.
[26] Gelvin, 80
[27] Quataert, 55
[28] Although several sources have indicated 1839 as the beginning of the tanzimat reform period, Gelvin notes that the period of “liberal reform” actually began prior to this date. 79.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Quataert, 72
[31] Ibid, 81

[32] Gelvin, 77
[33] Ibid. 54
[34] Quataert, 72
[35] Ibid.
[36] Gelvin, 82
[37] Ibid., 83
[38] Elton L. Daniel. The History of Iran. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 2001). 185.
[39] Gelvin, 85
[40] Ibid.
[41] Alfred J. Andrea, and James H. Overfield. The Human Record: Sources of Global
History – Volume II: Since 1500 Fifth Edition. New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 2005. 325.
[42] Gelvin, 86
[43] “Our History”. British Petroleum Corporate Website.
http://www.bp.com/subsection.do?categoryId=10&contentId=2001674 (accessed
February 28, 2006)
[44] Ibid.
[45] Andrea, 323
[46] Ibid., 323-4
[47] Gelvin, 88

Bibliography

Adelman, Jeremy and Stephen Aron, Stephen Kotkin, Suzanna Marchand, Gyan Prakash,
Robert Tignor and Michael Tsin. Worlds Together Worlds Apart. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002).
Andrea, Alfred J., and James H. Overfield. The Human Record:Sources of Global
History – Volume II: Since 1500 Fifth Edition. New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 2005.
Paul Bailleu (ed.), Preussen und Frankreichvon 1795 bis 1807 (Leipsic, 1881-87), I, 173.
Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
Bonaparte to Directory, Milan, August 16, 1797. Correspondance de Napoleon I. (Paris
1858-70), Vol. III, No. 2103. Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 244. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
Daniel, Elton L. The History of Iran. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 2001).

Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: a History. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005.
July 24, 1798. Corresp. de Nap., Vol. IV, No. 3259. Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig.
“French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
Lockman, Zachary. Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of
Orientalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and
Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
“Our History”. British Petroleum Corporate Website.
http://www.bp.com/subsection.do?categoryId=10&contentId=2001674 (accessed
February 28, 2006)
Quataert, Donald. The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922: Second Edition. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Historical Debate at the Heart of Future Japanese-US Relations

2006-06-09T10:05:00.000-07:00

On August 14, 1945, World War II officially ended in the Pacific theatre with the Japanese surrender in accord with the Potsdam Declaration. The nation of Japan was occupied by the United States army under the watch of General Douglass McArthur. Throughout the occupation, and following Japanese independence in 1952, to this day, Japan remains an important ally to the United States. In a region that includes Russia, China and North Korea, Japan and its neighboring US military bases, such as Okinawa, have become extremely important in furthering and protecting US interests in the region. Japan is also a huge economy and a top trade partner, hence, a hot bed for US investment. Nevertheless, Japanese ties with many of its neighbors have begun to improve, especially economically as China and Japan have recently become major trade partners. This has prompted some foreign policy experts to predict that Japan may begin to move away from ties with the United State and perhaps, become part of a regional Asian Union, along the lines of the EU. In a June 3, 2006 meeting of defense experts in Singapore, United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, expressed concern over an East Asian summit held last year which included ten of the states involved in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as well as China, South Korea and Japan, but excluded the United States, according to a New York Times article by Michael R. Gordon. Increasing ties with China could potentially bring Japan closer to such coalitions as the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, a security, economic and cultural based cooperation which includes China, Russia and several central Asian nations and has granted observer status to nations including Pakistan, India and Iran.

The direction of Japanese foreign policy will be greatly determined in the coming elections for Japanese Prime Minister. With the retirement of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizume, the vacant seat for Prime Minister and head of the governing Liberal Democratic Party has come down to two men with widely divergent views on the foreign policy path Japan should undertake. According to a New York Times column entitled “Race to Lead Japan May Turn on Asia Ties,” Norimitsu Onishi writes that the race has boiled down to politicians with “starkly different views:” Shinzo Abe, 51, current chief cabinet secretary and Yasuo Fukuda, 69, a former chief cabinet secretary. Mr. Abe has become popular amongst his supporters for his hard-line stance on North Korea and China, while Mr. Fukuda’s supporters rally behind his policy goals of rebuilding friendly ties with the rest of East Asia. While Mr. Abe leads in the polls, Mr. Fukuda has tightened the gap, which experts say is rooted in increasing public sentiment that Japan should fix ties with China as its top priority, according to the aforementioned article.

