The Origins of Western Imperialism in the Modern Middle East
With the current crises between Israel and Lebanon I regret that Lebanon and Palestine are not discussed, however I plan to post about them in the future.
The cold war, between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, fueled a fierce competition for spheres of influence and domination throughout the world, including the Middle East. The strategic location and valuable resources made the Middle East a desirable imperial possession. Describing the US – Soviet competition in the Middle East, a cold war historian labeled the rivalry “old wine in new bottles”.[1] Indeed, foreign intrusion in Middle Eastern affairs began far before the Bolshevik revolution established a socialist republic in Russia, and only decades after the United States declared independence from British rule.
The arrival of the 19th century found the British and French empires expanding their imperial influence and colonial possessions throughout the world. The vast imperial possessions became the lifeblood that fueled the growing empires. The Middle East, a region of substantial wealth and resources at the turn of the 19th century became a prime target. The British and French practiced a foreign policy throughout the Middle East that not only disrupted the economies of the said countries, but created a system whereby the European powers extracted raw materials and opened markets throughout the region. The system was protected through political diplomacy which took place under the shadow of British and French military forces.
Through economic, political and military intrusion in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and Persia; the British and French were able to create semi-sovereign imperial possessions throughout much of, what is today considered, the modern Middle East. One may be inclined to argue that the status of these Middle Eastern entities failed to constitute them as imperial possessions. However, if we accept the definition by imperialist scholar Ronald Robinson - that imperialism is the system “whereby agents of an expanding society gain inordinate influence or control over the vitals of weaker societies”[2]; or the Encyclopedia Britannica definition:
The policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of a nation especially by direct territorial acquisitions or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas; broadly: the extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence.
it must be agreed that the aforementioned regions of the Middle East did in fact constitute British and French imperial possessions.
Examination of European intervention in the Middle East will highlight the imperialist agendas of Britain and France in the Middle East and how the nations were able to profit at the expense of the region in question. The events of the 19th century in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and Persia, will lay the framework for understanding the relationship between the western powers and the Middle East. Highlighting the similarities between all of the case studies will provide insight into how a system of western domination evolved in the Middle East. Understanding the evolution of this power structure will serve, not only to contextualize relations between the Middle East and the western powers; but also to help understand the extreme resentment of the west that exists in the Middle East today.
To begin the study, I will discuss the evolution of Egypt into a western dominated society throughout the 19th century. Following decisive victories in Italy and occupation of the Ionian Islands, the young general Napoleon Bonaparte urged the seizure of Egypt as France’s share of the crumbling Ottoman Empire.[3] The French diplomat, Charles de Talleyrand convinced the directory that an expedition to Egypt would serve a double purpose, providing the French with a valuable colony in Egypt, and serving a strategic position to challenge the British position in the “crown jewel” of India.[4] In 1798, the French landed a fleet in Alexandria Egypt under the command of General Bonaparte. Following the victory at the Battle of the Pyramids, Napoleon declared that “No colony has ever offered greater advantages.”[5]
Napoleon’s ground victories meant little as Admiral Nelson destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir in August 1798; which, followed by a naval blockade forced the landed French forces to capitulate in 1801.[6] Although the French colonization of Egypt was never realized, Zachary Lockman (author of Contending Visions of the Middle East: the History and Politics of Orientalism) notes:
The French invasion of Egypt inaugurated a new era in which the lands of the Middle East and North Africa would be increasingly subject to European economic and political encroachment, and finally European colonial rule.[7]
The Malmuk ruler’s army had been decimated and a young Ottoman officer Mehmet (Mohammad) Ali Pasha began to consolidate power, aligning himself with influential Egyptian merchants.[8] He was appointed Ottoman viceroy of Egypt in 1805. Ali began an intense process of modernization, looking to revolutionary France as a model. Realizing the necessity of a strong military, Ali brought in French military advisors such as Colonel Seve, who had served under Napoleon, and began to conscript peasants.[9] The military under Ali became the utmost power of the Middle East at roughly one hundred thousand strong.[10]
In 1821 the Greeks began a push for independence from Ottoman rule. The sultan offered Ali control of Greater Syria if he could put down the revolt. Egypt’s newly modernized military was able to suppress the revolt, however fearing the rise of a powerful military in Egypt that could serve to upset the balance of power, led to British, French and Russian intervention to rout Egyptian forces at the battle of Navarino.[11] Nevertheless, Ali felt that his side of the bargain had been upheld and through his son Ibrahim, occupied Syria and began to integrate the region into the Egyptian economy.