The issue of Japanese relations with its Asian neighbors is deeply rooted in historical circumstance, particularly, Japanese aggression against its East Asian neighbors, beginning in the early 1930s, and lasting throughout the duration of World War II. Following the war, in which Japanese troops committed horrendous war crimes including mass execution, rape, torture and pillaging; over one thousand Japanese troops were convicted as war criminals at the Tokyo Trials, including fourteen class-A war criminals. The Emperor Hirohito, the behind the scenes leader throughout the period of aggression and war, was allowed to stay in power, despite calls for his removal from power and trial as a war criminal. Since the war, intense debate has arisen between Japanese and other East Asian scholars over the nature of the crimes. In addition, all of the Japanese sentenced as criminals of war, including the 14 class-A war criminals, were enshrined in a monument to war veterans known as the Yasukuni Shrine. The shrine has become a focal point of debate, both inside Japan and abroad. Retiring Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the shrine in 2005 to honor the war dead, a move that enraged critics of former Japanese militarism. His potential successors, being divided on future Japanese foreign relations, are no doubt also divided on the Yasukuni Shrine issue. The more conservative Mr. Abe, who promotes the hard-line stance toward China and North Korea, not only advocates the visitation of the shrine by Prime Ministers, but also refuses to accept the validity of the Tokyo Trials, which convicted the war criminals. Mr. Fukuda does not think that Prime Ministers should visit the shrine, as he views it a stumbling block toward improving relations with Asian neighbors. Mr. Fukuda claims that Japan must resume a “heart to heart” dialogue with its Asian neighbors and ultimately build an East Asian community, Norimitsu Onishi writes.

I have written two articles, the first of which discusses the Yasukuni Shrine issue and the second of which details the events that have created a sort of historical amnesia which continues to plague Japanese relations with its Asian counterparts. The articles were prepared for a history course on modern Japan, taught by Herbert Bix, world-renown Japanese historian and author of the myth-shattering Hirohito: and the Making of Modern Japan which won the 2001 Pulitzer Prize, National Book Critics Circle Award and was a New York Times notable book. Some of Professor Bix’s recent articles include:

"Japan's Surrender Decision and the Monarchy: Staying the Course in an Unwinnable War," (posted on japanfocus.org, July 5, 2005)

"Torture, Racism, and the Sovereign Presidency," Z. Magazine Online, 18:7-8 (July-August 2005) at http://zmagsite.zmag.org/JulAug2005/bix0705.html.

"The Faith that Supports U.S. Violence: Comparative Reflections on the Arrogance of Empires," (posted on Z-net website and japanfocus.org, Sept. 2, 2004)

"From Nanjing 1937 to Fallujah 2004: War Crimes in Perspective," completed May 3, 2004 and posted on japanfocus.org

The Yasukuni Shrine Issue

Beginning in the eighth century, the people of Japan popularized the term Shinto (the Way of the Gods) to describe a diverse set of ritual observances and sacred sites.[i] The Shinto divinities were known as kami and they were worshiped in small shrines located throughout Japan. One thousand years later, Shinto would be used to justify a revolutionary shift in the governing apparatus of Japan. The Meiji constitution redefined the role of Emperor and Shinto from mere religious symbols to intimately intertwined entities within the Japanese state system. Ito Hirobumi, one of the post-revolutionary oligarchs, described the emergence of Emperor-rule, justified by state-Shinto and articulated in the Meiji constitution, in his famous Commentaries on the Constitution, which defined the now classic rhetoric of the theocratic emperor.[ii] The Commentaries dictated “The Emperor is Heaven descended, divine and sacred. He is preeminent above all his subjects. He must be reverenced and is inviolable.”[iii]
Following the depression crises and the Manchurian incident, right-wing militaristic forces began to consolidate power in Japan through heavy handed means of insubordination and outright terror. As Hirohito moved closer to the expansionists and began to increase military capabilities, the state unleashed an unrelenting propaganda campaign promoting ultra-nationalism with the armed forces, endowed by Hirohito’s spiritual authority as commander-in-chief, fulfilling a “moral mission” to expand.[iv] When Japanese soldiers began to die in Asia, the Yasukuni Shrine, established to commemorate the spirits of those who die serving the Emperor, took on a new significance.[v]
Following Japanese defeat in 1945, U.S. officials, together with the Japanese “moderates” and Hirohito agreed that preserving the monarchy was in the best interest of all parties involved, however the Emperor was to be redefined as a figurehead, absent of any political power.[vi] With the transformation of the Emperor came the abolition of the state-Shinto as well, for the new constitution provided for a scrupulous separation of church and state.[vii] In abolishing state-Shinto the constitution also removed ties between the Yasukuni Shrine and the state, yet the Shrine was not abolished and like the Emperor it was shielded from international pressures calling for its destruction.[viii]
The ties to Japanese militarism were thus overlooked, and the shrine was designated a religious monument independent of the state.[ix] The separation from the state as a purely religious entity is somewhat contradictory however, in light of the fact that the Shrine had been erected by Emperor Meiji in 1869 to honor pro-government troops who died serving the Emperor. Although officially separated from the state by the constitution, the Yasukuni Shrine had been established and evolved exclusively in accord with the policy of state-Shinto. The controversy surrounding the Shrine escalated when, in 1978, fourteen class-A war criminals were enshrined at Yasukuni.[x] They were not the first war criminals to be enshrined, yet, in the eyes of the Asian continent that had suffered under Japan’s brutal military campaign, it was a direct insult.
When diplomatic relations between Japan and China were normalized in 1972, the Chinese government did not ask for reparations because many Chinese felt, according to a Daily Editorial, that Japanese aggression had been caused by a small faction of militaristic elements, who they did not equate with the Japanese people as a whole.[xi] Tensions over the Shrine were further inflamed in 1985 when Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro made an official visit to the Shrine, conjuring memories of state-Shinto and its disastrous consequences.[xii] In light of the controversy, Nakasone sought to separate the fourteen war criminals, but was rebuffed by Shinto doctrine which states that once spirits of kami have been enshrined, removal of the spirits would be impossible, such a feat would be like retrieving a cup of liquid after it has been poured into a larger tank of water.[xiii]
The state also has its hands tied in regards to modifying Shinto doctrine because of the rigid separation of church and state embedded in the post WWII constitution. Nevertheless, Japanese politicians are constantly ridiculed by foreign populations, as well as peace activists at home, who feel that the post war Yasukuni Shrine represents the prewar view of Japan’s modern wars and stands in direct opposition to the results of the Tokyo Trials.[xiv] These opposing viewpoints can not be disregarded especially in light of the Shrines ties to the Yasukuni Museum, which serves to glorify the Asian campaigns of the 1930’s and exalts the Japanese soldiers as national heroes. The official website for the museum directly condemns any criticism of Japanese war policy, describing the 1,068 convicted war criminals sentenced to death as “Martyrs of Showa, who were cruelly and unjustly tried as war criminals by a sham-like tribunal of the Allied forces (United States, England, the Netherlands, China and others).” Such sentiments add fuel to the international outcries against the Shrine for its role in channeling religious energy into the war.[xv] Ironically, the post-1945 separation of church and state, established to assure that the Emperor would never again be able to manipulate state-Shinto doctrine to fuel militaristic endeavors and construct autocratic power, has also tied the states hands in eliminating a symbol which glorifies the military campaigns conducted in the era of state-Shinto. Today, with economic ties uniting many of the Asian nations, particularly Japan and China, two of the world’s economic superpowers, the prospect of a united Asia, along the lines of the European Union economic alliance, may lie in the foreseeable future. Such a move, however, will require a vast amount of diplomatic maneuvering by Japanese officials to appease their Asian neighbors by acknowledging their crimes on the continent. Solving the Yasukuni Shrine dilemma will, no doubt, be a central component of the appeasement process.