The possession of Greater Syria combined with influence in Sudan and parts of Arabia provided raw materials that were vital to Ali’s modernization efforts. He focused the economy around cash-crops, and borrowed money to build modern railroad and port systems, to get goods to Europe faster. The money they borrowed not only had to be paid back, but was used to foster closer economic ties to Europe, both aspects positive from a European perspective. Egyptian trade with the Ottoman Empire declined as trade relations with Europe rose dramatically.[12]
As Ali continued to modernize, his power and influence in the region grew. Throughout the 1830s the Ottomans battled with Ali’s forces for control of Greater Syria. By 1839 the Egyptian forces under Ali’s son Ibrahim, were poised to attack Constantinople and the Ottomans were forced to turn to the great powers for help. Fearing the effects of an Ottoman collapse and the rise of a new power in Egypt, Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia intervened and restored the lost territories to the Ottoman Empire.[13] Describing the European intervention against Ali’s military forces, Middle Eastern historian Donald Quataert notes that “Although he may have had the power to do so, Muhammad Ali did not become master of the Middle East, in significant measure because the European states would not allow it.[14]
Despite the territorial losses and the forced reduction of his army, Ali was granted hereditary rule in Egypt. He developed the economy around cotton, a staple crop that would remain as the cornerstone of the Egyptian economy for most of the 19th century.[15] In May of 1861 American President Abraham Lincoln, in the midst of civil war, proclaimed the Union blockade closing virtually all southern ports. The American south was an international cotton provider and the blockade provided a vast cotton boom. Egyptian leaders, perhaps anticipating an extended price surge, began to borrow heavily from European investors to foster internal improvements such as the Suez Canal (completed in 1869).[16] When the blockade ended, southern cotton once again entered the international market and decimated the Egyptian economy. The international depression of 1873 provided a further blow and Egypt was forced to declare bankruptcy in 1876.[17]
The imperial powers relied on a mutual alliance between merchants and the state. In order to protect European investors, a commission was established to supervise the Egyptian budget and ensure repayment of debt. Resentment of foreign intervention into the economy led to the Urabi Revolt in 1881-82 and providing a pretext for British invasion and occupation.[18]
Gelvin notes the irony that “defensive developmentalism” led to borrowing, which led to bankruptcy and economic stagnation, fueling a revolt which would allow for direct economic (and political-military) intervention.[19] The occupation allowed Britain to encourage cotton cultivation to feed British textile mills, while discouraging investment in Egyptian industries that could possibly offer competition.[20] Under the banner of free trade, European merchants were given unobstructed access to Egyptian markets.[21] This trend of European encroachment into foreign markets was mimicked throughout much of the 19th century world. As was the case in Egypt, the Ottoman economy would fall victim to economic intrusion as well.
The Ottoman Empire, a dynastic state encompassing much of modern day Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Israel and Iraq (as well as Egypt prior to the rise of Pasha); became aware of the threat that the European powers posed, following Napoleon’s rout of the Malmuk forces at the Battle of the Pyramids.[22] In response, Sultan Selim III in 1805, attempted to create a military corps - nizam-i jedid (new order) - trained and drilled in the western style.[23] Before Selim was able to bring his army to full strength he was deposed by the janissary forces in 1807. The janissaries had become a dominant force throughout the 18th century, boasting substantial power as well as autonomy they were often able to depose sultans at will.
Understanding the janissaries to be a great obstacle in the path of centralization - due to the autonomy, revenue and power that the forces demanded, Selim III’s successor Mahmud II continued to build the new order corps, while rallying support from conservative opponents, clerics and the ulama.[24] Upon completing his new army corps, the janissaries revolted in 1826[25] and were routed by the newly modernized army. The remaining janissaries were hunted down throughout the provinces in what came to be called the “Auspicious Incident”.[26] While Mahmud continued to strengthen his domestic position, foreign powers and internal revolts began to dismantle the empire.
Egypt had effectively broken free of Ottoman control and Ali’s forces occupied vast portions of the empire throughout the 1830s. The Balkan states also began to call for independence. For example, in 1804 the Serbs rebelled and by 1817, a Serbian prince had established hereditary rule, and while still technically a vassal of the empire (as is the case with Egypt) the Serbian state was in effect independent.[27]
Russia continued territorial expansion as well, such as seizing Bessarabia in 1812. The international community, fearful of total Ottoman collapse often intervened to undue huge territorial losses, but allowed continuous succession of small territories. This pattern would continue into the 1870s with the Ottoman-Russian war, which ended with the Treaty of Berlin, granting independence to many lands formerly under Ottoman control.
Despite the slow dissolution of the once powerful empire, the Sultans were able to set the Ottoman state on a path of modernization. The 19th century Ottoman reforms can be broken into two periods: The tanzimat period, beginning in 1839[28], which sought to modernize along the lines of British Liberalism; and the period of “autocratic reform” beginning in 1878, with the suspension of the short lived Ottoman constitution, which sought to modernize along the lines of German and Italian unification movements.[29]
The Ottoman leaders attempted to restructure the bureaucracy, establish more representative government, reform education, and develop infrastructure. To do so, the state took hold of the economy, attempting to remove the empire from the world economy and the crippling free trade agreements. The state run companies were unable to compete with the superior foreign industry. Lacking skilled workers and investment capital; the Ottomans, aware of the risks[30], turned to foreign investors, offering concessions to those who were willing to invest in the development of infrastructure.[31]
When Mohammed Ali Pasha sent his forces to occupy large portions of the empire, threatening Ottoman control, the empire lacked the resources to put down his forces. The Sultan was forced to ask for European intervention. The European assistance came at a great cost to the Ottomans, who were forced to make a series of concessions, most notably the Treaty of Balta Liman, which set low tariffs and forbade the formation of Turkish monopolies.[32]
The treaty ensured that both the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, which was restored as a vassal state, would: modernize and become more integrated into the world economy; not be able to compete with foreign companies – which protected European market interests in the area; and set an incredibly low import tariff so that a practically open market became institutionalized.