End Notes

[i] Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2003. p. 6
[ii] Bix, Herbert P. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2000. p. 29
[iii] Bix 29
[iv] Bix 274
[v] Bix, Herbert P. “Emperor, Shinto, Democracy: Japan’s Unresolved Questions of Historical
Consciousness” (13 June, 2005): http://www.japanfocus.org (accessed May 2, 2006)
[vi] Ibid.
[vii] Ibid.
[viii] Ibid.
[ix] Yomiuri Shimbun. “Yasukuni: Behind the Torii / From Government-run Shrine for War Heroes to Bone
of Contention” (11 July, 2005): http://www.japanfocus.org (accessed May 2, 2006)
[x] Bix, “Emperor…”
[xi] Shimbun
[xii] Ibid.
[xiii] Ibid.
[xiv] Ibid.
[xv] Bix 653

Historical Amnesia Concerning Japanese War Crimes

In June 1945 American forces secured the island of Okinawa, killing an astounding 250,000 Japanese people in the process.[i] Japan’s wartime ally Germany had surrendered and a massive campaign of carpet bombing had turned most of Japan’s cities to rubble.[ii] Coupled with the Soviet announcement that they would not renew their neutrality pact with Japan, Hirohito and his cabinet understood the inevitability of defeat, yet refused surrender.[iii] Well aware that continued fighting was hopeless, Hirohito, Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro and the senior statesmen around the throne refused surrender, fearing peace, which might doom the imperial institution, more than a prolonged war, which promised a continuation of death and destruction.[iv]
Imminent defeat and the ever fading illusion that the crippled Japanese army could mount a decisive blow to allied forces, made the prospect of unconditional surrender all but certain. Still, Hirohito, while introducing the idea of “early peace” to his military leaders, took no steps toward immediate surrender.[v] With the prospect of conditional surrender off the table, Hirohito and his senior statesmen could no longer manipulate the actions of the allies. Perhaps the Japanese leadership knew they could play the United States and Soviet Union against one another, convincing the US of the value in preserving the imperial throne to effectively combat communist elements. The fact that the US Secretary of State was none other than Joseph C. Grew, the former ambassador to Tokyo and a man sympathetic toward the emperor and the “moderates” around the throne, supports this theory.[vi]
Nevertheless, the Emperor and his associates understood that they were at the mercy of the foreign powers and planning shifted toward the domestic sphere. The Potsdam declaration was issued on July 26, 1945 which notified Japan that it had just two choices, “the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces” or “prompt and utter destruction.”[vii] The threat of destruction did concern Hirohito, not the destruction of lives but of the imperial regalia, three sacred items that symbolized his legitimacy of rule through the northern court, these items, he stressed to Kido, were to be protected at all costs.[viii] The destruction of lives, however, was not of primary concern to Hirohito, whose dismissal of the Potsdam Declaration echoed the sentiments of Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa, who told his secretary on July 28 that there was “no need to rush.”[ix]
Indeed, Hirohito’s primary concern had shifted toward domestic issues however his concern was not to save the people from further destruction but rather, to save the kokutai (Emperor worship) from destruction by the people.[x] Perhaps Hirohito was waiting for a declaration of war by the Soviets, thereby allowing him to surrender in the face of insurmountable force. The dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima (August 6), convinced Stalin to enter the war a week early (August 8), and the subsequent atomic bombing of Nagasaki (August 9), the same day as the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, taken together provided, as Professor Bix notes, “a face-saving excuse to surrender.”[xi]
Hirohito manipulated the situation masterfully, declaring that he was acting out of altruism to save “human civilization” from “total extinction” by “paving the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come.”[xii] The Emperor, in whose name the war had been fought, sought not only to avoid accountability, but to redefine his image as the center of domestic unity, from which the people of Japan would prosper.[xiii] Following the surrender rescript, radio announcer Wada Shinken proclaimed “We ourselves invited a situation in which we had no choice but to lay down our arms,” having thus implicated the people she illustrated the benevolence of the Emperor, who declared “I can no longer bear to see my people die in war,” despite what may become of him.[xiv] “Before such great benevolence and love,” she asked, “who among us can escape reflecting on his own disloyalty?”[xv]
Following the conflagration of materials that could implicate Japan’s highest leaders, the media unleashed a relentless propaganda campaign which established Hirohito as a national hero, the savior of Japan.[xvi] The Emperor and his propaganda specialists constructed another myth alongside that of the peoples shared responsibility and the Emperor’s exalted ideals in saving the nation. To lift the burden which the whole nation was made to share, the Japanese aggression in Asia was redefined, or perhaps restated, as having been a legitimate war of self defense, seeking autonomy from western encroachment while promoting the altruistic ideals for the “liberation of Asia.”[xvii]
The surrender rescript and the myths constructed to legitimize surrender served not only to redefine the Emperor, but also the Japanese war of aggression in Asia and the status of convicted war criminals. Thus, the portrayal of Japan’s role in the aggression and mass atrocities of the 1930’s, combined with United States policy which allowed a war criminal to remain in power, so long as he served US interests, created a problem of historical consciousness that today, as Professor Herbert Bix notes complicate Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors.[xviii] These issues, which began with the surrender, continue to foster fierce debate, within Japan as well as with its neighbors, over the true nature of Japanese aggression in Asia.

End Notes

[i] Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2003. p. 223

[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Bix, Herbert P. “Japan's Surrender Decision and the Monarchy: Staying the Course in an Unwinnable
War” (5 July, 2005): http://www.japanfocus.org (accessed May 3, 2006)

[vi] Ibid.
[vii] Bix, Herbert P. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2000. p. 500
[viii] Bix 502
[ix] Bix “Japan’s…”
[x] Bix 509
[xi] Ibid.
[xii] Bix 526
[xiii] Bix 527
[xiv] Bix 527-28
[xv] Bix 528
[xvi] Ibid.
[xvii] Bix “Japan’s…”
[xviii] Ibid.

A Discussion and Analysis of Current U.S. Drug Laws

2006-05-31T14:04:00.000-07:00

*Based on a philosophy paper I wrote for class my freshman year at Binghamton University. It was edited by my Professor Jason Mallory and I have since expanded upon it to form this article.

Today, the utopian vision of a classless society seems outside the realm of possibility. The United States, the world's most advanced and prosperous nation, is among the farthest from this utopian ideal and is growing still farther. In a society where labor is exploited, one's loss being another’s gain, those at the top will act shamelessly to ensure the status-quo remains. Capitalism in the United States serves as a textbook example. There are many tools which those in the upper-class use to repress those beneath them (a debatable proposition, which I will have to set aside but which, for the time being, we will assume to be true). By weakening the lower class, it makes it less likely, by providing them with little resources, that they should ever rise up to challenge the wealth and power of the American elite. One element of weakening the lower class is by criminalizing actions statistically prominent to their class, coupled with heavy enforcement in areas of concentrated poverty. Without enough violent criminals to successfully (or as successfully as the ruling class may deem necessary) fracture already impoverished communities, non-violent offenders must be targeted as well, hence creating criminals. The US drug laws are one of the most efficient manufacturers of criminals and crime. Those who manufacture, traffic, distribute and use drugs become criminals, a status which no doubt weakens their already fractured social and economic standing. The tax dollars paid to punish these non-violent offenders weigh far more heavily on the lower and middle classes, many of whom are forced to fund the system which undermines their own liberty. Combine this system with the fact that the United States, the most “advanced” civilization in the history of our world, has the highest incarceration rate on the globe, and the system of social control becomes ever more apparent. The ruling class utilizes their power, to ensure that they remain in power.

The use of drugs by human beings has occurred through thousands of years and in thousands of civilizations. The legality, morality and ethics of drug use are debates which, no doubt, must carry a philosophical overtone. Let us, for instance, ask the question from a libertarian perspective. If one engages in a chosen activity, one which does not negatively affect the liberty of others, where then, does the unaffected victim derive the right to infringe on the liberty of those who choose to partake in drug activity? Many argue that those who use drugs may in fact be causing direct or indirect harm to others, a point to which I will later return. As to whether or not one is harming their self by using drugs, the user must be entrusted to act in his own best interests, less of course, we advocate the style of government that makes our decisions for us. Boxing, Hockey, Motocross, Ultimate Fighting and countless other sports can be seriously damaging to the health of those who partake in said events. Nevertheless, if they feel the joy of the activity outweighs the damaging effects, who is to tell the individuals not to partake? Even informing someone of the dangers posed by conscription into the armed forces, far more dangerous than most illegal drugs, can result in imprisonment, as is evident by Supreme Court Justice Wendell Holmes Jr’s decision in Schenck v. United States.