This point is well articulated by Middle East historian Zachary Lockman, who notes:
The workings of the world market, policy decisions by hegemonic European states led to partial deindustrialization in other parts of the world as machine-made European goods undermined or destroyed local production.[33]
Thus, the nations of the rest of the world emerged as the victims of European capitalism – acting as a provider of raw materials and a market for finished goods. So long as these nations could not compete economically, they could not compete militarily and had little choice but to participate in the system. The Ottoman Empire, like Egypt, was faced with heavy borrowing and unfair trade agreements. In a similar pattern the Ottomans, faced with a stagnant economy, were hit hard by the 1873 global depression resulting in eventual bankruptcy.
In 1881 the Ottoman Public Debt Administration emerged, a group of foreign creditors to oversee the Ottoman economy in order to assure the repayment of debts.[34] Historian Donald Quataert notes that the debt administration became “a vast, essentially independent bureaucracy within the Ottoman Bureaucracy, run by creditors.”[35] The debt administration both highlighted and accentuated increasing European control of the Ottoman economy.
The third and final area of the Middle East which I will discuss is Persia (modern day Iran), under the Qajar dynasty. The Qajar’s had established a relatively weak and unstable empire upon the ruins of the Safavid Empire.[36] The dynasty exercised little control outside the capital – surviving by auctioning off tax collection to the highest bidder. The government was unable to create an economy to compete with Europe, rather, revenues were generated by selling the rights to cultivate, produce, and market resources found within Persia.[37] In 1890 a British investor, Major Gerald Talbot, negotiated a concession with minister Ali Asghar Khan Amin-al-Soltan in order to fill Naser-as-Din Shah’s incessant need for money.[38] The concession granted the rights to produce, sell and export Persia’s tobacco for fifty years, all for a mere fifteen thousand pounds and twenty five percent annual profits; which Talbot sold to the British Imperial Tobacco Company, creating a foreign monopoly over a staple cash crop.[39]
The deal was so lopsided that the Shah was forced to cancel the concession resulting in a penalty of three hundred-forty six-thousand British pounds – requiring a subsequent loan of five hundred-thousand to pay off.[40] The borrowing increased the foreign deficit and led to further concessions.
The foreign encroachment enraged the Persian populace. In opposition to the tobacco concession; Sayyid Jamal ad-Din, an Islamic intellectual and vocal critic of the Shah, wrote a letter to Persia’s most prominent Shia religious leader, Hasan Shirazi – reflecting popular Muslim sentiment - in which he stated that the concessions meant:
…the complete handing over of the reigns of government to the enemies of Islam, the enslaving of the people to that enemy, the surrendering of them and of all dominion and authority into the hands of a foreign foe.[41]
The accumulating debt led to the greatest concession of all in which Anglo-Australian investor William Knox d’Arcy was granted the right to obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable for trade, carry away and sell petroleum and petroleum products in exchange for forty-thousand British pounds and sixteen percent of the annual income.[42]
The British government – seeking to convert their navy from coal to oil and to exclude their rival, the French – purchased the concession and founded the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which would come to evolve into the British Petroleum Company “BP”.[43] In the 2005 Fortune Global 500 list of companies “BP” was ranked second in world turnover.[44]
Persia, like the Ottoman Empire was able to remain an independent state throughout the 19th century, however both were subject to economic manipulation by European businessmen.[45] The economic control, granted by the hundreds of concessions ranging from railroad construction to a national lottery - often for a one time fee - gave European investors control over vast sectors of the Persian economy.[46]
As we have seen by studying Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia in terms of their interactions with European powers throughout the 19th century - economic, political and military – encroachment by the powers into the region led to the “modern” Middle East evolving into little more than a European vassal by the 20th century. The system of European hegemony had become a virtual institution throughout the world.
Clearly, the pattern of economic encroachment throughout virtually all of what we today consider the Middle East is not a coincidence. In the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, the arrival of superior and hostile military forces led both Sultan Selim III and his successor Mahmud II, as well as Mohammed Ali Pasha to modernize in an attempt to compete. This led to borrowing from foreign businessmen, however, a failure to compete due to unequal treaties and trade agreements led to failure in both cases. Both Egypt and the Ottoman Empire were forced to submit to economic intervention by European powers protecting investors. Egyptians revolted against the economic intervention, leading to an invasion and occupation, while the Ottoman Empire chose submission over occupation.