It is hypocritical to say that our country is built on and embraces the concept of liberty, when in fact, the liberty of the ruling class is to infringe upon the liberty of its subjects, when and how it sees fit. Nevertheless this is a philosophical argument, one to which there is no absolutely right or wrong answer. We should turn away then and discuss in more detail the way in which drug laws create criminals and create crime. One must imagine for a moment that drugs are legal in the United States. If a young man, high-school dropout, no trust fund and a meager salary from Wal-Mart or any of the Forbes Magazine labor-exploiters, decides to experiment with hallucinogenic drugs. Keep in mind the culture that so many wage slaves live in today, never owning a home, unreliable transportation and little money for consumer goods, working for a corporation where upward mobility is virtually non-existent, in a materialistic culture of private ownership, such as our own. With little aspiration for a better future and entrapment in a monotonous routine of laboring with little sense of accomplishment, an escape from the realities of everyday life may be a welcome development. Were drugs legal, the young man who chose this path could be open about his activities not having to feel the ridicule and stereotyping that drug laws manufacture. In our society he would be ostracized, most likely alienated from his family, friends and loved ones; he may lose his job or worse, be arrested and become a criminal. The same could be said for a middle class or even upper middle class student, one of the rare examples of someone outside the lower class who must feel the presence of the totalitarian shadow. The class of privilege in our country, however, are excused for crashing their cars and remembering nothing the next day (Pat Kennedy), because their drug problems are of a different nature, a point to which I will later return. Nevertheless, a student who becomes involved with drugs can become a felon (depending on the seriousness of the case), can lose all federal funding and potentially be forced to drop out of school, dooming him/her to the cycle of low wage jobs and lower class status. Repeal the drug laws and you have one less felon and one more student (the scenario may seem like a stretch, however I and many of my friends are very familiar with, and close to, a person who constitutes a perfect example).

So long as there are drugs there will be drug users and with them inevitably come drug dealers, one of the few irrevocable truisms when studying drugs and drug use throughout human existence. Even a country with extremely draconian drug laws, such as our own, can not prevent the human consumption of drugs. Therefore our own society, taken with countless others, proves that drug laws do not work. Why then, do we choose to create criminals out of ordinary citizens with the knowledge that the practice is not curtailing the use of drugs?

The current drug laws are a mirror image of the 18th Amendment to the US constitution and the Volstead Act, which created a federal prohibition on the manufacturing, distributing and possession of alcoholic beverages, just one of the many drugs humans have chosen over the centuries as a means of intoxication. Before prohibition became law, those who manufactured, distributed and possessed alcoholic beverages were not criminals, unless of course, they infringed on the liberty of others in the process. Nevertheless, prohibition did not curtail any of these activities. While deterring a small minority of the population from alcohol consumption, it also had the pleasant side effect of criminalizing many citizens who were not criminals before the 1920 act was passed. Thus, we can state, encountering little if any rational dispute, that prohibition served almost exclusively as an act to create crime. By sending the manufacturers and distributors of alcohol underground, the government forced the formerly lawful industry to adopt underground methods. Is it such a stretch to compare drug manufacturing, trafficking and distributing to that of alcohol under prohibition? As history has shown, not only do such laws turn ordinary citizens into criminals, they also force the entire industry underground, creating a crime based industry that nurtures criminal activity and excretes the problem for society to face.