The case in Persia is relatively the same. Attempts by the Qajars to modernize and centralize power led to foreign loans and concessions which sold the rights to many of Persia’s resources. These grossly unequal terms, met with public outrage, forced the cancellation of many concessions, and resulted in hefty penalties that required further foreign borrowing to pay. Funding to repay loans was often raised by further concessions, trapping the Shah in a vicious cycle.
These policies, whereby agents of expanding European societies gained inordinate influence over the comparatively weaker Middle Eastern societies no doubt fits Robinson’s definition of imperialism. Indirect control over the political or economic life of Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and Persia by the European powers certainly took place – defining the relationship as imperialist by the Encyclopedia Britannica’s standards as well. Suffice to say, the Middle East became a region of European imperial possessions throughout the 19th century.
Following World War I and Wilson’s Fourteen Points which established the right of national self determination, borders were drawn and many “nations” of the Middle East were granted independence. The power structure that emerged throughout the 19th century did not disappear. The European powers would continue to exert “inordinate influence”[47] over the Middle Eastern nation states. As Britain and France began to fade as world powers and the United States and Soviet Union emerged as world powers, they too fought for control over who would exert their influence in the region. Thus, the label of the U.S.-Soviet competition in the Middle East as “new wine in old bottles” is quite accurate.
The evolution of this power structure of “western” dominance in the Middle East is crucial to contextualize the circumstances that exist in the region today. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower. Today the United States continues to exert an inordinate influence in the region. Open resentment to United States policy in the region has led to terrorism, wars and an increase in the risk of a nuclear weapons showdown. While there seems to be no short term solution in sight, an excellent starting point may be to examine the relationship between the U.S. and the Middle East and how the power structure began.
[1] James L. Gelvin. The Modern Middle East: a History. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005. ( 257)
[2] Gelvin, 88
[3] Bonaparte to Directory, Milan, August 16, 1797. Correspondance de Napoleon I. (Paris 1858-70), Vol. III, No. 2103. Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 244. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
[4] Paul Bailleu (ed.), Preussen und Frankreichvon 1795 bis 1807 (Leipsic, 1881-87), I, 173. Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
[5] July 24, 1798. Corresp. de Nap., Vol. IV, No. 3259. Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
[6] Carl Ludwig Lokke. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
[7] Zachary Lockman. Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) ( 71 )
[8] Jeremy Adelman, Stephen Aron, Stephen Kotkin, Suzanna Marchand, Gyan Prakash, Robert Tignor and Michael Tsin. Worlds Together Worlds Apart. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002). 224.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid. 225
[11] Ibid. 226
[12] In 1800, 50% of Egyptian trade was with the Ottomans and 14% was with Europe. By 1823 the figures had reversed. (Gelvin 78)
[13] Donald Quataert. The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922: Second Edition. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) (58)
[14] Ibid.
[15] Gelvin, 78
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid., 79
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Adelman, 226
[22] Ibid.
[23] Gelvin, 80
[24] Adelman, 227
[25] Some scholars argue that Sultan Mahmud II actually enticed the janissaries to revolt in order to crush their forces.
[26] Gelvin, 80
[27] Quataert, 55
[28] Although several sources have indicated 1839 as the beginning of the tanzimat reform period, Gelvin notes that the period of “liberal reform” actually began prior to this date. 79.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Quataert, 72
[31] Ibid, 81
[32] Gelvin, 77
[33] Ibid. 54
[34] Quataert, 72
[35] Ibid.
[36] Gelvin, 82
[37] Ibid., 83
[38] Elton L. Daniel. The History of Iran. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 2001). 185.
[39] Gelvin, 85
[40] Ibid.
[41] Alfred J. Andrea, and James H. Overfield. The Human Record: Sources of Global
History – Volume II: Since 1500 Fifth Edition. New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 2005. 325.
[42] Gelvin, 86
[43] “Our History”. British Petroleum Corporate Website.
http://www.bp.com/subsection.do?categoryId=10&contentId=2001674 (accessed
February 28, 2006)
[44] Ibid.
[45] Andrea, 323
[46] Ibid., 323-4
[47] Gelvin, 88
Bibliography
Adelman, Jeremy and Stephen Aron, Stephen Kotkin, Suzanna Marchand, Gyan Prakash,
Robert Tignor and Michael Tsin. Worlds Together Worlds Apart. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002).
Andrea, Alfred J., and James H. Overfield. The Human Record:Sources of Global
History – Volume II: Since 1500 Fifth Edition. New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 2005.
Paul Bailleu (ed.), Preussen und Frankreichvon 1795 bis 1807 (Leipsic, 1881-87), I, 173.
Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
Bonaparte to Directory, Milan, August 16, 1797. Correspondance de Napoleon I. (Paris
1858-70), Vol. III, No. 2103. Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 244. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
Daniel, Elton L. The History of Iran. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 2001).
Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: a History. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005.
July 24, 1798. Corresp. de Nap., Vol. IV, No. 3259. Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig.
“French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
Lockman, Zachary. Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of
Orientalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and
Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
“Our History”. British Petroleum Corporate Website.
http://www.bp.com/subsection.do?categoryId=10&contentId=2001674 (accessed
February 28, 2006)
Quataert, Donald. The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922: Second Edition. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
The cold war, between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, fueled a fierce competition for spheres of influence and domination throughout the world, including the Middle East. The strategic location and valuable resources made the Middle East a desirable imperial possession. Describing the US – Soviet competition in the Middle East, a cold war historian labeled the rivalry “old wine in new bottles”.[1] Indeed, foreign intrusion in Middle Eastern affairs began far before the Bolshevik revolution established a socialist republic in Russia, and only decades after the United States declared independence from British rule.
The arrival of the 19th century found the British and French empires expanding their imperial influence and colonial possessions throughout the world. The vast imperial possessions became the lifeblood that fueled the growing empires. The Middle East, a region of substantial wealth and resources at the turn of the 19th century became a prime target. The British and French practiced a foreign policy throughout the Middle East that not only disrupted the economies of the said countries, but created a system whereby the European powers extracted raw materials and opened markets throughout the region. The system was protected through political diplomacy which took place under the shadow of British and French military forces.
Through economic, political and military intrusion in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and Persia; the British and French were able to create semi-sovereign imperial possessions throughout much of, what is today considered, the modern Middle East. One may be inclined to argue that the status of these Middle Eastern entities failed to constitute them as imperial possessions. However, if we accept the definition by imperialist scholar Ronald Robinson - that imperialism is the system “whereby agents of an expanding society gain inordinate influence or control over the vitals of weaker societies”[2]; or the Encyclopedia Britannica definition:
The policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of a nation especially by direct territorial acquisitions or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas; broadly: the extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence.
it must be agreed that the aforementioned regions of the Middle East did in fact constitute British and French imperial possessions.
Examination of European intervention in the Middle East will highlight the imperialist agendas of Britain and France in the Middle East and how the nations were able to profit at the expense of the region in question. The events of the 19th century in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and Persia, will lay the framework for understanding the relationship between the western powers and the Middle East. Highlighting the similarities between all of the case studies will provide insight into how a system of western domination evolved in the Middle East. Understanding the evolution of this power structure will serve, not only to contextualize relations between the Middle East and the western powers; but also to help understand the extreme resentment of the west that exists in the Middle East today.
To begin the study, I will discuss the evolution of Egypt into a western dominated society throughout the 19th century. Following decisive victories in Italy and occupation of the Ionian Islands, the young general Napoleon Bonaparte urged the seizure of Egypt as France’s share of the crumbling Ottoman Empire.[3] The French diplomat, Charles de Talleyrand convinced the directory that an expedition to Egypt would serve a double purpose, providing the French with a valuable colony in Egypt, and serving a strategic position to challenge the British position in the “crown jewel” of India.[4] In 1798, the French landed a fleet in Alexandria Egypt under the command of General Bonaparte. Following the victory at the Battle of the Pyramids, Napoleon declared that “No colony has ever offered greater advantages.”[5]
Napoleon’s ground victories meant little as Admiral Nelson destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir in August 1798; which, followed by a naval blockade forced the landed French forces to capitulate in 1801.[6] Although the French colonization of Egypt was never realized, Zachary Lockman (author of Contending Visions of the Middle East: the History and Politics of Orientalism) notes:
The French invasion of Egypt inaugurated a new era in which the lands of the Middle East and North Africa would be increasingly subject to European economic and political encroachment, and finally European colonial rule.[7]
The Malmuk ruler’s army had been decimated and a young Ottoman officer Mehmet (Mohammad) Ali Pasha began to consolidate power, aligning himself with influential Egyptian merchants.[8] He was appointed Ottoman viceroy of Egypt in 1805. Ali began an intense process of modernization, looking to revolutionary France as a model. Realizing the necessity of a strong military, Ali brought in French military advisors such as Colonel Seve, who had served under Napoleon, and began to conscript peasants.[9] The military under Ali became the utmost power of the Middle East at roughly one hundred thousand strong.[10]
In 1821 the Greeks began a push for independence from Ottoman rule. The sultan offered Ali control of Greater Syria if he could put down the revolt. Egypt’s newly modernized military was able to suppress the revolt, however fearing the rise of a powerful military in Egypt that could serve to upset the balance of power, led to British, French and Russian intervention to rout Egyptian forces at the battle of Navarino.[11] Nevertheless, Ali felt that his side of the bargain had been upheld and through his son Ibrahim, occupied Syria and began to integrate the region into the Egyptian economy.