It seems that all too often we hear stories of drug related violence; however these acts of violence are not drug related because the offenders were using drugs. The stories are drug related because forcing the drug industry underground creates violent criminals. If drug laws were repealed, dealers would not resort to violence, largely because the “dealers” would be convenience stores, supermarkets and specialty stores. Legalizing drugs would also open up government funding to researching drugs and educating the populace on their effects, bringing FDA approval etc. It is relatively unlikely that a street dealer will hand you a brochure with your purchase indicating responsible dosage and the effects of exceeding the recommendations. Legalizing drugs would make recreational drug use safer. Such developments would help the government set rules for drug use, such as the amount safe to drive under the influence of, and so forth. There is no doubt that education and awareness, which lead to responsible use, would exponentially increase.

Mention of the legalization of drugs, even decriminalization, will no doubt be met with strong opposition from the post- Passion of the Christ Mel Gibson-types among us. There are a number of oppositional points, several of which I would like to consider and discuss, the first being that legalizing drugs will infringe on individual liberties. Many concerned citizens are worried that those under the influence of drugs will harm not only themselves, but innocent law abiding citizens as well. They fear that a drugged up lunatic may run over their daughter while she rides her bike home after school, or that they may be subject to attack from a user in a drug induced rage. They are forgetting that one mind altering drug, alcohol, can impair one as much as, if not more than, most illegal drugs. Drunk drivers kill people with cars, as well as attack fellow citizens as a direct result of alcohol intoxication. Still, people recognize the illogicality of a move toward a second prohibition of alcohol. Furthermore, a majority of people feel that the benefits of alcohol use outweigh the negative effects which are prone to happen. Those who cause the negative effects are punished accordingly under the law. At the same time, those of us who use illegal drugs and do not cause negative side effects are still being punished. One must remember that the legalization of drugs would not make crimes committed under the influence of drugs legal as well. If someone under the influence of drugs were to crash their car, they would lose their driving privileges, if they started a fight, they would be arrested. The penalties, however, could be focused on those who cause problems for society, not those whose drug use is harmless.

Perhaps if the many now illegal drugs had been introduced into mainstream US culture at the same time alcohol was, most of them would still be legal today. The problem lies in the fact that many of the illegal drugs in widespread use today have been introduced into our mainstream culture relatively recently. Therefore, a great portion of society, being such loyal subjects, are ignorant to the way that many of these drugs actually effect the human mind – such as those misinformed individuals who see marijuana as a “gateway” drug and thus, equate it with heroine, Professor Mallory adds. Since the lawmakers dictate and propagate the populace with theories that drug laws are necessary for our own safety, much of society will smile and nod. When the media, a powerful branch of any governing apparatus, shows people under the influence of marijuana running over little girls on bicycles, allowing children under their watch to drown in pools and even standing up their poor grandmother for dinner, a fear and repulsion toward those who use marijuana is instilled in the populace. Knowing that marijuana, which can lead to such awful tragedies, is one of the least harmful illegal drugs, one can only imagine the horrors that other illegal drugs would plague society with.

We are educated from grade school that drugs are harmful and that those associated with drugs are bad people – the DARE program being a more obnoxious example where kids are forced to recite such song lines as “doing drugs is stupid, say no! My mind is mine!” The middle and upper classes get the greatest amount of drug education (or brainwashing, depending how you spin it) and thus, become the most wary of those associated with drugs; lower class people, on the other hand, receive less drug “education” and are less likely to adopt the stigma many people higher on the social food chain, have against drugs. Such disparities turn classes against one another, create stereotypes and instill fear amongst the populace against one another. Noam Chomsky articulates this point in his 1997 article Drug Policy as Social Control, arguing “The more you can increase the fear of drugs and crime and welfare mothers and immigrants and aliens and poverty and all sorts of things, the more you can control people.” This is exactly what drug laws create, criminals, crime, poverty and fear of those involved with the aforementioned creations. Drug laws are an awesome tool of those with social control on their agenda, because not only are the lower classes held down by the laws, they are held down because stereotypes associate them with drugs and therefore associate them with crime, making the poor more feared by, and thus, more alienated from, society.

The objection to legalizing drugs on the grounds that drug users will injure others is based less on facts than on fears which are fostered amongst the population by relentless propaganda from the government and its media apparatus. In addition, drug laws will not curtail drug induced crimes, because as history has irrevocably proven, drug laws do not hinder drug use. The only way to prove such arguments, however, would be legalizing drugs (or at least decriminalizing them). Such a step is unlikely, however, so long as the government is able to continue manufacturing fear and stigma of drugs and drug users.