The possession of Greater Syria combined with influence in Sudan and parts of Arabia provided raw materials that were vital to Ali’s modernization efforts. He focused the economy around cash-crops, and borrowed money to build modern railroad and port systems, to get goods to Europe faster. The money they borrowed not only had to be paid back, but was used to foster closer economic ties to Europe, both aspects positive from a European perspective. Egyptian trade with the Ottoman Empire declined as trade relations with Europe rose dramatically.[12]
As Ali continued to modernize, his power and influence in the region grew. Throughout the 1830s the Ottomans battled with Ali’s forces for control of Greater Syria. By 1839 the Egyptian forces under Ali’s son Ibrahim, were poised to attack Constantinople and the Ottomans were forced to turn to the great powers for help. Fearing the effects of an Ottoman collapse and the rise of a new power in Egypt, Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia intervened and restored the lost territories to the Ottoman Empire.[13] Describing the European intervention against Ali’s military forces, Middle Eastern historian Donald Quataert notes that “Although he may have had the power to do so, Muhammad Ali did not become master of the Middle East, in significant measure because the European states would not allow it.[14]
Despite the territorial losses and the forced reduction of his army, Ali was granted hereditary rule in Egypt. He developed the economy around cotton, a staple crop that would remain as the cornerstone of the Egyptian economy for most of the 19th century.[15] In May of 1861 American President Abraham Lincoln, in the midst of civil war, proclaimed the Union blockade closing virtually all southern ports. The American south was an international cotton provider and the blockade provided a vast cotton boom. Egyptian leaders, perhaps anticipating an extended price surge, began to borrow heavily from European investors to foster internal improvements such as the Suez Canal (completed in 1869).[16] When the blockade ended, southern cotton once again entered the international market and decimated the Egyptian economy. The international depression of 1873 provided a further blow and Egypt was forced to declare bankruptcy in 1876.[17]
The imperial powers relied on a mutual alliance between merchants and the state. In order to protect European investors, a commission was established to supervise the Egyptian budget and ensure repayment of debt. Resentment of foreign intervention into the economy led to the Urabi Revolt in 1881-82 and providing a pretext for British invasion and occupation.[18]
Gelvin notes the irony that “defensive developmentalism” led to borrowing, which led to bankruptcy and economic stagnation, fueling a revolt which would allow for direct economic (and political-military) intervention.[19] The occupation allowed Britain to encourage cotton cultivation to feed British textile mills, while discouraging investment in Egyptian industries that could possibly offer competition.[20] Under the banner of free trade, European merchants were given unobstructed access to Egyptian markets.[21] This trend of European encroachment into foreign markets was mimicked throughout much of the 19th century world. As was the case in Egypt, the Ottoman economy would fall victim to economic intrusion as well.
The Ottoman Empire, a dynastic state encompassing much of modern day Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Israel and Iraq (as well as Egypt prior to the rise of Pasha); became aware of the threat that the European powers posed, following Napoleon’s rout of the Malmuk forces at the Battle of the Pyramids.[22] In response, Sultan Selim III in 1805, attempted to create a military corps - nizam-i jedid (new order) - trained and drilled in the western style.[23] Before Selim was able to bring his army to full strength he was deposed by the janissary forces in 1807. The janissaries had become a dominant force throughout the 18th century, boasting substantial power as well as autonomy they were often able to depose sultans at will.
Understanding the janissaries to be a great obstacle in the path of centralization - due to the autonomy, revenue and power that the forces demanded, Selim III’s successor Mahmud II continued to build the new order corps, while rallying support from conservative opponents, clerics and the ulama.[24] Upon completing his new army corps, the janissaries revolted in 1826[25] and were routed by the newly modernized army. The remaining janissaries were hunted down throughout the provinces in what came to be called the “Auspicious Incident”.[26] While Mahmud continued to strengthen his domestic position, foreign powers and internal revolts began to dismantle the empire.
Egypt had effectively broken free of Ottoman control and Ali’s forces occupied vast portions of the empire throughout the 1830s. The Balkan states also began to call for independence. For example, in 1804 the Serbs rebelled and by 1817, a Serbian prince had established hereditary rule, and while still technically a vassal of the empire (as is the case with Egypt) the Serbian state was in effect independent.[27]
Russia continued territorial expansion as well, such as seizing Bessarabia in 1812. The international community, fearful of total Ottoman collapse often intervened to undue huge territorial losses, but allowed continuous succession of small territories. This pattern would continue into the 1870s with the Ottoman-Russian war, which ended with the Treaty of Berlin, granting independence to many lands formerly under Ottoman control.
Despite the slow dissolution of the once powerful empire, the Sultans were able to set the Ottoman state on a path of modernization. The 19th century Ottoman reforms can be broken into two periods: The tanzimat period, beginning in 1839[28], which sought to modernize along the lines of British Liberalism; and the period of “autocratic reform” beginning in 1878, with the suspension of the short lived Ottoman constitution, which sought to modernize along the lines of German and Italian unification movements.[29]
The Ottoman leaders attempted to restructure the bureaucracy, establish more representative government, reform education, and develop infrastructure. To do so, the state took hold of the economy, attempting to remove the empire from the world economy and the crippling free trade agreements. The state run companies were unable to compete with the superior foreign industry. Lacking skilled workers and investment capital; the Ottomans, aware of the risks[30], turned to foreign investors, offering concessions to those who were willing to invest in the development of infrastructure.[31]
When Mohammed Ali Pasha sent his forces to occupy large portions of the empire, threatening Ottoman control, the empire lacked the resources to put down his forces. The Sultan was forced to ask for European intervention. The European assistance came at a great cost to the Ottomans, who were forced to make a series of concessions, most notably the Treaty of Balta Liman, which set low tariffs and forbade the formation of Turkish monopolies.[32]
The treaty ensured that both the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, which was restored as a vassal state, would: modernize and become more integrated into the world economy; not be able to compete with foreign companies – which protected European market interests in the area; and set an incredibly low import tariff so that a practically open market became institutionalized.
This point is well articulated by Middle East historian Zachary Lockman, who notes:
The workings of the world market, policy decisions by hegemonic European states led to partial deindustrialization in other parts of the world as machine-made European goods undermined or destroyed local production.[33]
Thus, the nations of the rest of the world emerged as the victims of European capitalism – acting as a provider of raw materials and a market for finished goods. So long as these nations could not compete economically, they could not compete militarily and had little choice but to participate in the system. The Ottoman Empire, like Egypt, was faced with heavy borrowing and unfair trade agreements. In a similar pattern the Ottomans, faced with a stagnant economy, were hit hard by the 1873 global depression resulting in eventual bankruptcy.
In 1881 the Ottoman Public Debt Administration emerged, a group of foreign creditors to oversee the Ottoman economy in order to assure the repayment of debts.[34] Historian Donald Quataert notes that the debt administration became “a vast, essentially independent bureaucracy within the Ottoman Bureaucracy, run by creditors.”[35] The debt administration both highlighted and accentuated increasing European control of the Ottoman economy.
The third and final area of the Middle East which I will discuss is Persia (modern day Iran), under the Qajar dynasty. The Qajar’s had established a relatively weak and unstable empire upon the ruins of the Safavid Empire.[36] The dynasty exercised little control outside the capital – surviving by auctioning off tax collection to the highest bidder. The government was unable to create an economy to compete with Europe, rather, revenues were generated by selling the rights to cultivate, produce, and market resources found within Persia.[37] In 1890 a British investor, Major Gerald Talbot, negotiated a concession with minister Ali Asghar Khan Amin-al-Soltan in order to fill Naser-as-Din Shah’s incessant need for money.[38] The concession granted the rights to produce, sell and export Persia’s tobacco for fifty years, all for a mere fifteen thousand pounds and twenty five percent annual profits; which Talbot sold to the British Imperial Tobacco Company, creating a foreign monopoly over a staple cash crop.[39]
The deal was so lopsided that the Shah was forced to cancel the concession resulting in a penalty of three hundred-forty six-thousand British pounds – requiring a subsequent loan of five hundred-thousand to pay off.[40] The borrowing increased the foreign deficit and led to further concessions.
The foreign encroachment enraged the Persian populace. In opposition to the tobacco concession; Sayyid Jamal ad-Din, an Islamic intellectual and vocal critic of the Shah, wrote a letter to Persia’s most prominent Shia religious leader, Hasan Shirazi – reflecting popular Muslim sentiment - in which he stated that the concessions meant:
…the complete handing over of the reigns of government to the enemies of Islam, the enslaving of the people to that enemy, the surrendering of them and of all dominion and authority into the hands of a foreign foe.[41]
The accumulating debt led to the greatest concession of all in which Anglo-Australian investor William Knox d’Arcy was granted the right to obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable for trade, carry away and sell petroleum and petroleum products in exchange for forty-thousand British pounds and sixteen percent of the annual income.[42]
The British government – seeking to convert their navy from coal to oil and to exclude their rival, the French – purchased the concession and founded the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which would come to evolve into the British Petroleum Company “BP”.[43] In the 2005 Fortune Global 500 list of companies “BP” was ranked second in world turnover.[44]
Persia, like the Ottoman Empire was able to remain an independent state throughout the 19th century, however both were subject to economic manipulation by European businessmen.[45] The economic control, granted by the hundreds of concessions ranging from railroad construction to a national lottery - often for a one time fee - gave European investors control over vast sectors of the Persian economy.[46]
As we have seen by studying Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia in terms of their interactions with European powers throughout the 19th century - economic, political and military – encroachment by the powers into the region led to the “modern” Middle East evolving into little more than a European vassal by the 20th century. The system of European hegemony had become a virtual institution throughout the world.