Yet another popular argument on the banner of those who oppose the legalization of drugs is that such an action will destroy society because everyone will become addicted to drugs and hence, stereotypically lazy. One can imagine such a world where people stop educating themselves, stop working and live their lives in a haze of intoxication as society slowly decays. Much of this vision is again associated with stigmas which are instilled in the populace. People see drug users as lazy, criminal, welfare recipients who are inherently evil by nature. One making such arguments becomes caught in a chicken or the egg dilemma. Are these people overwhelmingly poor because they are illegal-drug users, or are they overwhelmingly illegal-drug users because they are poor?

Those with drug related crime records are criminals only because drugs are illegal; their financial situation, in many cases already poor, becomes dire as they are often turned down from all but the lowest wage jobs and can not qualify for government subsidized assistance, loans or many forms of public housing. The stereotype of drug users being parasites on society largely comes from the stereotype of poor drug users, many of whom will never qualify for a job outside a degrading post for an exploitative corporation and a sub-living wage. Professor Jason Mallory adds that “capitalist society creates a ‘cesspool’ of poor people, brutalizes them in prison and then asks ‘why are “criminals” so violent?’” Many, of course, would argue that these excuses are simply copouts used by those who want to abuse the system. These arguments, however, are brought about mostly by those wealthy enough to have medical benefits so that they may partake in the pharmaceutical, hence, legal drugs to make their moods improve. Meanwhile, the only type of mood enhancing drugs the poor may partake in are those that the government insists remain illegal and hence, the users criminals. Take this as an example: in early May, 2006 Representative Pat Kennedy, son of Senator Ted Kennedy, was involved in a single car accident. The police report included an observation that Kennedy appeared to have been drinking and that his ability was impaired, yet a sobriety test was not issued, the police labor union officials said that officers were told not to give Kennedy a sobriety test and he was given a ride home. In a CNN report, Sgt. Kenneth Weaver said he saw Kennedy’s vehicle “traveling at a high rate of speed in a construction zone and also swerving into the wrong lane of travel” with it’s lights off. When Weaver approached the vehicle, which had crashed head-on into a vehicle barrier, he noticed his “eyes were red and watery, speech was slightly slurred, and upon exiting the vehicle, his balance was unsure.” Kennedy claims to have owed his disoriented mind-state to prescribed medications, none of which, he claims, did he take more than the recommended dosage of. Nevertheless he admitted that he has long suffered from depression and addiction. “I struggle with this disease, as do millions of Americans” Kennedy said. Millions of Americans do struggle with the “disease,” as Kennedy described it, of addiction and depression. Unlike Kennedy, however, was not asked to step down from his position as a House Representative of Rhode Island, and was not criminally charged with any type of substance abuse, as his problems are associated with prescription and hence, socially acceptable, drugs. Millions of Americans who have much more to be depressed about, but can not afford the luxurious drugs that a rich healthcare plan will provide, become criminals for similar or even far lesser infractions.

With all this said, stereotypes of the poor are attributed to those who use the same types of illegal drugs as they (the poor) use. Thus, people who use drugs of this nature are equated with the stereotypes of the poor in capitalist society. Drug users, along with the other “enemies” of society, welfare mothers, poverty children, immigrants and so forth become a scapegoat for the problems which the billionaires of the Fortune 500 cultivate.

We may conclude then, that drug laws in the United States are in fact necessary. However, they are not necessary to protect people and certainly not to protect individual liberties. Rather, drug laws in the United States are necessary to keep the lower class and the disappearing middle class suppressed and divided. This may seem completely necessary, or it may seem a violation of you rights, depending of course, on what class of society you come from and how susceptible you are to indoctrination.

Personally, I feel that in a society so strongly rooted in concepts of liberty and justice, if someone chooses to spend their free time using substances that affect no one but their own self, there is no just reason that they should be prevented from doing so. If, however, they should go so far as to infringe upon the rights of others while enjoying these substances, they should no doubt be subject to the same penalties as anyone who carried out such acts of injustice. Until they go so far, however, I can not see any rational justification for laws that punish them.