Clearly, the pattern of economic encroachment throughout virtually all of what we today consider the Middle East is not a coincidence. In the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, the arrival of superior and hostile military forces led both Sultan Selim III and his successor Mahmud II, as well as Mohammed Ali Pasha to modernize in an attempt to compete. This led to borrowing from foreign businessmen, however, a failure to compete due to unequal treaties and trade agreements led to failure in both cases. Both Egypt and the Ottoman Empire were forced to submit to economic intervention by European powers protecting investors. Egyptians revolted against the economic intervention, leading to an invasion and occupation, while the Ottoman Empire chose submission over occupation.
The case in Persia is relatively the same. Attempts by the Qajars to modernize and centralize power led to foreign loans and concessions which sold the rights to many of Persia’s resources. These grossly unequal terms, met with public outrage, forced the cancellation of many concessions, and resulted in hefty penalties that required further foreign borrowing to pay. Funding to repay loans was often raised by further concessions, trapping the Shah in a vicious cycle.
These policies, whereby agents of expanding European societies gained inordinate influence over the comparatively weaker Middle Eastern societies no doubt fits Robinson’s definition of imperialism. Indirect control over the political or economic life of Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and Persia by the European powers certainly took place – defining the relationship as imperialist by the Encyclopedia Britannica’s standards as well. Suffice to say, the Middle East became a region of European imperial possessions throughout the 19th century.
Following World War I and Wilson’s Fourteen Points which established the right of national self determination, borders were drawn and many “nations” of the Middle East were granted independence. The power structure that emerged throughout the 19th century did not disappear. The European powers would continue to exert “inordinate influence”[47] over the Middle Eastern nation states. As Britain and France began to fade as world powers and the United States and Soviet Union emerged as world powers, they too fought for control over who would exert their influence in the region. Thus, the label of the U.S.-Soviet competition in the Middle East as “new wine in old bottles” is quite accurate.
The evolution of this power structure of “western” dominance in the Middle East is crucial to contextualize the circumstances that exist in the region today. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower. Today the United States continues to exert an inordinate influence in the region. Open resentment to United States policy in the region has led to terrorism, wars and an increase in the risk of a nuclear weapons showdown. While there seems to be no short term solution in sight, an excellent starting point may be to examine the relationship between the U.S. and the Middle East and how the power structure began.
[1] James L. Gelvin. The Modern Middle East: a History. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005. ( 257)
[2] Gelvin, 88
[3] Bonaparte to Directory, Milan, August 16, 1797. Correspondance de Napoleon I. (Paris 1858-70), Vol. III, No. 2103. Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 244. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
[4] Paul Bailleu (ed.), Preussen und Frankreichvon 1795 bis 1807 (Leipsic, 1881-87), I, 173. Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
[5] July 24, 1798. Corresp. de Nap., Vol. IV, No. 3259. Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
[6] Carl Ludwig Lokke. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
[7] Zachary Lockman. Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) ( 71 )
[8] Jeremy Adelman, Stephen Aron, Stephen Kotkin, Suzanna Marchand, Gyan Prakash, Robert Tignor and Michael Tsin. Worlds Together Worlds Apart. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002). 224.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid. 225
[11] Ibid. 226
[12] In 1800, 50% of Egyptian trade was with the Ottomans and 14% was with Europe. By 1823 the figures had reversed. (Gelvin 78)
[13] Donald Quataert. The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922: Second Edition. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) (58)
[14] Ibid.
[15] Gelvin, 78
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid., 79
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Adelman, 226
[22] Ibid.
[23] Gelvin, 80
[24] Adelman, 227
[25] Some scholars argue that Sultan Mahmud II actually enticed the janissaries to revolt in order to crush their forces.
[26] Gelvin, 80
[27] Quataert, 55
[28] Although several sources have indicated 1839 as the beginning of the tanzimat reform period, Gelvin notes that the period of “liberal reform” actually began prior to this date. 79.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Quataert, 72
[31] Ibid, 81
[32] Gelvin, 77
[33] Ibid. 54
[34] Quataert, 72
[35] Ibid.
[36] Gelvin, 82
[37] Ibid., 83
[38] Elton L. Daniel. The History of Iran. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 2001). 185.
[39] Gelvin, 85
[40] Ibid.
[41] Alfred J. Andrea, and James H. Overfield. The Human Record: Sources of Global
History – Volume II: Since 1500 Fifth Edition. New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 2005. 325.
[42] Gelvin, 86
[43] “Our History”. British Petroleum Corporate Website.
http://www.bp.com/subsection.do?categoryId=10&contentId=2001674 (accessed
February 28, 2006)
[44] Ibid.
[45] Andrea, 323
[46] Ibid., 323-4
[47] Gelvin, 88
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Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig. “French Dreams of Colonial Empire Under the Directory and Consulate, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Jun., 1930), pp. 246. Accessed online at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193006%292%3A2%3C237%3AFDOCEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N. (Accessed 27 March, 2006).
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July 24, 1798. Corresp. de Nap., Vol. IV, No. 3259. Quoted in: Lokke, Carl Ludwig.
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February 28, 2006)
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